Cryptography
Release 10.1

The Sage Development Team

Aug 21, 2023
<p>| 1  | Cryptosystems                          | 1   |
| 2  | Ciphers                               | 5   |
| 3  | Classical Cryptosystems               | 7   |
| 4  | Classical Ciphers                    | 43  |
| 5  | Simplified DES                        | 45  |
| 6  | Mini-AES                              | 55  |
| 7  | DES                                   | 75  |
| 8  | PRESENT                               | 83  |
| 9  | Blum-Goldwasser Probabilistic Encryption | 93  |
| 10 | Stream Cryptosystems                  | 101 |
| 11 | Stream Ciphers                        | 105 |
| 12 | Linear feedback shift register (LFSR) sequence commands | 109 |
| 13 | Utility Functions for Cryptography    | 113 |
| 14 | Boolean functions                    | 119 |
| 15 | S-Boxes and Their Algebraic Representations | 131 |
| 16 | S-Boxes used in cryptographic schemes | 149 |
| 17 | Abstract base class for generators of polynomial systems | 157 |
| 18 | Small Scale Variants of the AES (SR) Polynomial System Generator | 161 |
| 19 | Rijndael-GF                           | 191 |
| 20 | Hard Lattice Generator                | 211 |
| 21 | (Ring-)LWE oracle generators          | 215 |
| 22 | Indices and Tables                   | 225 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Python Module Index</th>
<th>227</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE

CRYPTOSYSTEMS

This module contains base classes for various cryptosystems, including symmetric key and public-key cryptosystems. The classes defined in this module should not be called directly. It is the responsibility of child classes to implement specific cryptosystems. Take for example the Hill or matrix cryptosystem as implemented in `HillCryptosystem`. It is a symmetric key cipher so `HillCryptosystem` is a child class of `SymmetricKeyCryptosystem`, which in turn is a child class of `Cryptosystem`. The following diagram shows the inheritance relationship of particular cryptosystems:

```
Cryptosystem
  + SymmetricKeyCryptosystem
  |   + HillCryptosystem
  |   + LFSRCryptosystem
  |   + ShiftCryptosystem
  |   + ShrinkingGeneratorCryptosystem
  |   + SubstitutionCryptosystem
  |   + TranspositionCryptosystem
  |   + VigenereCryptosystem
  + PublicKeyCryptosystem
```

```python
class sage.crypto.cryptosystem.Cryptosystem(plaintext_space, ciphertext_space, key_space, block_length=1, period=None)

Bases: Parent, Set_generic

A base cryptosystem class. This is meant to be extended by other specialized child classes that implement specific cryptosystems. A cryptosystem is a pair of maps

\[ E : \mathcal{K} \to \text{Hom}(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C}) \]

\[ D : \mathcal{K} \to \text{Hom}(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{M}) \]

where \( \mathcal{K} \) is the key space, \( \mathcal{M} \) is the plaintext or message space, and \( \mathcal{C} \) is the ciphertext space. In many instances \( \mathcal{M} = \mathcal{C} \) and the images will lie in \( \text{Aut}(\mathcal{M}) \). An element of the image of \( E \) is called a cipher.

We may assume that \( E \) and \( D \) are injective, hence identify a key \( K \) in \( \mathcal{K} \) with its image \( E_K := E(K) \) in \( \text{Hom}(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C}) \).

The cryptosystem has the property that for every encryption key \( K_1 \) there is a decryption key \( K_2 \) such that \( D_{K_2} \circ E_{K_1} \). A cryptosystem with the property that \( K := K_2 = K_1 \) is called a symmetric cryptosystem. Otherwise, if the key \( K_2 \neq K_1 \) nor is \( K_2 \) easily derived from \( K_1 \), we call the cryptosystem asymmetric or public key. In that case, \( K_1 \) is called the public key and \( K_2 \) is called the private key.

INPUT:

- `plaintext_space` – the plaintext alphabet.
- `ciphertext_space` – the ciphertext alphabet.
• key_space – the key alphabet.
• block_length – (default: 1) the block length.
• period – (default: None) the period.

EXAMPLES:
Various classical cryptosystems:

```
sage: ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
Shift cryptosystem on Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z
sage: SubstitutionCryptosystem(HexadecimalStrings())
Substitution cryptosystem on Free hexadecimal string monoid
sage: HillCryptosystem(BinaryStrings(), 3)
Hill cryptosystem on Free binary string monoid of block length 3
sage: TranspositionCryptosystem(OctalStrings(), 5)
Transposition cryptosystem on Free octal string monoid of block length 5
sage: VigenereCryptosystem(Radix64Strings(), 7)
Vigenere cryptosystem on Free radix 64 string monoid of period 7
```

`block_length()`

Return the block length of this cryptosystem. For some cryptosystems this is not relevant, in which case the block length defaults to 1.

EXAMPLES:

The block lengths of various classical cryptosystems:

```
sage: ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings()).block_length()
1
sage: SubstitutionCryptosystem(HexadecimalStrings()).block_length()
1
sage: HillCryptosystem(BinaryStrings(), 3).block_length()
3
sage: TranspositionCryptosystem(OctalStrings(), 5).block_length()
5
sage: VigenereCryptosystem(Radix64Strings(), 7).block_length()
1
```

cipher_codomain()

Return the alphabet used by this cryptosystem for encoding ciphertexts. This is the same as the ciphertext space.

EXAMPLES:

The cipher codomains, or ciphertext spaces, of various classical cryptosystems:

```
sage: ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings()).cipher_codomain()
Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z
sage: SubstitutionCryptosystem(HexadecimalStrings()).cipher_codomain()
Free hexadecimal string monoid
sage: HillCryptosystem(BinaryStrings(), 3).cipher_codomain()
Free binary string monoid
sage: TranspositionCryptosystem(OctalStrings(), 5).cipher_codomain()
Free octal string monoid
sage: VigenereCryptosystem(Radix64Strings(), 7).cipher_codomain()
Free radix 64 string monoid
```
cipher_domain()
Return the alphabet used by this cryptosystem for encoding plaintexts. This is the same as the plaintext space.
EXAMPLES:
The cipher domains, or plaintext spaces, of various classical cryptosystems:

```
sage: ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings()).cipher_domain()
Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z
sage: SubstitutionCryptosystem(HexadecimalStrings()).cipher_domain()
Free hexadecimal string monoid
sage: HillCryptosystem(BinaryStrings(), 3).cipher_domain()
Free binary string monoid
sage: TranspositionCryptosystem(OctalStrings(), 5).cipher_domain()
Free octal string monoid
sage: VigenereCryptosystem(Radix64Strings(), 7).cipher_domain()
Free radix 64 string monoid
```

ciphertext_space()
Return the ciphertext alphabet of this cryptosystem.
EXAMPLES:
The ciphertext spaces of various classical cryptosystems:

```
sage: ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings()).ciphertext_space()
Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z
sage: SubstitutionCryptosystem(HexadecimalStrings()).ciphertext_space()
Free hexadecimal string monoid
sage: HillCryptosystem(BinaryStrings(), 3).ciphertext_space()
Free binary string monoid
sage: TranspositionCryptosystem(OctalStrings(), 5).ciphertext_space()
Free octal string monoid
sage: VigenereCryptosystem(Radix64Strings(), 7).ciphertext_space()
Free radix 64 string monoid
```

key_space()
Return the alphabet used by this cryptosystem for encoding keys.
EXAMPLES:
The key spaces of various classical cryptosystems:

```
sage: ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings()).key_space()
Ring of integers modulo 26
sage: SubstitutionCryptosystem(HexadecimalStrings()).key_space()
Free hexadecimal string monoid
sage: HillCryptosystem(BinaryStrings(), 3).key_space()
Full MatrixSpace of 3 by 3 dense matrices over Ring of integers modulo 2
sage: TranspositionCryptosystem(OctalStrings(), 5).key_space()
Symmetric group of order 5! as a permutation group
sage: VigenereCryptosystem(Radix64Strings(), 7).key_space()
Free radix 64 string monoid
```

period()
plaintext_space()  
Return the plaintext alphabet of this cryptosystem.

EXAMPLES:

The plaintext spaces of various classical cryptosystems:

```python
sage: ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings()).plaintext_space()  
Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z
sage: SubstitutionCryptosystem(HexadecimalStrings()).plaintext_space()  
Free hexadecimal string monoid
sage: HillCryptosystem(BinaryStrings(), 3).plaintext_space()  
Free binary string monoid
sage: TranspositionCryptosystem(OctalStrings(), 5).plaintext_space()  
Free octal string monoid
sage: VigenereCryptosystem(Radix64Strings(), 7).plaintext_space()  
Free radix 64 string monoid
```

class sage.crypto.cryptosystem.PublicKeyCryptosystem(plaintext_space, ciphertext_space, key_space, block_length=1, period=None)

Bases: Cryptosystem

The base class for asymmetric or public-key cryptosystems.

class sage.crypto.cryptosystem.SymmetricKeyCryptosystem(plaintext_space, ciphertext_space, key_space, block_length=1, period=None)

Bases: Cryptosystem

The base class for symmetric key, or secret key, cryptosystems.

alphabet_size()  
Return the number of elements in the alphabet of this cryptosystem. This only applies to any cryptosystem whose plaintext and ciphertext spaces are the same alphabet.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings()).alphabet_size()  
26
sage: ShiftCryptosystem(BinaryStrings()).alphabet_size()  
2
sage: ShiftCryptosystem(HexadecimalStrings()).alphabet_size()  
16
sage: SubstitutionCryptosystem(OctalStrings()).alphabet_size()  
8
sage: SubstitutionCryptosystem(Radix64Strings()).alphabet_size()  
64
```
CHAPTER TWO

CIPHERS

class sage.crypto.cipher.Cipher(parent, key)
    Bases: Element
    Cipher class
codomain()

    domain()

    key()

class sage.crypto.cipher.PublicKeyCipher(parent, key, public=True)
    Bases: Cipher
    Public key cipher class

class sage.crypto.cipher.SymmetricKeyCipher(parent, key)
    Bases: Cipher
    Symmetric key cipher class
A convenient user interface to various classical ciphers. These include:

- affine cipher; see `AffineCryptosystem`
- Hill or matrix cipher; see `HillCryptosystem`
- shift cipher; see `ShiftCryptosystem`
- substitution cipher; see `SubstitutionCryptosystem`
- transposition cipher; see `TranspositionCryptosystem`
- Vigenere cipher; see `VigenereCryptosystem`

These classical cryptosystems support alphabets such as:

- the capital letters of the English alphabet; see `AlphabeticStrings()`
- the hexadecimal number system; see `HexadecimalStrings()`
- the binary number system; see `BinaryStrings()`
- the octal number system; see `OctalStrings()`
- the radix-64 number system; see `Radix64Strings()`

**AUTHORS:**

- David Kohel (2007): initial version with the Hill, substitution, transposition, and Vigenere cryptosystems.
- Minh Van Nguyen (2009-08): shift cipher, affine cipher

**class** `sage.crypto.classical.AffineCryptosystem(A)`

Bases: `SymmetricKeyCryptosystem`

Create an affine cryptosystem.

Let $A = \{a_0, a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{n-1}\}$ be a non-empty alphabet consisting of $n$ unique elements. Define a mapping $f: A \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ from the alphabet $A$ to the set $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ of integers modulo $n$, given by $f(a_i) = i$. Thus we can identify each element of the alphabet $A$ with a unique integer $0 \leq i < n$. A key of the affine cipher is an ordered pair of integers $(a, b) \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ such that $\gcd(a, n) = 1$. Therefore the key space is $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$.

Since we assume that $A$ does not have repeated elements, the mapping $f: A \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ is bijective. Encryption and decryption functions are both affine functions. Let $(a, b)$ be a secret key, i.e. an element of the key space, and let $p$ be a plaintext character and consequently $p \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$. Then the ciphertext character $c$ corresponding to $p$ is given by

$$c \equiv ap + b \pmod{n}$$
Similarly, given a ciphertext character $c \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ and a secret key $(a, b)$, we can recover the corresponding plaintext character as follows:

$$p \equiv a^{-1}(c - b) \pmod n$$

where $a^{-1}$ is the inverse of $a$ modulo $n$. Use the bijection $f : A \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ to convert $c$ and $p$ back to elements of the alphabet $A$. Currently, only the following alphabet is supported for the affine cipher:

- capital letters of the English alphabet as implemented in `AlphabeticStrings()`

**EXAMPLES:**

Encryption and decryption over the capital letters of the English alphabet:

```python
sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings()); A
Affine cryptosystem on Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z
sage: P = A.encoding("The affine cryptosystem generalizes the shift cipher.")
sage: P
THEAFFINECRYPTOSYSTEMGENERALIZESTHESHIFTCIPHER
sage: a, b = (9, 13)
sage: C = A.enciphering(a, b, P); C
CYXNGGHAXFKVSCJTVCTXRPAAXKNIHEXTCYXTHGCFHSYXK
sage: A.deciphering(a, b, C)
THEAFFINECRYPTOSYSTEMGENERALIZESTHESHIFTCIPHER
sage: A.deciphering(a, b, C) == P
True
```

We can also use functional notation to work through the previous example:

```python
sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings()); A
Affine cryptosystem on Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z
sage: P = A.encoding("The affine cryptosystem generalizes the shift cipher.")
sage: P
THEAFFINECRYPTOSYSTEMGENERALIZESTHESHIFTCIPHER
sage: a, b = (9, 13)
sage: E = A(a, b); E
Affine cipher on Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z
sage: C = E(P); C
CYXNGGHAXFKVSCJTVCTXRPAAXKNIHEXTCYXTHGCFHSYXK
sage: aInv, bInv = A.inverse_key(a, b)
sage: D = A(aInv, bInv); D
Affine cipher on Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z
sage: D(C)
THEAFFINECRYPTOSYSTEMGENERALIZESTHESHIFTCIPHER
sage: D(C) == P
True
sage: D(C) == P == D(E(P))
True
```

Encrypting the ciphertext with the inverse key also produces the plaintext:

```python
sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: P = A.encoding("Encrypt with inverse key.")
sage: a, b = (11, 8)
sage: C = A.enciphering(a, b, P)
sage: P; C
```

(continues on next page)
ENCRYPTWITHINVERSEKEY
AVENMRJQSJHSVFANYAAM
sage: aInv, bInv = A.inverse_key(a, b)
sage: A.enciphering(aInv, bInv, C)
ENCRYPTWITHINVERSEKEY
sage: A.enciphering(aInv, bInv, C) == P
True

For a secret key \((a, b) \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}\), if \(a = 1\) then any affine cryptosystem with key \((1, b)\) for any \(b \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}\) is a shift cryptosystem. Here is how we can create a Caesar cipher using an affine cipher:

sage: caesar = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: a, b = (1, 3)
sage: P = caesar.encoding("abcdef"); P
ABCDEF
sage: C = caesar.enciphering(a, b, P); C
DEFGHI
sage: caesar.deciphering(a, b, C) == P
True

Any affine cipher with keys of the form \((a, 0) \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}\) is called a decimation cipher on the Roman alphabet, or decimation cipher for short:

sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: P = A.encoding("A decimation cipher is a specialized affine cipher.")
sage: a, b = (17, 0)
sage: C = A.enciphering(a, b, P)
sage: P; C
ADECIMATIONCIPHERISASPECIALIZEDAFFINECIPHER  
AZQIGWALGENIGVPQDGUAUVQIGAFGJQZAHHGNQIGVPQD
sage: A.deciphering(a, b, C) == P
True

Generate a random key for encryption and decryption:

sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: P = A.encoding("An affine cipher with a random key.")
sage: a, b = A.random_key()
sage: C = A.enciphering(a, b, P)
sage: A.deciphering(a, b, C) == P
True

REFERENCES:
• [Sti2006]  
\texttt{brute\_force}(C, \texttt{ranking}='none')  
Attempt a brute force cryptanalysis of the ciphertext \(C\).

INPUT:
• \(C\) – A ciphertext over one of the supported alphabets of this affine cryptosystem. See the class \texttt{AffineCryptosystem} for documentation on the supported alphabets.
• \texttt{ranking} – (default "none") the method to use for ranking all possible keys. If \texttt{ranking}="none", then do not use any ranking function. The following ranking functions are supported:
"chi_square" – the chi-square ranking function as implemented in the method `rank_by_chi_square()`.

"squared_differences" – the squared differences ranking function as implemented in the method `rank_by_squared_differences()`.

OUTPUT:

- All the possible plaintext sequences corresponding to the ciphertext C. This method effectively uses all the possible keys in this affine cryptosystem to decrypt C. The method is also referred to as exhaustive key search. The output is a dictionary of key, candidate decipherment pairs.

EXAMPLES:

Cryptanalyze using all possible keys with the option ranking="none":

```
sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: a, b = (3, 7)
sage: P = A.encoding("Linear"); P
LINEAR
sage: C = A.enciphering(a, b, P)
sage: L = A.brute_force(C)
sage: sorted(L.items())[:26] # display 26 candidate decipherments
```

Use the chi-square ranking function, i.e. ranking="chisquare":

```
sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: a, b = (3, 7)
sage: P = A.encoding("Linear functions for encrypting and decrypting."); P
(continues on next page)```
LINEARFUNCTIONSFORENCRYPTINGANDDECRYPTING

sage: C = A.enciphering(a, b, P)
sage: Rank = A.brute_force(C, ranking="chisquare")
sage: Rank[:10]  # display only the top 10 candidate keys

[((3, 7), LINEARFUNCTIONSFORENCRYPTINGANDDECRYPTING),
((23, 25), VYTCGPBMENSTOBSPCTEPIRNYTAGTDDCEPIRNYTA),
((11, 12), CTIHVUKDIBATLXHIBUPOATINVIEEHBUPAOATIN),
((11, 15), HSRYELDARVSLRQDWLYROLUBVSRIERTTYOLUBSRI),
((25, 1), NWHIUVMOPHEWSEFIJOABHPWHCUHLLIOABPWH),
((25, 7), TCOABLNSUVCKNLKBONUBGHCN1ANRRBOUGHCVN1),
((15, 4), SHIVBOWZILEHDJWDDBILOFYEHIRVIGHGBLOFYEIR),
((15, 23), PEFYSLTWIIFBEAFGTALYFICVBEFOSFDDYILCVBEO),
((7, 10), IDUFHSXUTDNLYSUTSVGUDHRUNMFSTVSGEDUR),
((19, 22), QVETRAGBEFUVLENALGTFDSUEHREMMTFGDSUVEH)]

Use the squared differences ranking function, i.e. ranking="squared_differences":

sage: Rank = A.brute_force(C, ranking="squared_differences")
sage: Rank[:10]  # display only the top 10 candidate keys

[((3, 7), LINEARFUNCTIONSFORENCRYPTINGANDDECRYPTING),
((23, 6), GJENRAMXEPYJDEZMDANEPCYTJELREOONPATCYJEL),
((23, 25), VYTCGPBMENSTOBSPCTEPIRNYTAGTDDCEPIRNYTA),
((19, 22), QVETRAGBEFUVLENALGTFDSUEHREMMTFGDSUVEH),
((19, 9), DFGETNORSHIYRANTGTSTQFHRURWZGQSTQFHIRU),
((23, 18), KNIRVQ8BITCNHIDQHERITEXGCNPVISISRSRTXGCNIP),
((17, 16), GBORHEDOJMFOVIFEROJETMWHOZBOAARJETWMOZ),
((21, 14), AHEZROFEOVQHTEBOTM2E5HNIQHDREKKZVMNQHED),
((11, 12), CTIHVUKDIBATLXHIBUPOATINVIEEHBUPAOATIN),
((7, 18), SNEPRCIHEDONXEIXCPEDFCQONEBREWNPDCFQONEB)]

deciphering(a, b, C)
Decrypt the ciphertext C with the key (a, b) using affine cipher decryption.

INPUT:

• a, b – a secret key belonging to the key space of this affine cipher. This key must be an element of $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ such that $gcd(a, n) = 1$ with n being the size of the ciphertext and plaintext spaces.

• C – a string of ciphertext; possibly an empty string. Characters in this string must be encoded using one of the supported alphabets. See the method encoding() for more information.

OUTPUT:

• The plaintext corresponding to the ciphertext C.

EXAMPLES:

Decryption over the capital letters of the English alphabet:

sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: a, b = (5, 2)
sage: P = A.encoding("Affine functions are linear functions.")
sage: C = A.enciphering(a, b, P); C

CBBQPWBYPMTQUPOCJWFQPWCJBYPMQTUPO
sage: P == A.deciphering(a, b, C)
True

The previous example can also be worked through using functional notation:

sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: a, b = (5, 2)
sage: P = A.encoding("Affine functions are linear functions.")
sage: E = A(a, b); E
Affine cipher on Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z
sage: C = E(P); C
CBBQPWBYPMTQUPOCJWFQPWCJBYPMTQUPO
sage: aInv, bInv = A.inverse_key(a, b)
sage: D = A(aInv, bInv); D
Affine cipher on Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z
sage: D(C) == P
True

If the ciphertext is an empty string, then the plaintext is also an empty string regardless of the value of the secret key:

sage: a, b = A.random_key()
sage: A.deciphering(a, b, A.encoding(""))
sage: A.deciphering(a, b, A.encoding(" "))

enciphering$(a, b, P)$

Encrypt the plaintext $P$ with the key $(a, b)$ using affine cipher encryption.

INPUT:

- $a, \ b$ – a secret key belonging to the key space of this affine cipher. This key must be an element of $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ such that $\gcd(a, n) = 1$ with $n$ being the size of the ciphertext and plaintext spaces.
- $P$ – a string of plaintext; possibly an empty string. Characters in this string must be encoded using one of the supported alphabets. See the method $\text{encoding()}$ for more information.

OUTPUT:

- The ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext $P$.

EXAMPLES:

Encryption over the capital letters of the English alphabet:

sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: a, b = (3, 6)
sage: P = A.encoding("Affine ciphers work with linear functions.")
sage: A.enciphering(a, b, P)
GVVETSMEZBSFIUWFKUELNETSGFVOTMLEWTI

Now work through the previous example using functional notation:

sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: a, b = (3, 6)
sage: P = A.encoding("Affine ciphers work with linear functions.")
(continues on next page)
If the plaintext is an empty string, then the ciphertext is also an empty string regardless of the value of the secret key:

```
sage: a, b = A.random_key()
sage: A.enciphering(a, b, A.encoding(''))
sage: A.enciphering(a, b, A.encoding(' '))
```

**encoding**($S$)

The encoding of the string $S$ over the string monoid of this affine cipher. For example, if the string monoid of this cryptosystem is `AlphabeticStringMonoid`, then the encoding of $S$ would be its upper-case equivalent stripped of all non-alphabetic characters. Only the following alphabet is supported for the affine cipher:

- capital letters of the English alphabet as implemented in `AlphabeticStrings()`

**INPUT:**

- $S$ – a string, possibly empty.

**OUTPUT:**

- The encoding of $S$ over the string monoid of this cryptosystem. If $S$ is an empty string, return an empty string.

**EXAMPLES:**

Encoding over the upper-case letters of the English alphabet:

```
sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: A.encoding("Affine cipher over capital letters of the English alphabet.")
```

The argument $S$ can be an empty string, in which case an empty string is returned:

```
sage: AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings()).encoding(""")
```

**inverse_key**($a$, $b$)

The inverse key corresponding to the secret key $(a, b)$. If $p$ is a plaintext character so that $p \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ and $n$ is the alphabet size, then the ciphertext $c$ corresponding to $p$ is

\[
c \equiv ap + b \pmod{n}
\]

As $(a, b)$ is a key, then the multiplicative inverse $a^{-1}$ exists and the original plaintext can be recovered as follows

\[
p \equiv a^{-1}(c - b) \pmod{n} \equiv a^{-1}c + a^{-1}(-b) \pmod{n}
\]

Therefore the ordered pair $(a^{-1}, -ba^{-1})$ is the inverse key corresponding to $(a, b)$.

**INPUT:**

- $a$, $b$ – a secret key for this affine cipher. The ordered pair $(a, b)$ must be an element of $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ such that $\gcd(a, n) = 1$. 

Cryptography, Release 10.1

OUTPUT:

- The inverse key \((a^{-1}, -ba^{-1})\) corresponding to \((a, b)\).

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: a, b = (1, 2)
sage: A.inverse_key(a, b)
(1, 24)
sage: A.inverse_key(3, 2)
(9, 8)
```

Suppose that the plaintext and ciphertext spaces are the capital letters of the English alphabet so that \(n = 26\). If \(\varphi(n)\) is the Euler phi function of \(n\), then there are \(\varphi(n)\) integers \(0 \leq a < n\) that are relatively prime to \(n\). For the capital letters of the English alphabet, there are 12 such integers relatively prime to \(n\):

```python
sage: euler_phi(A.alphabet_size())
12
```

And here is a list of those integers:

```python
sage: n = A.alphabet_size()
sage: L = [i for i in range(n) if gcd(i, n) == 1]; L
[1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25]
```

Then a secret key \((a, b)\) of this shift cryptosystem is such that \(a\) is an element of the list \(L\) in the last example. Any inverse key \((A, B)\) corresponding to \((a, b)\) is such that \(A\) is also in the list \(L\) above:

```python
sage: a, b = (3, 9)
sage: a in L
True
sage: aInv, bInv = A.inverse_key(a, b)
sage: aInv, bInv
(9, 23)
sage: aInv in L
True
```

`random_key()`

Generate a random key within the key space of this affine cipher. The generated secret key is an ordered pair \((a, b) \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}\) with \(n\) being the size of the cipher domain and \(\gcd(a, n) = 1\). Let \(\varphi(n)\) denote the Euler phi function of \(n\). Then the affine cipher has \(n \cdot \varphi(n)\) possible keys (see page 10 of [Sti2006]).

OUTPUT:

- A random key within the key space of this affine cryptosystem. The output key is an ordered pair \((a, b)\).

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: A.random_key() # random
(17, 25)
```

If \((a, b)\) is a secret key and \(n\) is the size of the plaintext and ciphertext alphabets, then \(\gcd(a, n) = 1\):

```python
sage: a, b = A.random_key()
sage: n = A.alphabet_size()
```

(continues on next page)
\texttt{gcd(a, n)}

1

\texttt{rank_by_chi_square}(C, pdict)

Use the chi-square statistic to rank all possible keys. Currently, this method only applies to the capital letters of the English alphabet.

\textbf{ALGORITHM:}
Consider a non-empty alphabet $A$ consisting of $n$ elements, and let $C$ be a ciphertext encoded using elements of $A$. The plaintext $P$ corresponding to $C$ is also encoded using elements of $A$. Let $M$ be a candidate decipherment of $C$, i.e. $M$ is the result of attempting to decrypt $C$ using a key $(a, b)$ which is not necessarily the same key used to encrypt $P$. Suppose $F_A(e)$ is the characteristic frequency probability of $e \in A$ and let $F_M(e)$ be the message frequency probability with respect to $M$. The characteristic frequency probability distribution of an alphabet is the expected frequency probability distribution for that alphabet. The message frequency probability distribution of $M$ provides a distribution of the ratio of character occurrences over message length. One can interpret the characteristic frequency probability $F_A(e)$ as the expected probability, while the message frequency probability $F_M(e)$ is the observed probability. If $M$ is of length $L$, then the observed frequency of $e \in A$ is

$$O_M(e) = F_M(e) \cdot L$$

and the expected frequency of $e \in A$ is

$$E_A(e) = F_A(e) \cdot L$$

The chi-square rank $R_{\chi^2}(M)$ of $M$ corresponding to a key $(a, b) \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ is given by

$$R_{\chi^2}(M) = \sum_{e \in A} \frac{(O_M(e) - E_A(e))^2}{E_A(e)}$$

Cryptanalysis by exhaustive key search produces a candidate decipherment $M_{a,b}$ for each possible key $(a, b)$. For a set $D = \{ M_{a_1,b_1}, M_{a_2,b_2}, \ldots, M_{a_k,b_k} \}$ of all candidate decipherments corresponding to a ciphertext $C$, the smaller is the rank $R_{\chi^2}(M_{a_i,b_i})$ the more likely that $(a_i, b_i)$ is the secret key. This key ranking method is based on the Pearson chi-square test \cite{PearsonTest}.

\textbf{INPUT:}
- $C$ – The ciphertext, a non-empty string. The ciphertext must be encoded using the upper-case letters of the English alphabet.
- $pdict$ – A dictionary of key, possible plaintext pairs. This should be the output of \texttt{brute_force()} with \texttt{ranking="none"}.

\textbf{OUTPUT:}
- A list ranking the most likely keys first. Each element of the list is a tuple of key, possible plaintext pairs.

\textbf{EXAMPLES:}
Use the chi-square statistic to rank all possible keys and their corresponding decipherment:

\begin{verbatim}
\texttt{sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())}
\texttt{sage: a, b = (3, 7)}
\texttt{sage: P = A.encoding("Line.")}
\texttt{sage: C = A.enciphering(a, b, P)}
\end{verbatim}

(continues on next page)
As more ciphertext is available, the reliability of the chi-square ranking function increases:

```python
sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: a, b = (11, 24)
sage: P = A.encoding("Longer message is more information for cryptanalysis.
"

```sage: C = A.enciphering(a, b, P)
sage: Plist = A.brute_force(C)
sage: Rank = A.rank_by_chi_square(C, Plist)
sage: Rank[:10] # display only the top 10 candidate keys
```

As more ciphertext is available, the reliability of the chi-square ranking function increases:

```
[((11, 24), LONGERMESSAGEISMOREINFORMATIONFORCRYPTANALYSIS),
((17, 9), RMFIUHYUOOSIUWOYHMUHFYMHGHTV5SREOWO),
((15, 12), VSTACPUOOGACYOUPCITYBSPOGUHSTBSPEPIRNGTVIOYO),
((3, 22), PAFOYLYKGGSOYEGKALYEFTALKSBEAFALTILCVBSFSPCEG),
((25, 3), OHSRNADNNPPFRNVPDHANVSCHADFVEVSHCAJABWEFSFOBVP),
((7, 25), GHYNVIPVRLWVFPHFVHYEHIPLAFYEHIDITQALYLGIRFR),
((5, 2), NEHCIVKISSUICWKEVHRFVEFVUPWHEFEOVABPUHUNASWS),
((15, 25), IFGPHCFPBBTNPBLHFCPLOFCHTLGFOPCRVEATGTIVLB),
((9, 6), BWPSERYYYCSEYGINREGPLWRICFWPLWRQRODFCPCBOYG)]
```

**rank_by_squared_differences** \((C, pdict)\)

Use the squared-differences measure to rank all possible keys. Currently, this method only applies to the capital letters of the English alphabet.

**ALGORITHM:**

Consider a non-empty alphabet \(A\) consisting of \(n\) elements, and let \(C\) be a ciphertext encoded using elements of \(A\). The plaintext \(P\) corresponding to \(C\) is also encoded using elements of \(A\). Let \(M\) be a candidate decipherment of \(C\), i.e. \(M\) is the result of attempting to decrypt \(C\) using a key \((a, b)\) which is not necessarily the same key used to encrypt \(P\). Suppose \(F_A(e)\) is the characteristic frequency probability of \(e \in A\) and let \(F_M(e)\) be the message frequency probability with respect to \(M\). The characteristic frequency probability distribution of an alphabet is the expected frequency probability distribution for that alphabet. The message frequency probability distribution of \(M\) provides a distribution of the ratio of character occurrences over message length. One can interpret the characteristic frequency probability \(F_A(e)\) as the expected probability, while the message frequency probability \(F_M(e)\) is the observed probability. If \(M\) is of length \(L\), then the observed frequency of \(e \in A\) is

\[ O_M(e) = F_M(e) \cdot L \]
and the expected frequency of \( e \in A \) is

\[
E_A(e) = F_A(e) \cdot L
\]

The squared-differences, or residual sum of squares, rank \( R_{RSS}(M) \) of \( M \) corresponding to a key \((a, b) \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}\) is given by

\[
R_{RSS}(M) = \sum_{e \in A} (O_M(e) - E_A(e))^2
\]

Cryptanalysis by exhaustive key search produces a candidate decipherment \( M_{a, b} \) for each possible key \((a, b)\). For a set \( D = \{M_{a_1, b_1}, M_{a_2, b_2}, \ldots, M_{a_k, b_k}\} \) of all candidate decipherments corresponding to a ciphertext \( C \), the smaller is the rank \( R_{RSS}(M_{a_i, b_i}) \) the more likely that \((a_i, b_i)\) is the secret key. This key ranking method is based on the residual sum of squares measure [RSS].

**INPUT:**

- \( C \) – The ciphertext, a non-empty string. The ciphertext must be encoded using the upper-case letters of the English alphabet.
- \( pdict \) – A dictionary of key, possible plaintext pairs. This should be the output of \texttt{brute_force()} with \texttt{ranking="none"}.

**OUTPUT:**

- A list ranking the most likely keys first. Each element of the list is a tuple of key, possible plaintext pairs.

**EXAMPLES:**

Use the method of squared differences to rank all possible keys and their corresponding decipherment:

```python
sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: a, b = (3, 7)
sage: P = A.encoding("Line.")
sage: C = A.enciphering(a, b, P)
sage: Plist = A.brute_force(C)
sage: Rank = A.rank_by_squared_differences(C, Plist)
sage: Rank[:10]  # display only the top 10 candidate keys

[((1, 1), NETS),
 (15, 6), ETUN),
 (7, 17), HCTE),
 (3, 7), LINE),
 (17, 15), DELO),
 (9, 4), EDWT),
 (9, 9), POHE),
 (21, 8), ELID),
 (17, 20), STAD),
 (7, 18), SNEP)]
```

As more ciphertext is available, the reliability of the squared-differences ranking function increases:

```python
sage: A = AffineCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: a, b = (11, 24)
sage: P = A.encoding("Longer message is more information for cryptanalysis.")
sage: C = A.enciphering(a, b, P)
sage: Plist = A.brute_force(C)
```

(continues on next page)
sage: Rank = A.rank_by_squared_differences(C, Plist)
sage: Rank[:10] # display only the top 10 candidate keys

[((11, 24), LONGERMESSAGEISMOREINFORMATIONFORCRYPTANALYSIS),
 (9, 14), DRYUGTKGAAEGIAYTGIRNTKEHIYNTSTQFHEREDQAIA),
 ((23, 24), DSNEUHIIUMAEUOMISHUONZSHIAROSNZSHKHXRANADQOM),
 ((23, 1), ETOFVIJVNBVFNPJTIVPOATIJBSPTOATLIRYSBOBERPN),
 ((21, 16), VEBGANYAQGQAMYENAMDBENOTRMBEDENUNIHTOBOVIOQM),
 ((7, 12), TULAIWCIIEEYAIASECUVISLRRVCSNULRUVCNULCQNDYLYTGESE),
 ((5, 20), ZQTOUHWUEGOUIEWHUITRQHGIBIQTRQHANMBGTGZMEIE),
 ((21, 8), JSPUOMEOCEUOAOEMSBOPRSMCHASPRSBIWVHCPECWAEAE),
 ((25, 7), SLWVREHRTTJVRZTHLEZGWIGLEHJIZLMENEFWAIJWJSFTTZT),
 ((25, 15), ATEDZMPZBBRDZHBPTMZHEOTPMQREHTMVNIQSAMEBB)]

class sage.crypto.classical.HillCryptosystem(S, m)

Bases: SymmetricKeyCryptosystem

Create a Hill cryptosystem defined by the m x m matrix space over \( \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z} \), where N is the alphabet size of the string monoid S.

INPUT:

- S - a string monoid over some alphabet
- m - integer > 0; the block length of matrices that specify block permutations

OUTPUT:

- A Hill cryptosystem of block length m over the alphabet S.

EXAMPLES:

sage: S = AlphabeticStrings()
sage: E = HillCryptosystem(S,3)
sage: E
Hill cryptosystem on Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z of block length 3
sage: R = IntegerModRing(26)
sage: M = MatrixSpace(R,3,3)
sage: A = M([[1,0,1],[0,1,1],[2,2,3]])
sage: A
[1 0 1]
[0 1 1]
[2 2 3]
sage: e = E(A)
sage: e
Hill cipher on Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z of block length 3
sage: e("LAMAIJONBLANCHE")
JYVSKQPELAYKPV

block_length()  
The row or column dimension of a matrix specifying a block permutation. Encryption and decryption keys of a Hill cipher are square matrices, i.e. the row and column dimensions of an encryption or decryption key are the same. This row/column dimension is referred to as the block length.

OUTPUT:

- The block length of an encryption/decryption key.
EXAMPLES:

```
sage: A = AlphabeticStrings()
sage: n = randint(1, A.ngens() - 1)
sage: H = HillCryptosystem(A, n)
sage: H.block_length() == n
True
```

deciphering(A, C)
Decrypt the ciphertext C using the key A.

INPUT:
- A - a key within the key space of this Hill cipher
- C - a string (possibly empty) over the string monoid of this Hill cipher

OUTPUT:
- The plaintext corresponding to the ciphertext C.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: H = HillCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings(), 3)
sage: K = H.random_key()
sage: M = H.encoding("Good day, mate! How ya going?")
sage: H.deciphering(K, H.enciphering(K, M)) == M
True
```

deciphering(A, C)
Encrypt the plaintext M using the key A.

INPUT:
- A - a key within the key space of this Hill cipher
- M - a string (possibly empty) over the string monoid of this Hill cipher.

OUTPUT:
- The ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext M.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: H = HillCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings(), 3)
sage: K = H.random_key()
sage: M = H.encoding("Good day, mate! How ya going?")
sage: H.deciphering(K, H.enciphering(K, M)) == M
True
```

decoding(M)
The encoding of the string M over the string monoid of this Hill cipher. For example, if the string monoid of this Hill cipher is AlphabeticStringMonoid, then the encoding of M would be its upper-case equivalent stripped of all non-alphabetic characters.

INPUT:
- M - a string, possibly empty

OUTPUT:
- The encoding of M over the string monoid of this Hill cipher.
EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: M = "The matrix cipher by Lester S. Hill."
sage: A = AlphabeticStrings()
sage: H = HillCryptosystem(A, 7)
sage: H.encoding(M) == A.encoding(M)
True
```

**inverse_key(A)**

The inverse key corresponding to the key A.

**INPUT:**

- A - an invertible matrix of the key space of this Hill cipher

**OUTPUT:**

- The inverse matrix of A.

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: S = AlphabeticStrings()
sage: E = HillCryptosystem(S,3)
sage: A = E.random_key()
sage: B = E.inverse_key(A)
sage: M = S("LAMAISONBLANCHE")
sage: e = E(A)
sage: c = E(B)
sage: c(e(M))
LAMAISONBLANCHE
```

**random_key()**

A random key within the key space of this Hill cipher. That is, generate a random \( m \times m \) matrix to be used as a block permutation, where \( m \) is the block length of this Hill cipher. If \( n \) is the size of the cryptosystem alphabet, then there are \( n^m \) possible keys. However the number of valid keys, i.e. invertible \( m \times m \) square matrices, is smaller than \( n^m \).

**OUTPUT:**

- A random key within the key space of this Hill cipher.

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: A = AlphabeticStrings()
sage: n = 3
sage: H = HillCryptosystem(A, n)
sage: K = H.random_key()
sage: Ki = H.inverse_key(K)
sage: M = "LAMAISONBLANCHE"
sage: e = H(K)
sage: d = H(Ki)
sage: d(e(A(M))) == A(M)
True
```

**class** `sage.crypto.classical.ShiftCryptosystem(A)`

**Bases:** `SymmetricKeyCryptosystem`

Create a shift cryptosystem.
Let \( A = \{a_0, a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{n-1}\} \) be a non-empty alphabet consisting of \( n \) unique elements. Define a mapping 
\[
f : A \to \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}
\]
from the alphabet \( A \) to the set \( \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \) of integers modulo \( n \), given by \( f(a_i) = i \). Thus we can identify each element of the alphabet \( A \) with a unique integer \( 0 \leq i < n \). A key of the shift cipher is an integer \( 0 \leq k < n \). Therefore the key space is \( \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \). Since we assume that \( A \) does not have repeated elements, the mapping \( f : A \to \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \) is bijective. Encryption works by moving along the alphabet by \( k \) positions, with wrap around. Decryption reverses the process by moving backwards by \( k \) positions, with wrap around. More generally, let \( k \) be a secret key, i.e. an element of the key space, and let \( p \) be a plaintext character and consequently \( p \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \). Then the ciphertext character \( c \) corresponding to \( p \) is given by
\[
c \equiv p + k \pmod{n}
\]
Similarly, given a ciphertext character \( c \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \) and a secret key \( k \), we can recover the corresponding plaintext character as follows:
\[
p \equiv c - k \pmod{n}
\]
Use the bijection \( f : A \to \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \) to convert \( c \) and \( p \) back to elements of the alphabet \( A \). Currently, the following alphabets are supported for the shift cipher:

- capital letters of the English alphabet as implemented in \texttt{AlphabeticStrings()}
- the alphabet consisting of the hexadecimal number system as implemented in \texttt{HexadecimalStrings()}
- the alphabet consisting of the binary number system as implemented in \texttt{BinaryStrings()}

**EXAMPLES:**

Some examples illustrating encryption and decryption over various alphabets. Here is an example over the upper-case letters of the English alphabet:

```
\begin{verbatim}
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings()); S
Shift cryptosystem on Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z
sage: P = S.encoding("The shift cryptosystem generalizes the Caesar cipher.")

sage: P
THESHIFTCRYPTOSYSTEMGENERALIZESTHECAESARCIPHER

sage: K = 7
sage: C = S.enciphering(K, P); C
AOLZOPMAJYFWAVZFZALTNLULYHSPGLZAOLJHLZHYJPW0LY

sage: S.deciphering(K, C)
THESHIFTCRYPTOSYSTEMGENERALIZESTHECAESARCIPHER

sage: S.deciphering(K, C) == P
True
```

The previous example can also be done as follows:

```
\begin{verbatim}
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: P = S.encoding("The shift cryptosystem generalizes the Caesar cipher.")
sage: K = 7
sage: E = S(K); E
Shift cipher on Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z
sage: C = E(P); C
AOLZOPMAJYFWAVZFZALTNLULYHSPGZLAOLJHLZHYJPW0LY
sage: D = S(S.inverse_key(K)); D
Shift cipher on Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z
sage: D(C) == P
True
sage: D(C) == P == D(E(P))
True
```

Over the hexadecimal number system:

```sage
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(HexadecimalStrings()); S
Shift cryptosystem on Free hexadecimal string monoid
sage: P = S.encoding("Encryption & decryption shifts along the alphabet."); P
456e63727970746966f6e202620646563727970746966f6e2073686966747320616c6f6e672e
sage: K = 5
sage: C = S.enciphering(K, P); C
9ab3b8c7cecc5c9beb4b375c8bdbebbcc9c875b6b1b4b3bc75c9bdbe75b6bc5bdbe7bc97
sage: S.deciphering(K, C)
456e63727970746966f6e202620646563727970746966f6e2073686966747320616c6f6e672e
sage: S.deciphering(K, C) == P
True
```

And over the binary number system:

```sage
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(BinaryStrings()); S
Shift cryptosystem on Free binary string monoid
sage: P = S.encoding("The binary alphabet is very insecure."); P
01010100011010000110010100100000011000100110100101101110011000010111001001111001001000000110000101101100011100000110100001 ... 11001000000111011001100101011100100111100100100000011010010110111001110011011001010110001101110101011100100110010100101110
sage: K = 1
sage: C = S.enciphering(K, P); C
10101000011010000110010100100000011000100110100101101110011000010111001001111001001000000110000101101100011100000110100001 ... 11001000000111011001100101011100100111100100100000011010010110111001110011011001010110001101110101011100100110010100101110
sage: S.deciphering(K, C) == P
True
```

A shift cryptosystem with key \( k = 3 \) is commonly referred to as the Caesar cipher. Create a Caesar cipher over the upper-case letters of the English alphabet:

```sage
sage: caesar = ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: K = 3
sage: P = caesar.encoding("abcdef"); P
ABCDEF
sage: C = caesar.enciphering(K, P); C
DEFGHI
sage: caesar.deciphering(K, C) == P
True
```

Generate a random key for encryption and decryption:

```sage
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: P = S.encoding("Shift cipher with a random key.")
sage: K = S.random_key()
sage: C = S.enciphering(K, P)
sage: S.deciphering(K, C) == P
True
```

Decrypting with the key \( K \) is equivalent to encrypting with its corresponding inverse key:

```sage
sage: S.enciphering(S.inverse_key(K), C) == P
True
```

`brute_force(C, ranking='none')`
Attempt a brute force cryptanalysis of the ciphertext C.

INPUT:
- C – A ciphertext over one of the supported alphabets of this shift cryptosystem. See the class ShiftCryptosystem for documentation on the supported alphabets.
- ranking – (default "none") the method to use for ranking all possible keys. If ranking="none", then do not use any ranking function. The following ranking functions are supported:
  - "chisquare" – the chi-square ranking function as implemented in the method rank_by_chi_square().
  - "squared_differences" – the squared differences ranking function as implemented in the method rank_by_squared_differences().

OUTPUT:
- All the possible plaintext sequences corresponding to the ciphertext C. This method effectively uses all the possible keys in this shift cryptosystem to decrypt C. The method is also referred to as exhaustive key search. The output is a dictionary of key, plaintext pairs.

EXAMPLES:
Cryptanalyze using all possible keys for various alphabets. Over the upper-case letters of the English alphabet:

```python
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: P = S.encoding("The shift cryptosystem generalizes the Caesar cipher.")
sage: K = 7
sage: C = S.enciphering(K, P)
sage: Dict = S.brute_force(C)
sage: for k in range(len(Dict)):
    ....:     if Dict[k] == P:
    ....:         print("key = " + str(k))
key = 7
```

Over the hexadecimal number system:

```python
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(HexadecimalStrings())
sage: P = S.encoding("Encryption & decryption shifts along the alphabet.")
sage: K = 5
sage: C = S.enciphering(K, P)
sage: Dict = S.brute_force(C)
sage: for k in range(len(Dict)):
    ....:     if Dict[k] == P:
    ....:         print("key = " + str(k))
key = 5
```

And over the binary number system:

```python
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(BinaryStrings())
sage: P = S.encoding("The binary alphabet is very insecure.")
sage: K = 1
sage: C = S.enciphering(K, P)
sage: Dict = S.brute_force(C)
sage: for k in range(len(Dict)):
```

(continues on next page)
Don't use any ranking functions, i.e. ranking="none":

```python
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: P = S.encoding("Shifting using modular arithmetic.")
sage: K = 8
sage: C = S.enciphering(K, P)
sage: pdict = S.brute_force(C)
sage: sorted(pdict.items())
```

Use the chi-square ranking function, i.e. ranking="chisquare":

```python
sage: S.brute_force(C, ranking="chisquare")
```

(continues on next page)
Use the squared differences ranking function, i.e. ranking="squared_differences":

```sage
S.brute_force(C, ranking="squared_differences")
```

Use the squared differences ranking function, i.e. ranking="squared_differences":

```sage
S.brute_force(C, ranking="squared_differences")
```

**deciphering**($K, C$)

Decrypt the ciphertext $C$ with the key $K$ using shift cipher decryption.
INPUT:

• K – a secret key; a key belonging to the key space of this shift cipher. This key is an integer \( k \) satisfying the inequality \( 0 \leq k < n \), where \( n \) is the size of the cipher domain.

• C – a string of ciphertext; possibly an empty string. Characters in this string must be encoded using one of the supported alphabets. See the method `encoding()` for more information.

OUTPUT:

• The plaintext corresponding to the ciphertext C.

EXAMPLES:

Let’s perform decryption over the supported alphabets. Here is decryption over the capital letters of the English alphabet:

```sage
S = ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
P = S.encoding("Stop shifting me."); P
STOPSHIFTINGME
K = 13
C = S.enciphering(K, P); C
FGBCFUVSGVATZR
S.deciphering(K, C) == P
True
```

Decryption over the hexadecimal number system:

```sage
S = ShiftCryptosystem(HexadecimalStrings())
P = S.encoding("Shift me now."); P
56869674206d65206f7772e
K = 7
C = S.enciphering(K, P); C
cadfd0ddeb97d4dc97d5d6ee95
S.deciphering(K, C) == P
True
```

Decryption over the binary number system:

```sage
S = ShiftCryptosystem(BinaryStrings())
P = S.encoding("OK, enough shifting."); P
0100111101001011001011000010000001100101011011100110111101110101011001110110100000100000011100110110100001101001011001100111010001101001011011100110011100101110
K = 1
C = S.enciphering(K, P); C
10110000101101001101001111011111011010011010110011101110111110110110011001110110010001100010101100110011101001110010110100100011001100011010001
S.deciphering(K, C) == P
True
```

`enciphering(K, P)`

Encrypt the plaintext \( P \) with the key \( K \) using shift cipher encryption.

INPUT:

• \( K \) – a key belonging to the key space of this shift cipher. This key is an integer \( k \) satisfying the inequality \( 0 \leq k < n \), where \( n \) is the size of the cipher domain.

• \( P \) – a string of plaintext; possibly an empty string. Characters in this string must be encoded using one of the supported alphabets. See the method `encoding()` for more information.
OUTPUT:

• The ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext $P$.

EXAMPLES:

Let's perform encryption over the supported alphabets. Here is encryption over the capital letters of the English alphabet:

```python
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: P = S.encoding("Shift your gear."); P
SHIFTYOURGEAR
sage: K = 3
sage: S.enciphering(K, P)
VKLIWBRXUJHDU
```

Encryption over the hexadecimal number system:

```python
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(HexadecimalStrings())
sage: P = S.encoding("Capitalize with the shift key."); P
4361706974616c697a65207769746820746865207368696674206b65792e
sage: K = 5
sage: S.enciphering(K, P)
98b6c5bec9b6b1becfba75ccbec9bd75c9bdbebcc975b0bace73
```

Encryption over the binary number system:

```python
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(BinaryStrings())
sage: P = S.encoding("Don't shift."); P
01000100011011110110111000100111101111010001101001011001100111010001
sage: K = 1
sage: S.enciphering(K, P)
10111011101000010001001110110100011001101110111100011001101101010001101110111110111100001
```

The encoding of the string $S$ over the string monoid of this shift cipher. For example, if the string monoid of this cryptosystem is `AlphabeticStringMonoid`, then the encoding of $S$ would be its upper-case equivalent stripped of all non-alphabetic characters. The following alphabets are supported for the shift cipher:

• capital letters of the English alphabet as implemented in `AlphabeticStrings()`

• the alphabet consisting of the hexadecimal number system as implemented in `HexadecimalStrings()`

• the alphabet consisting of the binary number system as implemented in `BinaryStrings()`

INPUT:

• $S$ – a string, possibly empty.

OUTPUT:

• The encoding of $S$ over the string monoid of this cryptosystem. If $S$ is an empty string, return an empty string.

EXAMPLES:

Encoding over the upper-case letters of the English alphabet:
Cryptography, Release 10.1

```sage
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: S.encoding("Shift cipher on capital letters of the English alphabet.")
SHIFTCIPHERONCAPITALLETTERSOFTHEENGLISHALPHABET
```

Encoding over the binary system:

```sage
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(BinaryStrings())
sage: S.encoding("Binary")
01000010 01101001 01101110 01100001 01110010
```

Encoding over the hexadecimal system:

```sage
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(HexadecimalStrings())
sage: S.encoding("Over hexadecimal system.")
4f766572 20 68 65 78 61 64 65 63 68 65 2e
```

The argument `S` can be an empty string, in which case an empty string is returned:

```sage
sage: ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings()).encoding("")
sage: ShiftCryptosystem(HexadecimalStrings()).encoding("")
sage: ShiftCryptosystem(BinaryStrings()).encoding("")
```

### inverse_key(K)

The inverse key corresponding to the key `K`. For the shift cipher, the inverse key corresponding to `K` is \(-K \mod n\), where \(n > 0\) is the size of the cipher domain, i.e. the plaintext/ciphertext space. A key \(k\) of the shift cipher is an integer \(0 \leq k < n\). The key \(k = 0\) has no effect on either the plaintext or the ciphertext.

**INPUT:**

- `K` – a key for this shift cipher. This must be an integer \(k\) such that \(0 \leq k < n\), where \(n\) is the size of the cipher domain.

**OUTPUT:**

- The inverse key corresponding to `K`.

**EXAMPLES:**

Some random keys and their respective inverse keys:

```sage
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: key = S.random_key(); key # random
2
sage: S.inverse_key(key) # random
24
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(HexadecimalStrings())
sage: key = S.random_key(); key # random
12
sage: S.inverse_key(key) # random
4
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(BinaryStrings())
sage: key = S.random_key(); key # random
1
```

(continues on next page)
Regardless of the value of a key, the addition of the key and its inverse must be equal to the alphabet size. This relationship holds exactly when the value of the key is non-zero:

```python
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: K = S.random_key()
sage: while K == 0:
    ....:  K = S.random_key()
sage: invK = S.inverse_key(K)
sage: K + invK == S.alphabet_size()
True
sage: K + invK == S.alphabet_size()
True
sage: K = S.random_key()
sage: while K != 0:
    ....:  K = S.random_key()
sage: invK = S.inverse_key(K)
sage: K + invK != S.alphabet_size()
True
sage: K; invK
0
0
```

**random_key()**

Generate a random key within the key space of this shift cipher. The generated key is an integer $0 \leq k < n$ with $n$ being the size of the cipher domain. Thus there are $n$ possible keys in the key space, which is the set $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$. The key $k = 0$ has no effect on either the plaintext or the ciphertext.

**OUTPUT:**

- A random key within the key space of this shift cryptosystem.

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: S.random_key()  # random
18
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(BinaryStrings())
sage: S.random_key()  # random
0
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(HexadecimalStrings())
sage: S.random_key()  # random
5
```

Regardless of the value of a key, the addition of the key and its inverse must be equal to the alphabet size. This relationship holds exactly when the value of the key is non-zero:
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: K = S.random_key()
sage: while K == 0:
    K = S.random_key()
sage: invK = S.inverse_key(K)
sage: K + invK == S.alphabet_size()
    True
sage: invK + K == S.alphabet_size()
    True
sage: K = S.random_key()
sage: while K != 0:
    K = S.random_key()
sage: invK = S.inverse_key(K)
sage: K + invK != S.alphabet_size()
    True
sage: K; invK
0
0

rank_by_chi_square(C, pdict)

Use the chi-square statistic to rank all possible keys. Currently, this method only applies to the capital letters of the English alphabet.

ALGORITHM:

Consider a non-empty alphabet $A$ consisting of $n$ elements, and let $C$ be a ciphertext encoded using elements of $A$. The plaintext $P$ corresponding to $C$ is also encoded using elements of $A$. Let $M$ be a candidate decipherment of $C$, i.e. $M$ is the result of attempting to decrypt $C$ using a key $k \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ which is not necessarily the same key used to encrypt $P$. Suppose $F_A(e)$ is the characteristic frequency probability of $e \in A$ and let $F_M(e)$ be the message frequency probability with respect to $M$. The characteristic frequency probability distribution of an alphabet is the expected frequency probability distribution for that alphabet. The message frequency probability distribution of $M$ provides a distribution of the ratio of character occurrences over message length. One can interpret the characteristic frequency probability $F_A(e)$ as the expected probability, while the message frequency probability $F_M(e)$ is the observed probability. If $M$ is of length $L$, then the observed frequency of $e \in A$ is

$$O_M(e) = F_M(e) \cdot L$$

and the expected frequency of $e \in A$ is

$$E_A(e) = F_A(e) \cdot L$$

The chi-square rank $R_{\chi^2}(M)$ of $M$ corresponding to a key $k \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ is given by

$$R_{\chi^2}(M) = \sum_{e \in A} \frac{(O_M(e) - E_A(e))^2}{E_A(e)}$$

Cryptanalysis by exhaustive key search produces a candidate decipherment $M_k$ for each possible key $k \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$. For a set $D = \{M_{k_1}, M_{k_2}, \ldots, M_{k_r}\}$ of all candidate decipherments corresponding to a ciphertext $C$, the smaller is the rank $R_{\chi^2}(M_k)$ the more likely that $k_3$ is the secret key. This key ranking method is based on the Pearson chi-square test [PearsonTest].

INPUT:

- $C$ – The ciphertext, a non-empty string. The ciphertext must be encoded using the upper-case letters of the English alphabet.
• **pdict** – A dictionary of key, possible plaintext pairs. This should be the output of `brute_force()` with `ranking="none"`.

**OUTPUT:**

• A list ranking the most likely keys first. Each element of the list is a tuple of key, possible plaintext pairs.

**EXAMPLES:**

Use the chi-square statistic to rank all possible keys and their corresponding decipherment:

```python
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: P = S.encoding("Shi."); P
SHI
sage: K = 5
sage: C = S.enciphering(K, P)
sage: Pdict = S.brute_force(C)
sage: S.rank_by_chi_square(C, Pdict)
[(9, ODE),
 (5, SHI),
 (20, DST),
 (19, ETU),
 (21, CRS),
 (10, NCD),
 (25, YNO),
 (6, RGH),
 (12, LAB),
 (8, PEF),
 (1, WLM),
 (11, MBC),
 (18, FUV),
 (17, GVW),
 (2, VKL),
 (4, TIJ),
 (3, UJK),
 (0, XMN),
 (16, HWX),
 (15, IXY),
 (23, APQ),
 (24, ZOP),
 (22, BQR),
 (7, QFG),
 (13, KZA),
 (14, JYZ)]
```

As more ciphertext is available, the reliability of the chi-square ranking function increases:

```python
sage: P = S.encoding("Shift cipher."); P
SHIFTCIPHER
sage: C = S.enciphering(K, P)
sage: Pdict = S.brute_force(C)
sage: S.rank_by_chi_square(C, Pdict)
[(5, SHIFTCIPHER),
 (6, RGH),
 (12, LAB),
 (8, PEF),
 (1, WLM),
 (11, MBC),
 (18, FUV),
 (17, GVW),
 (2, VKL),
 (4, TIJ),
 (3, UJK),
 (0, XMN),
 (16, HWX),
 (15, IXY),
 (23, APQ),
 (24, ZOP),
 (22, BQR),
 (7, QFG),
 (13, KZA),
 (14, JYZ)]
```

(continues on next page)
Use the squared-differences measure to rank all possible keys. Currently, this method only applies to the capital letters of the English alphabet.

**ALGORITHM:**

Consider a non-empty alphabet $A$ consisting of $n$ elements, and let $C$ be a ciphertext encoded using elements of $A$. The plaintext $P$ corresponding to $C$ is also encoded using elements of $A$. Let $M$ be a candidate decipherment of $C$, i.e. $M$ is the result of attempting to decrypt $C$ using a key $k \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ which is not necessarily the same key used to encrypt $P$. Suppose $F_A(e)$ is the characteristic frequency probability of $e \in A$ and let $F_M(e)$ be the message frequency probability with respect to $M$. The characteristic frequency probability distribution of an alphabet is the expected frequency probability distribution for that alphabet. The message frequency probability distribution of $M$ provides a distribution of the ratio of character occurrences over message length. One can interpret the characteristic frequency probability $F_A(e)$ as the expected probability, while the message frequency probability $F_M(e)$ is the observed probability. If $M$ is of length $L$, then the observed frequency of $e \in A$ is

$$O_M(e) = F_M(e) \cdot L$$

and the expected frequency of $e \in A$ is

$$E_A(e) = F_A(e) \cdot L$$

The squared-differences, or residual sum of squares, rank $R_{RSS}(M)$ of $M$ corresponding to a key $k \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ is given by

$$R_{RSS}(M) = \sum_{e \in A} (O_M(e) - E_A(e))^2$$
Cryptanalysis by exhaustive key search produces a candidate decipherment $M_k$ for each possible key $k \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$. For a set $D = \{M_{k_1}, M_{k_2}, \ldots, M_{k_r}\}$ of all candidate decipherments corresponding to a ciphertext $C$, the smaller is the rank $R_{RSS}(M_k)$ the more likely that $k_i$ is the secret key. This key ranking method is based on the residual sum of squares measure [RSS].

**INPUT:**

- $C$ – The ciphertext, a non-empty string. The ciphertext must be encoded using the upper-case letters of the English alphabet.
- $pdict$ – A dictionary of key, possible plaintext pairs. This should be the output of `brute_force()` with `ranking="none"`.

**OUTPUT:**

- A list ranking the most likely keys first. Each element of the list is a tuple of key, possible plaintext pairs.

**EXAMPLES:**

Use the method of squared differences to rank all possible keys and their corresponding decipherment:

```python
sage: S = ShiftCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: P = S.encoding("Shi."); P
SHI
sage: K = 5
sage: C = S.enciphering(K, P)
sage: Pdict = S.brute_force(C)
sage: S.rank_by_squared_differences(C, Pdict)
[(19, ETU),
 (9, ODE),
 (20, DST),
 (5, SHI),
 (8, PEF),
 (4, TIJ),
 (25, YNO),
 (21, CRS),
 (6, RGH),
 (10, NCD),
 (12, LAB),
 (23, APQ),
 (24, ZOP),
 (0, XMN),
 (13, KZA),
 (15, IXY),
 (1, WLM),
 (16, HWX),
 (22, BQR),
 (11, MBC),
 (18, FUV),
 (2, VKL),
 (17, GWV),
 (7, QFG),
 (3, UJK),
 (14, JYZ)]
```

As more ciphertext is available, the reliability of the squared differences ranking function increases:
sage: P = S.encoding("Shift cipher."); P
SHIFTCIPHER
sage: C = S.enciphering(K, P)
sage: Pdict = S.brute_force(C)
sage: S.rank_by_squared_differences(C, Pdict)
[(20, DSTQENTASPC),
(5, SHIFTCIPHER),
(9, ODEBPYELDAN),
(19, ETURFOUBTQD),
(6, RGHESBHOGDQ),
(16, HWXUIRXEWGT),
(8, PEFCQZFMEBO),
(21, CRSPDMSZROB),
(22, BQROCLRYQNA),
(25, YNOLZIOVNXX),
(3, UJKHVEKRJGI),
(18, FUVSGPVCURE),
(4, TIJGUDJQIFS),
(10, NCAOXDKCZM),
(7, QFGRAGNFCP),
(24, ZOPMAJPWOLY),
(2, VKLWFLSKHU),
(12, LABYMVIAAXK),
(17, GWTHQWDVSF),
(1, WLMJXGTLIV),
(13, KZAKLUAHZWN),
(0, XHNKYHNUMJW),
(15, IXYVJSYFXUH),
(14, JYZWKTZGYVI),
(23, APQNBKQXPMZ)]

class sage.crypto.classical.SubstitutionCryptosystem(S)
Bases: SymmetricKeyCryptosystem
Create a substitution cryptosystem.

INPUT:

• S - a string monoid over some alphabet

OUTPUT:

• A substitution cryptosystem over the alphabet S.

EXAMPLES:

sage: M = AlphabeticStrings()
sage: E = SubstitutionCryptosystem(M)
sage: E
Substitution cryptosystem on Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z
sage: K = M([ 25-i for i in range(26) ])
sage: K
ZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
sage: e = E(K)
sage: m = M("THECATINTHEHAT")
sage: e(m)
GSVXZGRMGVSZG

deciphering($K, C$)

Decrypt the ciphertext $C$ using the key $K$.

INPUT:

- $K$ - a key belonging to the key space of this substitution cipher
- $C$ - a string (possibly empty) over the string monoid of this cryptosystem.

OUTPUT:

- The plaintext corresponding to the ciphertext $C$.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: S = SubstitutionCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: K = S.random_key()
sage: M = S.encoding("Don't substitute me!")
sage: S.deciphering(K, S.enciphering(K, M)) == M
True
```

enciphering($K, M$)

Encrypt the plaintext $M$ using the key $K$.

INPUT:

- $K$ - a key belonging to the key space of this substitution cipher
- $M$ - a string (possibly empty) over the string monoid of this cryptosystem.

OUTPUT:

- The ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext $M$.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: S = SubstitutionCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings())
sage: K = S.random_key()
sage: M = S.encoding("Don't substitute me.")
sage: S.deciphering(K, S.enciphering(K, M)) == M
True
```

encoding($M$)

The encoding of the string $M$ over the string monoid of this substitution cipher. For example, if the string monoid of this cryptosystem is `AlphabeticStringMonoid`, then the encoding of $M$ would be its upper-case equivalent stripped of all non-alphabetic characters.

INPUT:

- $M$ - a string, possibly empty

OUTPUT:

- The encoding of $M$ over the string monoid of this cryptosystem.

EXAMPLES:
The inverse key corresponding to the key \( K \). The specified key is a permutation of the cryptosystem alphabet.

**INPUT:**
- \( K \) - a key belonging to the key space of this cryptosystem

**OUTPUT:**
- The inverse key of \( K \).

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: S = AlphabeticStrings()
sage: E = SubstitutionCryptosystem(S)
sage: K = E.random_key()
sage: L = E.inverse_key(K)
sage: M = S("THECATEIN THEHAT")
sage: e = E(K)
sage: c = E(L)
sage: c(e(M))
THECATEIN THEHAT
```

Generate a random key within the key space of this substitution cipher. The generated key is a permutation of the cryptosystem alphabet. Let \( n \) be the length of the alphabet. Then there are \( n! \) possible keys in the key space.

**OUTPUT:**
- A random key within the key space of this cryptosystem.

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: A = AlphabeticStrings()
sage: S = SubstitutionCryptosystem(A)
sage: K = S.random_key()
sage: Ki = S.inverse_key(K)
sage: M = "THECATEIN THEHAT"
sage: e = S(K)
sage: d = S(Ki)
sage: d(e(A(M))) == A(M)
True
```

Create a transposition cryptosystem of block length \( n \).

**INPUT:**
- \( S \) - a string monoid over some alphabet
• \( n \) - integer > 0; a block length of a block permutation

OUTPUT:

• A transposition cryptosystem of block length \( n \) over the alphabet \( S \).

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: S = AlphabeticStrings()
sage: E = TranspositionCryptosystem(S, 14)
sage: E
Transposition cryptosystem on Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z of block length
→ 14
sage: K = [14-i for i in range(14)]
sage: K
[14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1]
sage: e = E(K)
sage: e(S("THECATINTHEHAT"))
TAHEHTNITACEHT
```

\textbf{deciphering}(K, C)

Decrypt the ciphertext \( C \) using the key \( K \).

INPUT:

• \( K \) - a key belonging to the key space of this transposition cipher

• \( C \) - a string (possibly empty) over the string monoid of this cryptosystem.

OUTPUT:

• The plaintext corresponding to the ciphertext \( C \).

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: T = TranspositionCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings(), 14)
sage: K = T.random_key()
sage: M = T.encoding("The cat in the hat.")
sage: T.deciphering(K, T.enciphering(K, M)) == M
True
```

\textbf{enciphering}(K, M)

Encrypt the plaintext \( M \) using the key \( K \).

INPUT:

• \( K \) - a key belonging to the key space of this transposition cipher

• \( M \) - a string (possibly empty) over the string monoid of this cryptosystem

OUTPUT:

• The ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext \( M \).

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: T = TranspositionCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings(), 14)
sage: K = T.random_key()
sage: M = T.encoding("The cat in the hat.")
sage: T.deciphering(K, T.enciphering(K, M)) == M
True
```
encoding($M$)

The encoding of the string $M$ over the string monoid of this transposition cipher. For example, if the string monoid of this cryptosystem is AlphabeticStringMonoid, then the encoding of $M$ would be its upper-case equivalent stripped of all non-alphabetic characters.

INPUT:

- $M$ - a string, possibly empty

OUTPUT:

- The encoding of $M$ over the string monoid of this cryptosystem.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: M = "Transposition cipher is not about matrix transpose."
sage: A = AlphabeticStrings()
sage: T = TranspositionCryptosystem(A, 11)
sage: T.encoding(M) == A.encoding(M)
True
```

inverse_key($K$, check=True)

The inverse key corresponding to the key $K$.

INPUT:

- $K$ - a key belonging to the key space of this transposition cipher
- check - bool (default: True); check that $K$ belongs to the key space of this cryptosystem.

OUTPUT:

- The inverse key corresponding to $K$.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: S = AlphabeticStrings()
sage: E = TranspositionCryptosystem(S, 14)
sage: K = E.random_key()
sage: Ki = E.inverse_key(K)
sage: e = E(K)
sage: d = E(Ki)
sage: M = "THECATINTHEHAT"
sage: C = e(S(M))
sage: d(S(C)) == S(M)
True
```

random_key()

Generate a random key within the key space of this transposition cryptosystem. Let $n > 0$ be the block length of this cryptosystem. Then there are $n!$ possible keys.

OUTPUT:

- A random key within the key space of this cryptosystem.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: S = AlphabeticStrings()
sage: E = TranspositionCryptosystem(S, 14)
sage: K = E.random_key()
```
```python
sage: Ki = E.inverse_key(K)
sage: e = E(K)
sage: d = E(Ki)
sage: M = "THECATINTHEHAT"
sage: C = e(S(M))
sage: d(S(C)) == S(M)
True
```

```python
class sage.crypto.classical.VigenereCryptosystem(S, n)

Bases: SymmetricKeyCryptosystem

Create a Vigenere cryptosystem of block length n.

INPUT:
- S– a string monoid over some alphabet
- n - integer > 0; block length of an encryption/decryption key

OUTPUT:
- A Vigenere cryptosystem of block length n over the alphabet S.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: S = AlphabeticStrings()
sage: E = VigenereCryptosystem(S,14)
sage: E
Vigenere cryptosystem on Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z of period 14
sage: K = S('ABCDEFGHIJKLMN')
sage: K
ABCDEFGHIJKLMN
sage: e = E(K)
sage: e
Cipher on Free alphabetic string monoid on A-Z
sage: e(S("THECATINTHEHAT"))
TIGFEY0UBQ0SMG
```

```python
def deciphering(K, C)

Decrypt the ciphertext C using the key K.

INPUT:
- K - a key belonging to the key space of this Vigenere cipher
- C - a string (possibly empty) over the string monoid of this cryptosystem

OUTPUT:
- The plaintext corresponding to the ciphertext C.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: V = VigenereCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings(), 24)
sage: K = V.random_key()
sage: M = V.encoding("Jack and Jill went up the hill.")
sage: V.deciphering(K, V.enciphering(K, M)) == M
True
```
**enciphering**\((K, M)\)

Encrypt the plaintext \(M\) using the key \(K\).

**INPUT:**

- \(K\) - a key belonging to the key space of this Vigenere cipher
- \(M\) - a string (possibly empty) over the string monoid of this cryptosystem

**OUTPUT:**

- The ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext \(M\).

**EXAMPLES:**

```sage
sage: V = VigenereCryptosystem(AlphabeticStrings(), 24)
sage: K = V.random_key()
sage: M = V.encoding("Jack and Jill went up the hill.")
sage: V.deciphering(K, V.enciphering(K, M)) == M
True
```

**encoding**\((M)\)

The encoding of the string \(M\) over the string monoid of this Vigenere cipher. For example, if the string monoid of this cryptosystem is `AlphabeticStringMonoid`, then the encoding of \(M\) would be its uppercase equivalent stripped of all non-alphabetic characters.

**INPUT:**

- \(M\) - a string, possibly empty

**OUTPUT:**

- The encoding of \(M\) over the string monoid of this cryptosystem.

**EXAMPLES:**

```sage
sage: A = AlphabeticStrings()
sage: V = VigenereCryptosystem(A, 24)
sage: M = "Jack and Jill went up the hill."
sage: V.encoding(M) == A.encoding(M)
True
```

**inverse_key**\((K)\)

The inverse key corresponding to the key \(K\).

**INPUT:**

- \(K\) - a key within the key space of this Vigenere cryptosystem

**OUTPUT:**

- The inverse key corresponding to \(K\).

**EXAMPLES:**

```sage
sage: S = AlphabeticStrings()
sage: E = VigenereCryptosystem(S, 14)
sage: K = E.random_key()
sage: L = E.inverse_key(K)
sage: M = S("THECATINTHEHAT")
sage: e = E(K)
sage: e == L
```

(continues on next page)
random_key()

Generate a random key within the key space of this Vigenere cryptosystem. Let \( n > 0 \) be the length of the cryptosystem alphabet and let \( m > 0 \) be the block length of this cryptosystem. Then there are \( n^m \) possible keys.

OUTPUT:

- A random key within the key space of this cryptosystem.

EXAMPLES:

```sage
sage: A = AlphabeticStrings()
sage: V = VigenereCryptosystem(A, 14)
sage: M = "THECATINTHEHAT"
sage: K = V.random_key()
sage: Ki = V.inverse_key(K)
sage: e = V(K)
sage: d = V(Ki)
sage: d(e(A(M))) == A(M)
True
```
class sage.crypto.classical_cipher.AffineCipher(parent, key)
    Bases: SymmetricKeyCipher
    Affine cipher class. This is the class that does the actual work of encryption and decryption. Users should not
directly instantiate or create objects of this class. Instead, functionalities of this class should be accessed via
AffineCryptosystem as the latter provides a convenient user interface.

class sage.crypto.classical_cipher.HillCipher(parent, key)
    Bases: SymmetricKeyCipher
    Hill cipher class
    inverse()

class sage.crypto.classical_cipher.ShiftCipher(parent, key)
    Bases: SymmetricKeyCipher
    Shift cipher class. This is the class that does the actual work of encryption and decryption. Users should not
directly instantiate or create objects of this class. Instead, functionalities of this class should be accessed via
ShiftCryptosystem as the latter provides a convenient user interface.

class sage.crypto.classical_cipher.SubstitutionCipher(parent, key)
    Bases: SymmetricKeyCipher
    Substitution cipher class
    inverse()

class sage.crypto.classical_cipher.TranspositionCipher(parent, key)
    Bases: SymmetricKeyCipher
    Transition cipher class
    inverse()

class sage.crypto.classical_cipher.VigenereCipher(parent, key)
    Bases: SymmetricKeyCipher
    Vigenere cipher class
    inverse()
A simplified variant of the Data Encryption Standard (DES). Note that Simplified DES or S-DES is for educational purposes only. It is a small-scale version of the DES designed to help beginners understand the basic structure of DES.

AUTHORS:
- Minh Van Nguyen (2009-06): initial version

```python
class sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes.SimplifiedDES
    Bases: SageObject

This class implements the Simplified Data Encryption Standard (S-DES) described in [Sch1996]. Schaefer's S-DES is for educational purposes only and is not secure for practical purposes. S-DES is a version of the DES with all parameters significantly reduced, but at the same time preserving the structure of DES. The goal of S-DES is to allow a beginner to understand the structure of DES, thus laying a foundation for a thorough study of DES. Its goal is as a teaching tool in the same spirit as Phan's Mini-AES [Pha2002].

EXAMPLES:
Encrypt a random block of 8-bit plaintext using a random key, decrypt the ciphertext, and compare the result with the original plaintext:
```
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes import SimplifiedDES
sage: sdes = SimplifiedDES(); sdes
Simplified DES block cipher with 10-bit keys
sage: bin = BinaryStrings()
sage: P = [bin(str(randint(0, 1))) for i in range(8)]
sage: K = sdes.random_key()
sage: C = sdes.encrypt(P, K)
sage: plaintxt = sdes.decrypt(C, K)
sage: plaintxt == P
True
```

We can also encrypt binary strings that are larger than 8 bits in length. However, the number of bits in that binary string must be positive and a multiple of 8:
```
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes import SimplifiedDES
sage: sdes = SimplifiedDES()
sage: bin = BinaryStrings()
sage: P = bin.encoding("Encrypt this using S-DES!")
sage: Mod(len(P), 8) == 0
True
sage: K = sdes.list_to_string(sdes.random_key())
sage: C = sdes(P, K, algorithm="encrypt")
```

(continues on next page)
sage: plaintext = sdes(C, K, algorithm="decrypt")
sage: plaintext == P
True

block_length()

Return the block length of Schaefer’s S-DES block cipher. A key in Schaefer’s S-DES is a block of 10 bits.

OUTPUT:

• The block (or key) length in number of bits.

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes import SimplifiedDES
sage: sdes = SimplifiedDES()
sage: sdes.block_length()
10

decrypt(C, K)

Return an 8-bit plaintext corresponding to the ciphertext C, using S-DES decryption with key K. The decryption process of S-DES is as follows. Let \( P \) be the initial permutation function, \( P^{-1} \) the corresponding inverse permutation, \( \Pi_F \) the permutation/substitution function, and \( \sigma \) the switch function. The ciphertext block \( C \) first goes through \( P \), the output of which goes through \( \Pi_F \) using the second subkey. Then we apply the switch function to the output of the last function, and the result is then fed into \( \Pi_F \) using the first subkey. Finally, run the output through \( P^{-1} \) to get the plaintext.

INPUT:

• \( C \) – an 8-bit ciphertext; a block of 8 bits

• \( K \) – a 10-bit key; a block of 10 bits

OUTPUT:

The 8-bit plaintext corresponding to \( C \), obtained using the key \( K \).

EXAMPLES:

Decrypt an 8-bit ciphertext block:

sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes import SimplifiedDES
sage: sdes = SimplifiedDES()
sage: C = [0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1]
sage: K = [1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]
sage: sdes.decrypt(C, K)
[0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1]

We can also work with strings of bits:

sage: C = "01010101"
sage: K = "1010000010"
sage: sdes.decrypt(sdes.string_to_list(C), sdes.string_to_list(K))
[0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1]

encrypt(P, K)

Return an 8-bit ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext P, using S-DES encryption with key K. The encryption process of S-DES is as follows. Let \( P \) be the initial permutation function, \( P^{-1} \) the corresponding inverse permutation, \( \Pi_F \) the permutation/substitution function, and \( \sigma \) the switch function. The plaintext.
block P first goes through $P$, the output of which goes through $\Pi_F$ using the first subkey. Then we apply the switch function to the output of the last function, and the result is then fed into $\Pi_F$ using the second subkey. Finally, run the output through $P^{-1}$ to get the ciphertext.

INPUT:
- $P$ – an 8-bit plaintext; a block of 8 bits
- $K$ – a 10-bit key; a block of 10 bits

OUTPUT:
The 8-bit ciphertext corresponding to $P$, obtained using the key $K$.

EXAMPLES:
Encrypt an 8-bit plaintext block:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes import SimplifiedDES
sage: sdes = SimplifiedDES()
sage: P = [0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1]
sage: K = [1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]
sage: sdes.encrypt(P, K)
[1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]
```

We can also work with strings of bits:

```
sage: P = "01010101"
sage: K = "1010000010"
sage: sdes.encrypt(sdes.string_to_list(P), sdes.string_to_list(K))
[1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]
```

`initial_permutation(B, inverse=False)`

Return the initial permutation of $B$. Denote the initial permutation function by $P$ and let $(b_0, b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_7)$ be a vector of 8 bits, where each $b_i \in \{0, 1\}$. Then

$$P(b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4, b_5, b_6, b_7) = (b_1, b_5, b_2, b_0, b_3, b_7, b_4, b_6)$$

The inverse permutation is $P^{-1}$:

$$P^{-1}(b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4, b_5, b_6, b_7) = (b_3, b_0, b_2, b_4, b_6, b_1, b_7, b_5)$$

INPUT:
- $B$ – list; a block of 8 bits
- $\text{inverse}$ – (default: False) if True then use the inverse permutation $P^{-1}$; if False then use the initial permutation $P$

OUTPUT:
The initial permutation of $B$ if inverse=False, or the inverse permutation of $B$ if inverse=True.

EXAMPLES:
The initial permutation of a list of 8 bits:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes import SimplifiedDES
sage: sdes = SimplifiedDES()
sage: B = [1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0]
sage: P = sdes.initial_permutation(B); P
[0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0]
```
Recovering the original list of 8 bits from the permutation:

```python
sage: Pinv = sdes.initial_permutation(P, inverse=True)
sage: Pinv; B
[1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0]
[1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0]
```

We can also work with a string of bits:

```python
sage: S = "10110100"
sage: L = sdes.string_to_list(S)
sage: P = sdes.initial_permutation(L); P
[0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0]
sage: sdes.initial_permutation(sdes.string_to_list("01111000"), inverse=True)
[1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0]
```

**left_shift(B, n=1)**

Return a circular left shift of B by n positions. Let \( B = (b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4, b_5, b_6, b_7, b_8, b_9) \) be a vector of 10 bits. Then the left shift operation \( L_n \) is performed on the first 5 bits and the last 5 bits of \( B \) separately. That is, if the number of shift positions is \( n=1 \), then \( L_1 \) is defined as

\[
L_1(b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4, b_5, b_6, b_7, b_8, b_9) = (b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4, b_5, b_6, b_7, b_8, b_9, b_0)
\]

If the number of shift positions is \( n=2 \), then \( L_2 \) is given by

\[
L_2(b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4, b_5, b_6, b_7, b_8, b_9) = (b_2, b_3, b_4, b_5, b_6, b_7, b_8, b_9, b_0, b_1)
\]

**INPUT:**
- \( B \) – a list of 10 bits
- \( n \) – (default: 1) if \( n=1 \) then perform left shift by 1 position; if \( n=2 \) then perform left shift by 2 positions. The valid values for \( n \) are 1 and 2, since only up to 2 positions are defined for this circular left shift operation.

**OUTPUT:**
The circular left shift of each half of \( B \).

**EXAMPLES:**
Circular left shift by 1 position of a 10-bit string:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes import SimplifiedDES
sage: sdes = SimplifiedDES()
sage: B = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0]
sage: sdes.left_shift(B)
[0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0]
sage: sdes.left_shift([1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0])
[0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0]
```

Circular left shift by 2 positions of a 10-bit string:

```python
sage: B = [0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0]
sage: sdes.left_shift(B, n=2)
[0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1]
```

Here we work with a string of bits:
```python
sage: S = "1000001100"
sage: L = sdes.string_to_list(S)
sage: sdes.left_shift(L)
[0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0]
sage: sdes.left_shift(sdes.string_to_list("1010000010"), n=2)
[1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0]
```

### list_to_string(B)

Return a binary string representation of the list B.

**INPUT:**

- B – a non-empty list of bits

**OUTPUT:**

The binary string representation of B.

**EXAMPLES:**

A binary string representation of a list of bits:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes import SimplifiedDES
c sage: sdes = SimplifiedDES()
c sage: L = [0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0]
c sage: sdes.list_to_string(L)
0000110100
```

### permutation10(B)

Return a permutation of a 10-bit string. This permutation is called \( P_{10} \) and is specified as follows. Let \((b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4, b_5, b_6, b_7, b_8, b_9)\) be a vector of 10 bits where each \( b_i \in \{0, 1\} \). Then \( P_{10} \) is given by

\[
P_{10}(b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4, b_5, b_6, b_7, b_8, b_9) = (b_2, b_4, b_1, b_6, b_3, b_9, b_0, b_8, b_7, b_5)
\]

**INPUT:**

- B – a block of 10-bit string

**OUTPUT:**

A permutation of B.

**EXAMPLES:**

Permute a 10-bit string:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes import SimplifiedDES
c sage: sdes = SimplifiedDES()
c sage: B = [1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1]
c sage: sdes.permutation10(B)
[0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0]
c sage: sdes.permutation10([0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1])
[1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0]
c sage: sdes.permutation10([1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0])
[1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0]
```

Here we work with a string of bits:

```python
```
sage: S = "1100100101"
sage: L = sdes.string_to_list(S)
sage: sdes.permutation10(L)
[0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0]
sage: sdes.permutation10(sdes.string_to_list("0110100101"))
[1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0]

permutation4(B)

Return a permutation of a 4-bit string. This permutation is called $P_4$ and is specified as follows. Let $(b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3)$ be a vector of 4 bits where each $b_i \in \{0, 1\}$. Then $P_4$ is defined by

$$P_4(b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3) = (b_1, b_3, b_2, b_0)$$

INPUT:

- B – a block of 4-bit string

OUTPUT:

A permutation of B.

EXAMPLES:

Permute a 4-bit string:

sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes import SimplifiedDES
sage: sdes = SimplifiedDES()

sage: B = [1, 1, 0, 0]
sage: sdes.permutation4(B)
[1, 0, 0, 1]
sage: sdes.permutation4([0, 1, 0, 1])
[1, 1, 0, 0]

We can also work with a string of bits:

sage: S = "1100"
sage: L = sdes.string_to_list(S)
sage: sdes.permutation4(L)
[1, 0, 0, 1]
sage: sdes.permutation4(sdes.string_to_list("0101"))
[1, 1, 0, 0]

permutation8(B)

Return a permutation of an 8-bit string. This permutation is called $P_8$ and is specified as follows. Let $(b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4, b_5, b_6, b_7, b_8, b_9)$ be a vector of 10 bits where each $b_i \in \{0, 1\}$. Then $P_8$ picks out 8 of those 10 bits and permutes those 8 bits:

$$P_8(b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4, b_5, b_6, b_7, b_8, b_9) = (b_5, b_2, b_6, b_3, b_7, b_4, b_9, b_8)$$

INPUT:

- B – a block of 10-bit string

OUTPUT:

Pick out 8 of the 10 bits of B and permute those 8 bits.

EXAMPLES:

Permute a 10-bit string:
We can also work with a string of bits:

```python
sage: S = "1100100101"
```

```python
sage: L = sdes.string_to_list(S)
sage: sdes.permutation8(L)
```

```
[0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0]
```

next read the second row as the 4-bit string \(p_{1,0}p_{1,3}p_{1,1}p_{1,2}\) and input this 4-bit string through S-box \(S_1\) to
get another 2-bit output.

\[
\begin{array}{ccc|ccc}
\text{Input} & \text{Output} & \text{Input} & \text{Output} \\
0000 & 00 & 1000 & 11 \\
0001 & 01 & 1001 & 00 \\
0010 & 10 & 1010 & 01 \\
0011 & 11 & 1011 & 00 \\
0100 & 10 & 1100 & 10 \\
0101 & 00 & 1101 & 01 \\
0110 & 01 & 1110 & 00 \\
0111 & 11 & 1111 & 11 \\
\end{array}
\]

\(S_1 = \)

Denote the 4 bits produced by \(S_0\) and \(S_1\) as \(b_0b_1b_2b_3\). This 4-bit string undergoes another permutation called \(P_4\) as follows:

\[P_4(b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3) = (b_1, b_3, b_2, b_0)\]

The output of \(P_4\) is the output of the function \(F\).

INPUT:

- \(B\) – a list of 8 bits
- key – an 8-bit subkey

OUTPUT:

The result of applying the function \(\Pi_F\) to \(B\).

EXAMPLES:

Applying the function \(\Pi_F\) to an 8-bit block and an 8-bit subkey:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes import SimplifiedDES
sage: sdes = SimplifiedDES()
sage: B = [1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1]
sage: K = [1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1]
sage: sdes.permute_substitute(B, K)
[1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1]
```

We can also work with strings of bits:

```python
sage: B = "10111101"
sage: K = "11010101"
sage: B = sdes.string_to_list(B); K = sdes.string_to_list(K)
sage: sdes.permute_substitute(B, K)
[1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1]
```

\texttt{random\_key()}\n
Return a random 10-bit key.

EXAMPLES:

The size of each key is the same as the block size:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes import SimplifiedDES
sage: sdes = SimplifiedDES()
sage: key = sdes.random_key()
sage: len(key) == sdes.block_length()
True
```
sbox()

Return the S-boxes of simplified DES.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes import SimplifiedDES
sage: sdes = SimplifiedDES()
sage: sbox = sdes.sbox()
```

```python
sage: sbox[0]; sbox[1]
(1, 0, 3, 2, 3, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2, 1, 3, 3, 1, 3, 2)
(0, 1, 2, 3, 2, 0, 1, 3, 3, 0, 1, 0, 2, 1, 0, 3)
```

string_to_list(S)

Return a list representation of the binary string S.

INPUT:

• S – a string of bits

OUTPUT:

A list representation of the string S.

EXAMPLES:

A list representation of a string of bits:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes import SimplifiedDES
sage: sdes = SimplifiedDES()
```

```python
sage: S = "0101010110"
```

```python
sage: sdes.string_to_list(S)
[0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0]
```

subkey(K, n=1)

Return the n-th subkey based on the key K.

INPUT:

• K – a 10-bit secret key of this Simplified DES

• n – (default: 1) if n=1 then return the first subkey based on K; if n=2 then return the second subkey.

The valid values for n are 1 and 2, since only two subkeys are defined for each secret key in Schaefer’s S-DES.

OUTPUT:

The n-th subkey based on the secret key K.

EXAMPLES:

Obtain the first subkey from a secret key:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes import SimplifiedDES
sage: sdes = SimplifiedDES()
```

```python
sage: key = [1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]
```

```python
sage: sdes.subkey(key, n=1)
[1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0]
```

Obtain the second subkey from a secret key:
We can also work with strings of bits:

```python
sage: K = "1010010010"
sage: L = sdes.string_to_list(K)
sage: sdes.subkey(L, n=1)
[1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1]
sage: sdes.subkey(sdes.string_to_list("0010010011"), n=2)
[0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0]
```

**switch**

Interchange the first 4 bits with the last 4 bits in the list \( B \) of 8 bits. Let \((b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4, b_5, b_6, b_7)\) be a vector of 8 bits, where each \( b_i \in \{0, 1\}\). Then the switch function \( \sigma \) is given by

\[
\sigma(b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4, b_5, b_6, b_7) = (b_4, b_5, b_6, b_7, b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3)
\]

**INPUT:**

- \( B \) – list; a block of 8 bits

**OUTPUT:**

A block of the same dimension, but in which the first 4 bits from \( B \) has been switched for the last 4 bits in \( B \).

**EXAMPLES:**

Interchange the first 4 bits with the last 4 bits:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes import SimplifiedDES
sage: sdes = SimplifiedDES()
sage: B = [1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0]
sage: sdes.switch(B)
[1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0]
sage: sdes.switch([1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0])
[0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1]
```

We can also work with a string of bits:

```python
sage: S = "11010000"
sage: L = sdes.string_to_list(S)
sage: sdes.switch(L)
[1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0]
sage: sdes.switch(sdes.string_to_list("11100000"))
[0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1]
```
A simplified variant of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Note that Mini-AES is for educational purposes only. It is a small-scale version of the AES designed to help beginners understand the basic structure of AES.

AUTHORS:

- Minh Van Nguyen (2009-05): initial version

**class** sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes.Miniaes  
**Bases:** SageObject

This class implements the Mini Advanced Encryption Standard (Mini-AES) described in [Pha2002]. Note that Phan's Mini-AES is for educational purposes only and is not secure for practical purposes. Mini-AES is a version of the AES with all parameters significantly reduced, but at the same time preserving the structure of AES. The goal of Mini-AES is to allow a beginner to understand the structure of AES, thus laying a foundation for a thorough study of AES. Its goal is as a teaching tool and is different from the SR small scale variants of the AES. SR defines a family of parameterizable variants of the AES suitable as a framework for comparing different cryptanalytic techniques that can be brought to bear on the AES.

**EXAMPLES:**

Encrypt a plaintext:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
sage: maes = MiniAES()
sage: K = FiniteField(16, "x")
sage: MS = MatrixSpace(K, 2, 2)
sage: P = MS([K("x^3 + x"), K("x^2 + 1"), K("x^2 + x"), K("x^3 + x^2")]); P
[ x^3 + x x^2 + 1]
[ x^2 + x x^3 + x^2]
sage: key = MS([K("x^3 + x^2"), K("x^3 + x"), K("x^3 + x^2 + x"), K("x^2 + x + 1")]); key
[ x^3 + x^2 x^3 + x]
[x^3 + x^2 + x x^2 + x + 1]
sage: C = maes.encrypt(P, key); C
[ x^3 + x^2 + 1 x^3 + x^2 + x + 1]
[ x x^3 + x^2 + x]
```

Decrypt the result:

```
sage: plaintxt = maes.decrypt(C, key)
sage: plaintxt; P
```

(continues on next page)
We can also work directly with binary strings:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
sage: maes = MiniAES()
sage: bin = BinaryStrings()
sage: key = bin.encoding("KE"); key
0100101101000101
sage: P = bin.encoding("Encrypt this secret message!"); P
0100010101101110011000110111001001111001011100000111010000100000011101000110100001101001011100110010000001110011011001010110001101110010
sage: C = maes(P, key, algorithm="encrypt"); C
11100000101000010110001101101001110110010010111011010001100111100000101000101111100110010010100001110101011100111001000010101000001111000101010011010001100111100111001100000001101100110110101001001000011100000101010110110101
sage: plaintxt = maes(C, key, algorithm="decrypt")
sage: plaintxt == P
True
```

Now we work with integers $n$ such that $0 \leq n \leq 15$:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
sage: maes = MiniAES()
sage: P = [n for n in range(16)]; P
[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]
sage: key = [2, 3, 11, 0]; key
[2, 3, 11, 0]
sage: P = maes.integer_to_binary(P); P
0000000100100011010001010110011110001001101010111100110111101111
sage: key = maes.integer_to_binary(key); key
0010001110110000
sage: C = maes(P, key, algorithm="encrypt"); C
00111010001011100100110001010101000111000100100011010001011100000101000101111100110010010100001110101011100111001000010101000001111000101010011010001100111100111001100000001101100110110101001001000011100000101010110110101
sage: plaintxt = maes(C, key, algorithm="decrypt")
sage: plaintxt == P
True
```

Generate some random plaintext and a random secret key. Encrypt the plaintext using that secret key and decrypt the result. Then compare the decrypted plaintext with the original plaintext:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
sage: maes = MiniAES()
sage: MS = MatrixSpace(FiniteField(16, "x"), 2, 2)
sage: P = MS.random_element()
sage: key = maes.random_key()
sage: C = maes.encrypt(P, key)
sage: plaintxt = maes.decrypt(C, key)
```

(continues on next page)
sage: plaintxt == P
True

GF_to_binary(G)

Return the binary representation of G. If G is an element of the finite field \( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} \), then obtain the binary representation of G. If G is a list of elements belonging to \( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} \), obtain the 4-bit representation of each element of the list, then concatenate the resulting 4-bit strings into a binary string. If G is a matrix with entries over \( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} \), convert each matrix entry to its 4-bit representation, then concatenate the 4-bit strings. The concatenation is performed starting from the top-left corner of the matrix, working across left to right, top to bottom. Each element of \( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} \) can be associated with a unique 4-bit string according to the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4-bit string ( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} )</th>
<th>4-bit string ( \mathbb{F}_{2^5} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000</td>
<td>0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0001</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0010</td>
<td>1010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0011</td>
<td>1011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0100</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0101</td>
<td>1101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0110</td>
<td>1110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0111</td>
<td>1111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INPUT:

- G – an element of \( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} \), a list of elements of \( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} \), or a matrix over \( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} \)

OUTPUT:

- A binary string representation of G.

EXAMPLES:

Obtain the binary representation of all elements of \( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} \):

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
sage: maes = MiniAES()

sage: K = FiniteField(16, "x")

sage: S = Set(K); len(S)  # GF(2^4) has this many elements
16

sage: [maes.GF_to_binary(S[i]) for i in range(len(S))]

[0000, 0001, 0010, 0011, 0100, 0101, 0110, 0111, 1100, 1101, 1110, 1111]
```

(continues on next page)
The binary representation of a list of elements belonging to $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES  
sage: maes = MiniAES()  
sage: K = FiniteField(16, "x")  
sage: G = [K("x^2 + x + 1"), K("x^3 + x^2"), K("x"), K("x^3 + x + 1"), K("x^3 \rightarrow x^2 + x + 1"), K("x^2 + x"), K("1"), K("x^2 + x + 1")]  
sage: maes.GF_to_binary(G)  
01111000010111111011000010111
```

The binary representation of a matrix over $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES  
sage: maes = MiniAES()  
sage: K = FiniteField(16, "x")  
sage: MS = MatrixSpace(K, 2, 2)  
sage: G = MS([K("x^3 + x^2"), K("x + 1"), K("x^2 + x + 1"), K("x^3 + x^2 + x \rightarrow ")]); G  
[ x^3 + x^2 x + 1]  
[ x^2 + x + 1 x^3 + x^2 + x]  
sage: maes.GF_to_binary(G)  
1100001101111110  
sage: MS = MatrixSpace(K, 2, 4)  
sage: G = MS([K("x^2 + x + 1"), K("x^3 + x^2"), K("x"), K("x^3 + x + 1"), K("x^3 \rightarrow 3 + x^2 + x + 1"), K("x^2 + x"), K("1"), K("x^2 + x + 1"))]; G  
[ x^2 + x + 1 x^3 + x^2 x x^3 + x + 1]  
[x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 x^2 + x 1 x^2 + x + 1]  
sage: maes.GF_to_binary(G)  
01111100001011111011000010111
```

**GF_to_integer**(G)

Return the integer representation of the finite field element G. If G is an element of the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$, then obtain the integer representation of G. If G is a list of elements belonging to $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$, obtain the integer representation of each element of the list, and return the result as a list of integers. If G is a matrix with entries over $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$, convert each matrix entry to its integer representation, and return the result as a list of integers. The resulting list is obtained by starting from the top-left corner of the matrix, working across left to right, top to bottom. Each element of $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$ can be associated with a unique integer according to the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>integer</th>
<th>$\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$</th>
<th>integer</th>
<th>$\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>$x^4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>$x^3 + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>$x$</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$x^3 + x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>$x + 1$</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>$x^3 + x + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>$x^2$</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>$x^3 + x^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>$x^2 + 1$</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>$x^2 + x$</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>$x^2 + x + 1$</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cryptography, Release 10.1

INPUT:
• $G$ – an element of $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$, a list of elements belonging to $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$, or a matrix over $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$

OUTPUT:
• The integer representation of $G$.

EXAMPLES:

Obtain the integer representation of all elements of $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
sage: maes = MiniAES()
sage: K = FiniteField(16, "x")
S = Set(K); len(S)   # GF(2^4) has this many elements
16
sage: [maes.GF_to_integer(S[i]) for i in range(len(S))]
[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]
```

The integer representation of a list of elements belonging to $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
sage: maes = MiniAES()
sage: K = FiniteField(16, "x")
G = [K("x^2 + x + 1"), K("x^3 + x^2"), K("x"), K("x^3 + x + 1"), K("x^3 + x^2 + x + 1"), K("x^3 + x + 1"), K("x^2 + x + 1")]
sage: maes.GF_to_integer(G)
[7, 12, 2, 11, 15, 6, 1, 7]
```

The integer representation of a matrix over $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
sage: maes = MiniAES()
K = FiniteField(16, "x")
S = MatrixSpace(K, 2, 2)
G = S([K("x^3 + x^2"), K("x + 1"), K("x^2 + x + 1"), K("x^3 + x^2 + x + 1")]); G
[ x^3 + x^2 x + 1]
[ x^2 + x + 1 x^3 + x^2 + x]
sage: maes.GF_to_integer(G)
[12, 3, 7, 14]
```

add_key(block, rkey)
Return the matrix addition of block and rkey. Both block and rkey are $2 \times 2$ matrices over the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$. This method just return the matrix addition of these two matrices.

INPUT:
• **block** – a $2 \times 2$ matrix with entries over $F_{2^4}$

• **rkey** – a round key; a $2 \times 2$ matrix with entries over $F_{2^4}$

**OUTPUT:**

• The matrix addition of block and rkey.

**EXAMPLES:**

We can work with elements of $F_{2^4}$:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
sage: maes = MiniAES()
```

```python
sage: K = FiniteField(16, "x")
```

```python
sage: MS = MatrixSpace(K, 2, 2)
```

```python
sage: D = MS([ [K("x^3 + x^2 + x + 1"), K("x^3 + x")], [K("0"), K("x^3 + x^2")]]); D
```

```python
[x^3 + x^2 + x + 1  x^3 + x]
[ 0 x^3 + x^2]
```

```python
sage: k = MS([ [K("x^2 + 1"), K("x^3 + x^2 + x + 1")], [K("x + 1"), K("0")]]); k
```

```python
[x^2 + 1 x^3 + x^2 + x + 1]
[x + 1 0]
```

```python
sage: maes.add_key(D, k)
```

```python
[x^3 + x  x^2 + 1]
[x + 1 x^3 + x^2]
```

Or work with binary strings:

```python
sage: bin = BinaryStrings()
```

```python
sage: B = bin.encoding("We"); B
0101011101100101
```

```python
sage: B = MS(maes.binary_to_GF(B)); B
```

```python
[x^2 + 1 x^2 + x + 1]
[x^2 + x x^2 + 1]
```

```python
sage: key = bin.encoding("KY"); key
0100101101011001
```

```python
sage: key = MS(maes.binary_to_GF(key)); key
```

```python
[x^2 x^3 + x + 1]
[x^2 + 1 x^3 + 1]
```

```python
sage: maes.add_key(B, key)
```

```python
[1 x^3 + x^2]
[x + 1 x^3 + x^2]
```

We can also work with integers $n$ such that $0 \leq n \leq 15$:

```python
sage: N = [2, 3, 5, 7]; N
[2, 3, 5, 7]
```

```python
sage: key = [9, 11, 13, 15]; key
```

(continues on next page)
sage: N = MS(maes.integer_to_GF(N)); N
[x  x + 1]
[ x^2 + 1  x^2 + x + 1]
sage: key = MS(maes.integer_to_GF(key)); key
[x^3 + 1  x^3 + x + 1]
[ x^3 + x^2 + 1  x^3 + x^2 + x + 1]
sage: maes.add_key(N, key)
[x^3 + x + 1  x^3]
[ x^3  x^3]

\textbf{binary\_to\_GF}(B)

Return a list of elements of F_{2^4} that represents the binary string \texttt{B}. The number of bits in \texttt{B} must be greater than zero and a multiple of 4. Each nibble (or 4-bit string) is uniquely associated with an element of F_{2^4} as specified by the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4-bit string</th>
<th>F_{2^4}</th>
<th>4-bit string</th>
<th>F_{2^4}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>x^3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>x^3 + 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0010</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>x^3 + x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0011</td>
<td>x + 1</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td>x^3 + x + 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0100</td>
<td>x^2</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>x^3 + x^2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0101</td>
<td>x^2 + 1</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>x^3 + x^2 + 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0110</td>
<td>x^2 + x</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>x^3 + x^2 + x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0111</td>
<td>x^2 + x + 1</td>
<td>1111</td>
<td>x^3 + x^2 + x + 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INPUT:**
- \texttt{B} – a binary string, where the number of bits is positive and a multiple of 4

**OUTPUT:**
- A list of elements of the finite field F_{2^4} that represent the binary string \texttt{B}

**EXAMPLES:**

Obtain all the elements of the finite field F_{2^4}:

sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
sage: maes = MiniAES()
sage: bin = BinaryStrings()
sage: B = bin("0000000100100011000000010110001101100110110000000001011011101100011101111011111")
sage: maes.binary_to_GF(B)

[0,
1,
x,
x + 1,
x^2,
x^2 + 1,
x^2 + x,
\[ x^2 + x + 1, \\
x^3, \\
x^3 + 1, \\
x^3 + x, \\
x^3 + x + 1, \\
x^3 + x^2, \\
x^3 + x^2 + 1, \\
x^3 + x^2 + x, \\
x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 \]

**binary_to_integer**(\(B\))

Return a list of integers representing the binary string \(B\). The number of bits in \(B\) must be greater than zero and a multiple of 4. Each nibble (or 4-bit string) is uniquely associated with an integer as specified by the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4-bit string</th>
<th>integer</th>
<th>4-bit string</th>
<th>integer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0011</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0100</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0101</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0110</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0111</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1111</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INPUT:**

- \(B\) – a binary string, where the number of bits is positive and a multiple of 4

**OUTPUT:**

- A list of integers that represent the binary string \(B\).

**EXAMPLES:**

Obtain the integer representation of every 4-bit string:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
sage: maes = MiniAES()
sage: bin = BinaryStrings()
sage: B = bin("00000001001000110100010101100111100010011010101111001101111011111")
sage: maes.binary_to_integer(B)
[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]
```

**block_length()**

Return the block length of Phan’s Mini-AES block cipher. A key in Phan’s Mini-AES is a block of 16 bits. Each nibble of a key can be considered as an element of the finite field \(F_{2^4}\). Therefore the key consists of four elements from \(F_{2^4}\).

**OUTPUT:**

- The block (or key) length in number of bits.

**EXAMPLES:**
decrypt\((C, key)\)

Use Phan’s Mini-AES to decrypt the ciphertext \(C\) with the secret key \(key\). Both \(C\) and \(key\) must be \(2 \times 2\) matrices over the finite field \(F_{2^4}\). Let \(\gamma\) denote the operation of nibble-sub, \(\pi\) denote shift-row, \(\theta\) denote mix-column, and \(\sigma_{K_i}\) denote add-key with the round key \(K_i\). Then decryption \(D\) using Phan’s Mini-AES is the function composition

\[
D = \sigma_{K_0} \circ \gamma^{-1} \circ \pi \circ \theta \circ \sigma_{K_1} \circ \gamma^{-1} \circ \pi \circ \sigma_{K_2}
\]

where \(\gamma^{-1}\) is the nibble-sub operation that uses the S-box for decryption, and the order of execution is from right to left.

**INPUT:**

- \(C\) – a ciphertext block; must be a \(2 \times 2\) matrix over the finite field \(F_{2^4}\)
- \(key\) – a secret key for this Mini-AES block cipher; must be a \(2 \times 2\) matrix over the finite field \(F_{2^4}\)

**OUTPUT:**

- The plaintext corresponding to \(C\).

**EXAMPLES:**

We encrypt a plaintext, decrypt the ciphertext, then compare the decrypted plaintext with the original plaintext. Here we work with elements of \(F_{2^4}\):

\[
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES\\
sage: maes = MiniAES()\\
sage: C = maes.encrypt(P, key); C\\\begin{bmatrix} x+1 & x^2+1 \\ x^3+x^2+x+1 \\ x+1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}\\
sage: plaintext = maes.decrypt(C, key)\\
sage: plaintext == P\\\begin{bmatrix} x^3 + 1 & x^2 + x \\ x^3 + x^2 & x + 1 \\ x^3 + x^2 + x \\ x^3 + x^2 + x \end{bmatrix}\\
True
\]
But we can also work with binary strings:

```sage
sage: bin = BinaryStrings()
sage: P = bin.encoding("de"); P
0110010001100101
sage: P = MS(maes.binary_to_GF(P)); P
[x^2 + x  x^2]
[x^2 + x  x^2 + 1]
sage: key = bin.encoding("ke"); key
0110101101100101
sage: key = MS(maes.binary_to_GF(key)); key
[x  x^2 + x]
[x^2 + x  x^2 + 1]
sage: C = maes.encrypt(P, key)
sage: plaintxt = maes.decrypt(C, key)
sage: plaintxt == P
True
```

Here we work with integers \( n \) such that \( 0 \leq n \leq 15 \):

```sage
sage: P = [3, 5, 7, 14]; P
[3, 5, 7, 14]
sage: key = [2, 6, 7, 8]; key
[2, 6, 7, 8]
sage: P = MS(maes.integer_to_GF(P)); P
[ x + 1  x^2 + 1]
[ x^2 + x  x^2 + 1]
sage: key = MS(maes.integer_to_GF(key)); key
[x + x^2 + x]
[x^2 + x + 1  x^3]
sage: C = maes.encrypt(P, key)
sage: plaintxt = maes.decrypt(C, key)
sage: plaintxt == P
True
```

`encrypt(P, key)`

Use Phan’s Mini-AES to encrypt the plaintext `P` with the secret key `key`. Both `P` and `key` must be 2 \times 2 matrices over the finite field \( F_{2^4} \). Let \( \gamma \) denote the operation of nibble-sub, \( \pi \) denote shift-row, \( \theta \) denote mix-column, and \( \sigma_{K_i} \) denote add-key with the round key \( K_i \). Then encryption \( E \) using Phan’s Mini-AES is the function composition

\[
E = \sigma_{K_2} \circ \pi \circ \gamma \circ \sigma_{K_1} \circ \theta \circ \pi \circ \gamma \circ \sigma_{K_0}
\]

where the order of execution is from right to left. Note that \( \gamma \) is the nibble-sub operation that uses the S-box for encryption.

**INPUT:**

- `P` – a plaintext block; must be a 2 \times 2 matrix over the finite field \( F_{2^4} \)
- `key` – a secret key for this Mini-AES block cipher; must be a 2 \times 2 matrix over the finite field \( F_{2^4} \)

**OUTPUT:**
• The ciphertext corresponding to $P$.

EXAMPLES:

Here we work with elements of $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$:

```
from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
sage: maes = MiniAES()
```
```
sage: K = FiniteField(16, "x")
```
```
sage: MS = MatrixSpace(K, 2, 2)
```
```
sage: P = MS([[K("x^3 + 1"), K("x^2 + x")], [K("x^3 + x^2"), K("x + 1")]]); P
[ x^3 + 1 x^2 + x]
[ x^3 + x^2 x + 1]
```
```
sage: key = MS([[K("x^3 + x^2"), K("x^3 + x^2 + x + 1")], [K("x + 1"), K("0")]])
```
```
[ x^3 + x^2 x^3 + x^2 + x + 1]
[ x + 1 0]
```
```
sage: maes.encrypt(P, key)
[ x + 1 x^2 + 1]
[ x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 x^2]
```
```
But we can also work with binary strings:

```
sage: bin = BinaryStrings()
```
```
sage: P = bin.encoding("de"); P
0110010001100101
```
```
sage: P = MS(maes.binary_to_GF(P)); P
[ x^2 + x x^2]
[ x^2 + x x^2 + 1]
```
```
sage: key = bin.encoding("ke"); key
0110101101100101
```
```
sage: key = MS(maes.binary_to_GF(key)); key
[ x^2 + x x^3 + x + 1]
[ x^2 + x x^2 + 1]
```
```
sage: C = maes.encrypt(P, key)
sage: plaintxt = maes.decrypt(C, key)
sage: plaintxt == P
True
```

Now we work with integers $n$ such that $0 \leq n \leq 15$:

```
sage: P = [1, 5, 8, 12]; P
[1, 5, 8, 12]
sage: key = [5, 9, 15, 0]; key
[5, 9, 15, 0]
sage: P = MS(maes.integer_to_GF(P)); P
[ 1 x^2 + 1]
[ x^3 x^3 + x^2]
```
```
sage: key = MS(maes.integer_to_GF(key)); key
```

(continues on next page)
integer_to_GF(N)

Return the finite field representation of N. If N is an integer such that 0 ≤ N ≤ 15, return the element of \( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} \) that represents N. If N is a list of integers each of which is \( \geq 0 \) and \( \leq 15 \), then obtain the element of \( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} \) that represents each such integer, and return a list of such finite field representations. Each integer between 0 and 15, inclusive, can be associated with a unique element of \( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} \) according to the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>integer</th>
<th>( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} )</th>
<th>integer</th>
<th>( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>( x^4 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>( x^3 + 1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>( x )</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>( x^3 + x )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>( x + 1 )</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>( x^3 + x + 1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>( x^2 )</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>( x^3 + x^2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>( x^2 + 1 )</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>( x^3 + x^2 + 1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>( x^2 + x )</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>( x^3 + x^2 + x )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>( x^2 + x + 1 )</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>( x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INPUT:

- N – a non-negative integer less than or equal to 15, or a list of such integers

OUTPUT:

- Elements of the finite field \( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} \).

EXAMPLES:

Obtain the element of \( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} \) representing an integer \( n \), where 0 ≤ \( n \) ≤ 15:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{sage: } & \text{from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES} \\
\text{sage: } & \text{maes = MiniAES()} \\
\text{sage: } & \text{maes.integer_to_GF(0)} \\
& 0 \\
\text{sage: } & \text{maes.integer_to_GF(2)} \\
& x \\
\text{sage: } & \text{maes.integer_to_GF(7)} \\
& x^2 + x + 1
\end{align*}
\]

Obtain the finite field elements corresponding to all non-negative integers less than or equal to 15:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{sage: } & \text{from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES} \\
\text{sage: } & \text{maes = MiniAES()} \\
\text{sage: } & \text{lst = [n for n in range(16)]; lst} \\
& [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] \\
\text{sage: } & \text{maes.integer_to_GF(lst)} \\
& [0, 1, x, \ldots]
\end{align*}
\]
x + 1,
x^2,
x^2 + 1,
x^2 + x,
x^2 + x + 1,
x^3,
x^3 + 1,
x^3 + x,
x^3 + x + 1,
x^3 + x^2,
x^3 + x^2 + 1,
x^3 + x^2 + x,
x^3 + x^2 + x + 1

integer_to_binary(N)

Return the binary representation of N. If N is an integer such that 0 ≤ N ≤ 15, return the binary representation of N. If N is a list of integers each of which is ≥ 0 and ≤ 15, then obtain the binary representation of each integer, and concatenate the individual binary representations into a single binary string. Each integer between 0 and 15, inclusive, can be associated with a unique 4-bit string according to the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4-bit string</th>
<th>integer</th>
<th>4-bit string</th>
<th>integer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0011</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0100</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0101</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0110</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0111</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1111</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INPUT:

- N – a non-negative integer less than or equal to 15, or a list of such integers

OUTPUT:

- A binary string representing N.

EXAMPLES:

The binary representations of all integers between 0 and 15, inclusive:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
sage: maes = MiniAES()
sage: lst = [n for n in range(16)]; lst
[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]
sage: maes.integer_to_binary(lst)
'00000001001000110101011000111110110111100101101110111101111'
```

The binary representation of an integer between 0 and 15, inclusive:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
sage: maes = MiniAES()
sage: maes.integer_to_binary(3)
'0011'
```
mix_column(block)

Return the matrix multiplication of block with a constant matrix. The constant matrix is

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  x + 1 & x \\
  x & x + 1
\end{bmatrix}
\]

If the input block is

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  c_0 & c_2 \\
  c_1 & c_3
\end{bmatrix}
\]

then the output block is

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  d_0 & d_2 \\
  d_1 & d_3
\end{bmatrix}
= \begin{bmatrix}
  x + 1 & x \\
  x & x + 1
\end{bmatrix}
\begin{bmatrix}
  c_0 & c_2 \\
  c_1 & c_3
\end{bmatrix}
\]

INPUT:

- block—a 2 × 2 matrix with entries over \( F_{2^4} \)

OUTPUT:

- A 2 × 2 matrix resulting from multiplying the above constant matrix with the input matrix block.

EXAMPLES:

Here we work with elements of \( F_{2^4} \):

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  x^3 + x \\
  x^2 + 1 x^3 + x^2 + x + 1
\end{bmatrix}
\]

Multiplying by the identity matrix should leave the constant matrix unchanged:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  x + 1 & x \\
  x & x + 1
\end{bmatrix}
\]

We can also work with binary strings:

\[
0111001001010100
\]
We can also work with integers $n$ such that $0 \leq n \leq 15$:

\[
\text{sage: } P = [10, 5, 2, 7]; P \\n\text{sage: } P = \text{MS(maes.integer_to_GF(P))}; P
\]

\[
[ x^3 + x \quad x^2 + 1 ] \quad [ x^3 + x \quad x^2 + 1 ]
\]

\[
\text{sage: maes.mix_column}(P)
\]

\[
[x^3 + 1 \quad 1] \quad [x^3 + 1 \quad 1]
\]

\[
[1 \quad x + 1]
\]

\[
\text{nibble}\_\text{sub}(\text{block, } \text{algorithm}=\text{'encrypt'})
\]

Substitute a nibble (or a block of 4 bits) using the following S-box:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>0011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0001</td>
<td>0100</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>1010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0010</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>0110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0011</td>
<td>0001</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0100</td>
<td>0010</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>0101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0101</td>
<td>1111</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>1001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0110</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0111</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1111</td>
<td>0111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The values in the above S-box are taken from the first row of the first S-box of the Data Encryption Standard (DES). Each nibble can be thought of as an element of the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$ of 16 elements. Thus in terms
of $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$, the S-box can also be specified as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$x^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x$</td>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x + 1$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^2$</td>
<td>$x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^2 + 1$</td>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^2 + x$</td>
<td>$x^3 + x + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^2 + x + 1$</td>
<td>$x^3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^3$</td>
<td>$x + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^3 + 1$</td>
<td>$x^3 + x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^3 + x$</td>
<td>$x^2 + x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^3 + x + 1$</td>
<td>$x^3 + x^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^3 + x^2$</td>
<td>$x^2 + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + 1$</td>
<td>$x^3 + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + x$</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$</td>
<td>$x^2 + x + 1$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that the above S-box is used for encryption. The S-box for decryption is obtained from the above S-box by reversing the role of the Input and Output columns. Thus the previous Input column for encryption now becomes the Output column for decryption, and the previous Output column for encryption is now the Input column for decryption. The S-box used for decryption can be specified as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$x + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x$</td>
<td>$x^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x + 1$</td>
<td>$x^3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^2$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^2 + 1$</td>
<td>$x^3 + x^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^2 + x$</td>
<td>$x^3 + x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^2 + x + 1$</td>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^3$</td>
<td>$x^2 + x + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^3 + 1$</td>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^3 + x$</td>
<td>$x^3 + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^3 + x + 1$</td>
<td>$x^2 + x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^3 + x^2$</td>
<td>$x^3 + x + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + 1$</td>
<td>$x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + x$</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$</td>
<td>$x^2 + 1$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INPUT:
- block – a $2 \times 2$ matrix with entries over $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$
- algorithm – (default: "encrypt") a string; a flag to signify whether this nibble-sub operation is used for encryption or decryption. The encryption flag is "encrypt" and the decryption flag is "decrypt".

OUTPUT:
- A $2 \times 2$ matrix resulting from applying an S-box on entries of the $2 \times 2$ matrix block.

EXAMPLES:
Here we work with elements of the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$:
Cryptography, Release 10.1

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
sage: maes = MiniAES()
sage: K = FiniteField(16, "x")
sage: MS = MatrixSpace(K, 2, 2)
sage: mat = MS([[K("x^3 + x^2 + x + 1"), K("0")], [K("x^2 + x + 1"), K("x^3 + x")]])
sage: maes.nibble_sub(mat, algorithm="encrypt")

[ x^2 + x + 1 x^3 + x^2 + x]
[ x^3 x^2 + x]

But we can also work with binary strings:

```python
sage: bin = BinaryStrings()
sage: B = bin.encoding("bi"); B
0110001001101001
sage: B = MS(maes.binary_to_GF(B)); B

[ x^2 + x x]
[ x^2 + x x^3 + 1]
sage: maes.nibble_sub(B, algorithm="encrypt")

[ x^3 + x + 1 x^3 + x^2 + 1]
[ x^3 + x + 1 x^3 + x]
sage: maes.nibble_sub(B, algorithm="decrypt")

[ x^3 + x x^2]
[ x^3 + x x^3 + x^2 + 1]
```

Here we work with integers \( n \) such that \( 0 \leq n \leq 15 \):

```python
sage: P = [2, 6, 8, 14]; P
[2, 6, 8, 14]
sage: P = MS(maes.integer_to_GF(P)); P

[ x x^2 + x]
[ x^3 x^3 + x^2 + x]
sage: maes.nibble_sub(P, algorithm="encrypt")

[x^3 + x^2 + 1 x^3 + x + 1]
[x + 1 0]
sage: maes.nibble_sub(P, algorithm="decrypt")

[x^2 x^3 + x]
[x^2 + x + 1 0]
```

**random_key()**

A random key within the key space of this Mini-AES block cipher. Like the AES, Phan’s Mini-AES is a symmetric-key block cipher. A Mini-AES key is a block of 16 bits, or a \( 2 \times 2 \) matrix with entries over the finite field \( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} \). Thus the number of possible keys is \( 2^{16} = 16^4 \).

**OUTPUT:**

- A \( 2 \times 2 \) matrix over the finite field \( \mathbb{F}_{2^4} \), used as a secret key for this Mini-AES block cipher.
EXAMPLES:

Each nibble of a key is an element of the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$:

```sage
sage: K = FiniteField(16, "x")
```

```sage
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
```

```sage
sage: maes = MiniAES()
```

```sage
sage: key = maes.random_key()
```

```sage
sage: [key[i][j] in K for i in range(key.nrows()) for j in range(key.ncols())]  
[True, True, True, True]
```

Generate a random key, then perform encryption and decryption using that key:

```sage
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
```

```sage
sage: maes = MiniAES()
```

```sage
sage: K = FiniteField(16, "x")
```

```sage
sage: MS = MatrixSpace(K, 2, 2)
```

```sage
sage: key = maes.random_key()
```

```sage
sage: P = MS.random_element()
```

```sage
sage: C = maes.encrypt(P, key)
```

```sage
sage: plaintxt = maes.decrypt(C, key)
```

```sage
sage: plaintxt == P
```

```
True
```

`round_key(key, n)`

Return the round key for round $n$. Phan’s Mini-AES is defined to have two rounds. The round key $K_0$ is generated and used prior to the first round, with round keys $K_1$ and $K_2$ being used in rounds 1 and 2 respectively. In total, there are three round keys, each generated from the secret key $key$.

**INPUT:**

- $key$ – the secret key
- $n$ – non-negative integer; the round number

**OUTPUT:**

- The $n$-th round key.

**EXAMPLES:**

Obtaining the round keys from the secret key:

```sage
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
```

```sage
sage: maes = MiniAES()
```

```sage
sage: K = FiniteField(16, "x")
```

```sage
sage: MS = MatrixSpace(K, 2, 2)
```

```sage
sage: key = MS([[K("x^3 + x^2"), K("x^3 + x^2 + x + 1")], [K("x + 1"), K("0")]])
```

```sage
sage: maes.round_key(key, 0)
```

```
[ x^3 + x^2  x^3 + x^2 + x + 1]
[ x + 1      0]
```

```sage
sage: key
```

```
[ x^3 + x^2  x^3 + x^2 + x + 1]
[ x + 1      0]
```

(continues on next page)
sage: maes.round_key(key, 1)
[[x^3 + x x^2 + x],
[x^3 + 1 x^2 + x]]
sage: maes.round_key(key, 2)
[[ x^2 + 1 x^3 + x],
[x^3 + x^2 x^3 + x^2]]

sbox()
Return the S-box of Mini-AES.

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
sage: maes = MiniAES()
sage: maes.sbox()
(14, 4, 13, 1, 2, 15, 11, 8, 3, 10, 6, 12, 5, 9, 0, 7)

shift_row(block)
Rotate each row of block to the left by different nibble amounts. The first or zero-th row is left unchanged, while the second or row one is rotated left by one nibble. This has the effect of only interchanging the nibbles in the second row. Let \(b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3\) be four nibbles arranged as the following \(2 \times 2\) matrix

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  b_0 & b_2 \\
  b_1 & b_3
\end{bmatrix}
\]

Then the operation of shift-row is the mapping

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  b_0 & b_2 \\
  b_1 & b_3
\end{bmatrix}
\mapsto
\begin{bmatrix}
  b_0 & b_2 \\
  b_3 & b_1
\end{bmatrix}
\]

INPUT:

- block – a \(2 \times 2\) matrix with entries over \(F_{2^4}\)

OUTPUT:

- A \(2 \times 2\) matrix resulting from applying shift-row on \(\text{block}\).

EXAMPLES:

Here we work with elements of the finite field \(F_{2^4}\):

sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes import MiniAES
sage: maes = MiniAES()
sage: K = FiniteField(16, "x")
sage: MS = MatrixSpace(K, 2, 2)
sage: mat = MS([[K("x^3 + x^2 + x + 1"), K("0")],
             [K("x^3 + x") x^2 + x + 1]])
sage: maes.shift_row(mat)
[[x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 0],
 [ x^3 + x x^2 + x + 1]]
But we can also work with binary strings:

```
sage: bin = BinaryStrings()
sage: B = bin.encoding("Qt"); B
0101000101110100
sage: B = MS(maes.binary_to_GF(B)); B

[ 1 1
[x^2 + 1
[x^2 + x + 1  x^2]
sage: maes.shift_row(B)

[ 1 1]
[x^2 + 1
[x^2  x^2 + x + 1]
```

Here we work with integers \( n \) such that \( 0 \leq n \leq 15 \):

```
sage: P = [3, 6, 9, 12]; P
[3, 6, 9, 12]
sage: P = MS(maes.integer_to_GF(P)); P

[ 1  x^2 + x]
[x^3 + 1  x^3 + x^2]
sage: maes.shift_row(P)

[ 1  x^2 + x]
[ x^3 + x^2  x^3 + 1]
```
The Data Encryption Standard.

This file implements the Data Encryption Standard and the corresponding key schedule as described in [U.S1999].

This implementation is meant for experimental and educational usage only, do not use it in production code!

EXAMPLES:

Encrypt a message:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.des import DES
sage: des = DES()
sage: P = 0x01A1D6D039776742
sage: K = 0x7CA110454A1A6E57
sage: C = des.encrypt(plaintext=P, key=K); C.hex()
'690f5b0d9a26939b'
```

And decrypt it again:

```python
sage: des.decrypt(ciphertext=C, key=K).hex()
'1a1d6d039776742'
```

Have a look at the used round keys:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.des import DES_KS
sage: ks = DES_KS()
[sage: [k.hex() for k in ks(0x1F08260D1AC2465E)]
['103049bf90e',
'808d40f07bf',
'...'
'231000f2dd97']
```

Validate the Sample Round Outputs for DES (cf. [KeSm1998] p. 124):

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.des import DES
sage: P = 0
sage: K = 0x10316E028C8F3B4A
sage: for r in range(1, 17):
    ....:     DES(rounds=r, doFinalRound=False).encrypt(P, K).hex()
'47092b5b'
'47092b5b53f372af'
'53f372af9f1d158b'
...
Cryptography, Release 10.1

(continued from previous page)

'3f6c3ef5ae5228'
sage: DES().encrypt(P, K).hex()
'82dcbafebdeb6602'

Change cipher internals:

sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: cipher = DES(rounds=1, doFinalRound=False)
sage: cipher.sboxes = [[SBox(range(16))]**4]*8
sage: cipher.keySchedule = lambda x: [0]  # return the Ø key as round key
sage: cipher.encrypt(plaintext=0x1234, key=0x0).hex()
'80004000d08100'

AUTHORS:
• Lukas Stennes (2019-03-29): initial version

class sage.crypto.block_cipher.des.DES(rounds=None, keySchedule='DES_KS', keySize=64, doFinalRound=True)

Bases: sage_object

This class implements DES described in [U.S1999].

EXAMPLES:
You can invoke DES encryption/decryption either by calling DES with an appropriate flag:

sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.des import DES
sage: des = DES()
sage: P = 0x8000000000000000
sage: K = 0x0
sage: C = des(P, K, 'encrypt'); C.hex()
'95f8a5e5dd31d900'
sage: des(C, K, 'decrypt').hex()
'8000000000000000'

Or by calling encryption/decryption methods directly:

sage: C = des.encrypt(P, K)
sage: P == des.decrypt(C, K)
True

The number of rounds can be reduced easily:

sage: des = DES(rounds=15)
sage: des(des(P, K, 'encrypt'), K, 'decrypt') == P
True

You can use hex (i.e. integers) or a list-like bit representation for the inputs. If the input is an integer the output will be too. If it is list-like the output will be a bit vector:

sage: des = DES()
sage: P = vector(GF(2), 64, [1] + [0]*63)
sage: K = vector(GF(2), 64, [0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1]*8)
sage: des.encrypt(P, K)
Cryptography, Release 10.1

(continued from previous page)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

sage: P = 0x8000000000000000
sage: K = 0x0101010101010101
sage: C = des.encrypt(P, K); C; C.hex()
10806569712552630528 '95f8a5e5dd31d900'

See also:

DES_KS sage.crypto.sboxes

__init__(rounds=None, keySchedule='DES_KS', keySize=64, doFinalRound=True)

Construct an instance of DES.

INPUT:

- rounds – integer (default: None); the number of rounds. If None the number of rounds of the key schedule is used.
- keySchedule – (default: 'DES_KS'); the key schedule that will be used for encryption and decryption. If 'DES_KS' the default DES key schedule is used.
- keySize – (default: 64); the key length in bits. Must be 56 or 64. In the latter case the key contains 8 parity bits.
- doFinalRound – boolean (default: True); if False a swap takes places but the inverse initial permutation is omitted (i.e. you can get the state after rounds). This only effects encryption.

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.des import DES
sage: DES() # indirect doctest
DES block cipher with 16 rounds and the following key schedule:
Original DES key schedule with 16 rounds

Reducing the number of rounds is simple. But increasing it is only possible if the key schedule can produce enough round keys:

sage: DES(rounds=11) # indirect doctest
DES block cipher with 11 rounds and the following key schedule:
Original DES key schedule with 16 rounds
sage: DES(rounds=42) # indirect doctest
Traceback (most recent call last):
... ValueError: number of rounds must be less or equal to the number of rounds of the key schedule

You can use arbitrary key schedules. Since it is the only one implemented here the original key schedule is used for demonstration:

sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.des import DES_KS
sage: DES(keySchedule=DES_KS(11)) # indirect doctest
DES block cipher with 11 rounds and the following key schedule:
Original DES key schedule with 11 rounds
__call__(block, key, algorithm='encrypt')

Apply DES encryption or decryption on block using key. The flag algorithm controls what action is to be performed on block.

INPUT:

• block – integer or bit list-like; the plaintext or ciphertext
• key – integer or bit list-like; the key
• algorithm – string (default: 'encrypt'); a flag to signify whether encryption or decryption is to be applied to block. The encryption flag is 'encrypt' and the decryption flag is 'decrypt'

OUTPUT:

• The plaintext or ciphertext corresponding to block, obtained using key. If block is an integer the output will be too. If block is list-like the output will be a bit vector.

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.des import DES
sage: des = DES()
 sage: P = 0x480D39006EE762F2
 sage: K = 0x025816164629B007
 sage: des(P, K, 'encrypt').hex()
'1a1f9915541020b56'

decrypt(ciphertext, key)

Return the plaintext corresponding to ciphertext, using DES decryption with key.

INPUT:

• ciphertext – integer or bit list-like; the ciphertext that will be decrypted
• key – integer or bit list-like; the key

OUTPUT:

• The plaintext corresponding to ciphertext, obtained using key. If ciphertext is an integer the output will be too. If ciphertext is list-like the output will be a bit vector.

EXAMPLES:

Decrypt a message:

sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.des import DES
sage: des = DES()
 sage: K64 = 0x7CA110454A1A6E57
 sage: C = 0x690F5B0D9A26939B
 sage: P = des.decrypt(C, K64).hex(); P
'1a1d6d039776742'

You can also use 56 bit keys i.e. you can leave out the parity bits:

sage: K56 = 0x7D49224A35BAB
sage: des = DES(keySize=56)
sage: des.decrypt(C, K56).hex() == P
True
\textbf{encrypt}(plaintext, key)

Return the ciphertext corresponding to plaintext, using DES encryption with key.

\textbf{INPUT:}

- plaintext – integer or bit list-like; the plaintext that will be encrypted.
- key – integer or bit list-like; the key

\textbf{OUTPUT:}

- The ciphertext corresponding to plaintext, obtained using key. If plaintext is an integer the output will be too. If plaintext is list-like the output will be a bit vector.

\textbf{EXAMPLES:}

Encrypt a message:

\begin{verbatim}
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.des import DES
sage: des = DES()
\end{verbatim}
\begin{verbatim}
sage: K64 = 0x133457799BBCDFF1
sage: P = 0x0123456789ABCDEF
sage: C = des.encrypt(P, K64); C.hex()
'85e813540f0ab405'
\end{verbatim}

You can also use 56 bit keys i.e. you can leave out the parity bits:

\begin{verbatim}
sage: K56 = 0x12695BC9B7B7F8
sage: des = DES(keySize=56)
sage: des.encrypt(P, K56) == C
True
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{round}(state, round_key)

Apply one round of DES to state and return the result.

\textbf{EXAMPLES:}

\begin{verbatim}
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.des import DES
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.des import convert_to_vector
\end{verbatim}
\begin{verbatim}
sage: des = DES()
\end{verbatim}
\begin{verbatim}
sage: k1 = convert_to_vector(0xFFFFFFFFFFFF, 48)
sage: state = convert_to_vector(0xFFFFFFFF11111111, 64)
sage: ZZ(list(des.round(state, k1))[::-1], 2).hex()
'11111111b29684b8'
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{sbox_layer}(block)

Apply the Sboxes to block.

\textbf{EXAMPLES:}

\begin{verbatim}
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.des import DES
\end{verbatim}
\begin{verbatim}
sage: B = vector(GF(2), 48, [0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,
See also:

`sage.crypto.sboxes`

class `sage.crypto.block_cipher.des.DES_KS(rounds=16, masterKey=None)`

Bases: `SageObject`

This class implements the DES key schedules described in [U.S1999].

EXAMPLES:

 Initialise the key schedule with a `masterKey` to use it as an iterable:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.des import DES_KS
sage: ks = DES_KS(masterKey=0)
sage: ks[0]
sage: ks[15]
```

Or omit the `masterKey` and pass a key when calling the key schedule:

```
sage: ks = DES_KS()
sage: K = ks(0x584023641ABA6176)
sage: K[0].hex()
sage: K[15].hex()
```

See also:

`DES`

`__init__`(rounds=16, masterKey=None)

Construct an instance of DES_KS.

INPUT:

- `rounds` – integer (default: 16); the number of rounds `self` can create keys for
- `masterKey` – integer or bit list-like (default: None); the 64-bit key that will be used

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.des import DES_KS
sage: DES_KS()
Original DES key schedule with 16 rounds
```

Note: If you want to use a DES_KS object as an iterable you have to pass a `masterKey` value on initialisation. Otherwise you can omit `masterKey` and pass a key when you call the object.

`__call__`(key)

Return all round keys in a list.

INPUT:

- `key` – integer or bit list-like; the 64-bit key

OUTPUT:
• A list containing the round keys. If `key` is an integer the elements of the output list will be too. If `key` is list-like the element of the output list will be bit vectors.

**EXAMPLES:**

This implementation is using bit vectors for all internal representations. So you can invoke the key schedule with a bit vector:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.des import DES_KS
sage: K = vector(GF(2), [0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 
                      ....: 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 
                      ....: 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1])

sage: ks = DES_KS(16, K)

sage: [k for k in ks]
```

```python
[(0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 
  1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 
  0, 0, 1, 0),
 (0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 
  0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 
  1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 
  0, 1, 0, 1),
...
```

But of course you can invoke it with hex representation as well:

```python
sage: K = 0x13345779bbcdff1
sage: ks = DES_KS(16, K)

sage: [k.hex() for k in ks]
```

```python
['1b02effc7072',
 '79aed9dbc9e5',
...
'cb3d8b0e17f5']
```

**Note:** If you want to use a `DES_KS` object as an iterable you have to pass a `masterKey` value on initialisation. Otherwise you can omit `masterKey` and pass a key when you call the object.

```python
sage.crypto.block_cipher.des.convert_to_vector(I, L)
```

Convert `I` to a bit vector of length `L`.

**INPUT:**

- `I` – integer or bit list-like
- `L` – integer; the desired bit length of the output

**OUTPUT:**

- the L-bit vector representation of `I`

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.des import convert_to_vector
sage: convert_to_vector(0x1F, 8)
```

```
(0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
```

(continues on next page)
sage: v = vector(GF(2), 4, [1,0,1,0])
sage: convert_to_vector(v, 4)
(1, 0, 1, 0)
An ultra-lightweight block cipher.

This file implements the PRESENT block cipher and the corresponding key schedule as described in [BKLPPRSV2007]. PRESENT is an example of an SP-network and consists of 31 rounds. The block length is 64 bits and two key lengths of 80 and 128 bits are supported.

This implementation is meant for experimental and educational usage only, do not use it in production code!

EXAMPLES:

Encrypt a message:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.present import PRESENT
sage: present = PRESENT()
sage: present.encrypt(plaintext=0, key=0).hex()
'2844b365c06992a3'
```

And decrypt it again:

```
sage: present.decrypt(ciphertext=0x2844b365c06992a3, key=0)
0
```

Have a look at the used round keys:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.present import PRESENT_KS
sage: ks = PRESENT_KS()
sage: [k.hex() for k in ks(0)]
['0',
'c000000000000000',
'...'
'6dab31744f41d700']
```

Tweak around with the cipher:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: cipher = PRESENT(rounds=1, doFinalRound=False)
sage: cipher.sbox = SBox(range(16))
sage: cipher.keySchedule = lambda x: [0, 0]  # return the 0 keys as round keys
sage: cipher.encrypt(plaintext=0x1234, key=0x0).hex()
'1234'
```

AUTHORS:

- Lukas Stennes (2019-02-01): initial version
class sage.crypto.block_cipher.present.PRESENT(keySchedule=80, rounds=None, doFinalRound=False)
    Bases: SageObject

    This class implements PRESENT described in [BKLPPRSV2007].

    EXAMPLES:
    You can invoke PRESENT encryption/decryption either by calling PRESENT with an appropriate flag:

    sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.present import PRESENT
    sage: present = PRESENT()
    sage: P = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
    sage: K = 0x0
    sage: present(present(P, K, 'encrypt'), K, 'decrypt') == P
    True

    Or by calling encryption/decryption methods directly:

    sage: C = present.encrypt(P, K)
    sage: P == present.decrypt(C, K)
    True

    The number of rounds can be reduced easily:

    sage: present = PRESENT(rounds=15)
    sage: present(present(P, K, 'encrypt'), K, 'decrypt') == P
    True

    You can use integers or a list-like bit representation for the inputs. If the input is an integer the output will be too. If it is list-like the output will be a bit vector:

    sage: P = ZZ(0).digits(2,padto=64)
    sage: K = ZZ(0).digits(2,padto=80)
    sage: list(present(present(P, K, 'encrypt'), K, 'decrypt')) == P
    True
    sage: P = ZZ(0).digits(2,padto=64)
    sage: K = 0x0
    sage: list(present(present(P, K, 'encrypt'), K, 'decrypt')) == P
    True

    The 80-bit version of PRESENT is used by default but the 128-bit version is also implemented:

    sage: present = PRESENT(128)
    sage: P = 0x0123456789abcdef
    sage: K = 0x00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
    sage: present(present(P, K, 'encrypt'), K, 'decrypt') == P
    True

    See also:
    PRESENT_KS sage.crypto.sboxes

    __init__(keySchedule=80, rounds=None, doFinalRound=False)
    Construct an instance of PRESENT.

    INPUT:
• **keySchedule** – (default: 80); the key schedule that will be used for encryption and decryption. Use 80 or 128 as a shortcut for the original key schedules from [BKLPPRSV2007].

• **rounds** – integer (default: None); the number of rounds. If None the number of rounds of the key schedule is used.

• **doFinalRound** – boolean (default: False); flag to control whether the linear layer in the last round should take place or not. Since the last linear layer does not add any security, it usually does not take place in real world implementations for performance reasons.

**EXAMPLES:**

By default a 80-bit version with 31 rounds is created:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.present import PRESENT
sage: PRESENT() # indirect doctest
PRESENT block cipher with 31 rounds, deactivated linear layer in last round and the following key schedule:
Original PRESENT key schedule with 80-bit keys and 31 rounds
```

The 128-bit version is also implemented:

```
sage: PRESENT(128) # indirect doctest
PRESENT block cipher with 31 rounds, deactivated linear layer in last round and the following key schedule:
Original PRESENT key schedule with 128-bit keys and 31 rounds
```

Reducing the number of rounds is simple. But increasing it is not possible:

```
sage: PRESENT(keySchedule=80, rounds=23) # indirect doctest
PRESENT block cipher with 23 rounds, deactivated linear layer in last round and the following key schedule:
Original PRESENT key schedule with 80-bit keys and 31 rounds
```

```
sage: PRESENT(80, 32) # indirect doctest
Traceback (most recent call last):
... 
ValueError: number of rounds must be less or equal to the number of rounds of the key schedule
```

By default the linear layer operation in the last round is omitted but of course you can enable it:

```
sage: PRESENT(doFinalRound=True) # indirect doctest
PRESENT block cipher with 31 rounds, activated linear layer in last round and the following key schedule:
Original PRESENT key schedule with 80-bit keys and 31 rounds
```

You can use arbitrary key schedules. Since it is the only one implemented here the original key schedule is used for demonstration:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.present import PRESENT_KS
sage: PRESENT(keySchedule=PRESENT_KS(80, 15)) # indirect doctest
PRESENT block cipher with 15 rounds, deactivated linear layer in last round and the following key schedule:
Original PRESENT key schedule with 80-bit keys and 15 rounds
```

**See also:**

`PRESENT_KS`
__call__(block, key, algorithm='encrypt')

Apply PRESENT encryption or decryption on block using key. The flag algorithm controls what action is to be performed on block.

INPUT:

- block – integer or bit list-like; the plaintext or ciphertext
- K – integer or bit list-like; the key
- algorithm – string (default: 'encrypt'); a flag to signify whether encryption or decryption is to be applied to B. The encryption flag is 'encrypt' and the decryption flag is 'decrypt'

OUTPUT:

- The plaintext or ciphertext corresponding to block, obtained using the key. If block is an integer the output will be too. If block is list-like the output will be a bit vector.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.present import PRESENT
sage: present = PRESENT(doFinalRound=True)
sage: P = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
sage: K = 0x0
sage: present(P, K, 'encrypt').hex()
'a112ffc72f68417b'
```

decrypt(ciphertext, key)

Return the plaintext corresponding to the ciphertext, using PRESENT decryption with key.

INPUT:

- ciphertext – integer or bit list-like; the ciphertext that will be decrypted
- key – integer or bit list-like; the key

OUTPUT:

- The plaintext corresponding to ciphertext, obtained using the key. If ciphertext is an integer the output will be too. If ciphertext is list-like the output will be a bit vector.

EXAMPLES:

The test vectors from [BKLPPRSV2007] are checked here:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.present import PRESENT
sage: present = PRESENT(doFinalRound=True)
sage: p1 = 0x0
sage: k1 = 0x0
sage: c1 = 0x5579C1387B228445
sage: present.decrypt(c1, k1) == p1
True
sage: p2 = 0x0
sage: k2 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
sage: c2 = 0xE72C46C0F5945049
sage: present.decrypt(c2, k2) == p2
True
sage: p3 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
sage: k3 = 0x0
sage: c3 = 0xA112FFC72F68417B
```

(continues on next page)
encrypt(plaintext, key)

Return the ciphertext corresponding to plaintext, using PRESENT encryption with key.

INPUT:

- plaintext – integer or bit list-like; the plaintext that will be encrypted.
- key – integer or bit list-like; the key

OUTPUT:

- The ciphertext corresponding to plaintext, obtained using the key. If plaintext is an integer the output will be too. If plaintext is list-like the output will be a bit vector.

EXAMPLES:

The test vectors from [BKLPPRSV2007] are checked here:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.present import PRESENT
sage: present = PRESENT(doFinalRound=True)
sage: p1 = 0x0
sage: k1 = 0x0
sage: c1 = 0x5579C1387B228445
sage: present.encrypt(p1, k1) == c1
True
sage: p2 = 0x0
sage: k2 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
sage: c2 = 0xE72C46C0F5945049
sage: present.encrypt(p2, k2) == c2
True
sage: p3 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
sage: k3 = 0x0
sage: c3 = 0xA112FFC72F68417B
sage: present.encrypt(p3, k3) == c3
True
sage: p4 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
sage: k4 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
sage: c4 = 0x3333DCD3213210D2
sage: present.encrypt(p4, k4) == c4
True
```

ALGORITHM:

Description of the encryption function based on [BKLPPRSV2007]:

A top-level algorithmic description of PRESENT encryption:

```python
generateRoundKeys()
for i = 1 to 31 do
```

(continues on next page)
Each of the 31 rounds consists of an XOR operation to introduce a round key $K_i$ for $1 \leq i \leq 32$, where $K_{32}$ is used for post-whitening, a linear bitwise permutation and a non-linear substitution layer. The non-linear layer uses a single 4-bit S-box which is applied 16 times in parallel in each round. Each stage but addRoundkey is specified in its corresponding function.

**addRoundkey**: Given round key $K_i = \kappa_{i63} \ldots \kappa_{i0}$ for $1 \leq i \leq 32$ and current STATE $b_{63} \ldots b_0$, addRoundkey consists of the operation for $0 \leq j \leq 63$, $b_j = b_j \oplus \kappa_{ij}$.

**linear_layer**(state, inverse=False)

Apply the pLayer of PRESENT to the bit vector state and return the result.

The bit permutation used in PRESENT is given by the following table. Bit $i$ of STATE is moved to bit position $P(i)$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>i</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P(i)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P(i)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P(i)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P(i)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.present import PRESENT
sage: present = PRESENT()
```

```python
sage: state = vector(GF(2), 64, [0, 1]+[0]*62)
```

```python
sage: present.linear_layer(state)
```

```python
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
```

**round**(state, round_counter, round_key, inverse=False)

Apply one round of PRESENT to state and return the result.

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.present import PRESENT
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.present import convert_to_vector
sage: present = PRESENT(128)
```

```python
sage: k = convert_to_vector(0x0011223344556677, 64)
```

```python
sage: p = convert_to_vector(0x0123456789abcdef, 64)
```
sage: ZZ(list(present.round(p, 0, k)), 2).hex()
'ad0ed4ca386b6559'

sbox_layer(state, inverse=False)

Apply the sBoxLayer of PRESENT to the bit vector state and return the result.

The S-box used in PRESENT is a 4-bit to 4-bit S-box. The action of this box in hexadecimal notation is given by the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>x</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S[x]</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For sBoxLayer the current STATE $b_{63} \ldots b_0$ is considered as sixteen 4-bit words $w_{15} \ldots w_0$ where $w_i = b_{4i+3}||b_{4i+2}||b_{4i+1}||b_{4i}$ for $0 \leq i \leq 15$ and the output nibble $S[w_i]$ provides the updated state values in the obvious way.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.present import PRESENT
sage: present = PRESENT()
```

```python
sage: state = vector(GF(2), 64, [0]*64)
sage: present.sbox_layer(state)
(0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1)
```

```python
sage: state = vector(GF(2), 64, [1]+[0]*63)
sage: present.sbox_layer(state)
(1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1)
```

Note: `sage.crypto.sbox` uses big endian by default whereas most of Sage uses little endian. So to use the big endian PRESENT Sbox from `sage.crypto.sboxes sbox_layer()` has to do some endian conversion (i.e. reverse input and output of the Sbox). Keep this in mind if you change the Sbox or `sbox_layer()`.

class sage.crypto.block_cipher.present.PRESENT_KS(keysize=80, rounds=31, master_key=None)

Bases: SageObject

This class implements the PRESENT key schedules for both 80-bit and 128-bit keys as described in [BKLPPRSV2007].

EXAMPLES:

Initialise the key schedule with a `master_key` to use it as an iterable:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.present import PRESENT_KS
sage: ks = PRESENT_KS(master_key=0)
sage: ks[0] == 0x0
True
sage: ks[31] == 0x6dab31744f41d700
True
```

Or omit the `master_key` and pass a key when calling the key schedule:
ALGORITHM:

Description of the key schedule for 64-bit and 128-bit keys from [BKLPPRSV2007]:

The key schedule for 64-bit keys works as follows:

At round $i$ the 64-bit round key $K_i = \kappa_{63}\kappa_{62}\ldots\kappa_0$ consists of the 64 leftmost bits of the current contents of register $K$. Thus at round $i$ we have that:

$$K_i = \kappa_{63}\kappa_{62}\ldots\kappa_0 = k_{79}k_{78}\ldots k_{16}.$$ 

After extracting the round key $K_i$, the key register $K = k_{79}k_{78}\ldots k_0$ is updated as follows:

$$[k_{79}k_{78}\ldots k_1k_0] = [k_{18}k_{17}\ldots k_{20}k_{19}]$$

$$[k_{79}k_{78}k_{77}k_{76}] = S[k_{79}k_{78}k_{77}k_{76}]$$

$$[k_{19}k_{18}k_{17}k_{16}k_{15}] = [k_{19}k_{18}k_{17}k_{16}k_{15}] \oplus \text{round\_counter}$$

Thus, the key register is rotated by 61 bit positions to the left, the left-most four bits are passed through the PRESENT S-box, and the round_counter value $i$ is exclusive-ored with bits $k_{19}k_{18}k_{17}k_{16}k_{15}$ of $K$ with the least significant bit of round_counter on the right.

The key schedule for 128-bit keys works as follows:

At round $i$ the 64-bit round key $K_i = \kappa_{63}\kappa_{62}\ldots\kappa_0$ consists of the 64 leftmost bits of the current contents of register $K$. Thus at round $i$ we have that:

$$K_i = \kappa_{63}\kappa_{62}\ldots\kappa_0 = k_{127}k_{126}\ldots k_{64}$$

After extracting the round key $K_i$, the key register $K = k_{127}k_{126}\ldots k_0$ is updated as follows:

$$[k_{127}k_{126}\ldots k_1k_0] = [k_{66}k_{65}\ldots k_{68}k_{67}]$$

$$[k_{127}k_{126}k_{125}k_{124}] = S[k_{127}k_{126}k_{125}k_{124}]$$

$$[k_{123}k_{122}k_{121}k_{120}] = S[k_{123}k_{122}k_{121}k_{120}]$$

$$[k_{66}k_{65}k_{64}k_{63}k_{62}] = [k_{66}k_{65}k_{64}k_{63}k_{62}] \oplus \text{round\_counter}$$

Thus, the key register is rotated by 61 bit positions to the left, the left-most eight bits are passed through two PRESENT S-boxes, and the round_counter value $i$ is exclusive-ored with bits $k_{66}k_{65}k_{64}k_{63}k_{62}$ of $K$ with the least significant bit of round_counter on the right.

See also:

PRESENT sage.crypto.sboxes

Note: sage.crypto.sbox uses big endian by default whereas most of Sage uses little endian. So to use the big endian PRESENT Sbox from sage.crypto.sboxes PRESENT_KS has to do some endian conversion (i.e. reverse input and output of the Sbox). Keep this in mind if you change the Sbox or __call__().
__init__ (keysize=80, rounds=31, master_key=None)

Construct an instance of PRESENT_KS.

INPUT:

• keysize – integer (default: 80); the size of the keys that will be used in bits. It must be either 80 or 128.

• rounds – integer (default: 31); the number of rounds self can create keys for

• master_key – integer or bit list-like (default: None); the key that will be used

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.present import PRESENT_KS
sage: PRESENT_KS()
Original PRESENT key schedule with 80-bit keys and 31 rounds
```

Note: If you want to use a PRESENT_KS object as an iterable you have to pass a master_key value on initialisation. Otherwise you can omit master_key and pass a key when you call the object.

__call__ (K)

Return all round keys in a list.

INPUT:

• K – integer or bit list-like; the key

OUTPUT:

• A list containing rounds + 1 round keys. Since addRoundkey takes place in every round and after the last round there must be rounds + 1 round keys. If K is an integer the elements of the output list will be too. If K is list-like the element of the output list will be bit vectors.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.present import PRESENT_KS
sage: ks = PRESENT_KS()
sage: ks(0)[31] == 0x6dab31744f41d700
True
```

Note: If you want to use a PRESENT_KS object as an iterable you have to pass a master_key value on initialisation. Otherwise you can omit master_key and pass a key when you call the object.

sage.crypto.block_cipher.present.convert_to_vector (I, L)

Convert I to a bit vector of length L.

INPUT:

• I – integer or bit list-like

• L – integer; the desired bit length of the output

OUTPUT:

• the L-bit vector representation of I

EXAMPLES:
sage: from sage.crypto.block_cipher.present import convert_to_vector
sage: convert_to_vector(0x1F, 8)
(1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)
sage: v = vector(GF(2), 4, [1,0,1,0])
sage: convert_to_vector(v, 4)
(1, 0, 1, 0)
BLUM-GOLDWASSER PROBABILISTIC ENCRYPTION

The Blum-Goldwasser probabilistic public-key encryption scheme. This scheme was originally described in [BG1985]. See also section 8.7.2 of [MvOV1996] and the Wikipedia article Blum-Goldwasser_cryptosystem on this scheme.

AUTHORS:
• Mike Hogan and David Joyner (2009-9-19): initial procedural version released as public domain software.
• Minh Van Nguyen (2009-12): integrate into Sage as a class and relicense under the GPLv2+. Complete rewrite of the original version to follow the description contained in [MvOV1996].

```python
class sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser.BlumGoldwasser
    Bases: PublicKeyCryptosystem

The Blum-Goldwasser probabilistic public-key encryption scheme.

The Blum-Goldwasser encryption and decryption algorithms as described in encrypt() and decrypt(), respectively, make use of the least significant bit of a binary string. A related concept is the \( k \) least significant bits of a binary string. For example, given a positive integer \( n \), let \( b = b_0b_1 \cdots b_{m-1} \) be the binary representation of \( n \) so that \( b \) is a binary string of length \( m \). Then the least significant bit of \( n \) is \( b_{m-1} \). If \( 0 < k \leq m \), then the \( k \) least significant bits of \( n \) are \( b_{m-1-k}b_{m-k} \cdots b_{m-1} \). The least significant bit of an integer is also referred to as its parity bit, because this bit determines whether the integer is even or odd. In the following example, we obtain the least significant bit of an integer:

```sage
n = 123
sage: b = n.binary(); b
'1111011'
sage: n % 2
1
sage: b[-1]
'1'
```

Now find the 4 least significant bits of the integer \( n = 123 \):

```sage
b
'1111011'
sage: b[-4:]
'1011'
```

The last two examples could be worked through as follows:

```sage
from sage.crypto.util import least_significant_bits
sage: least_significant_bits(123, 1)
[1]
```

(continues on next page)
EXAMPLES:

The following encryption/decryption example is taken from Example 8.57, pages 309–310 of [MvOV1996]:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser import BlumGoldwasser
sage: bg = BlumGoldwasser(); bg
The Blum-Goldwasser public-key encryption scheme.
sage: p = 499; q = 547
sage: pubkey = bg.public_key(p, q); pubkey
272933
sage: prikey = bg.private_key(p, q); prikey
(499, 547, -57, 52)
sage: P = "10011100000100001100"
sage: C = bg.encrypt(P, pubkey, seed=159201); C
([ [0, 0, 1, 0], [0, 0, 0, 0], [1, 1, 0, 0], [1, 1, 1, 0], [0, 1, 0, 0] ], 139680)
sage: M = bg.decrypt(C, prikey); M
([ [1, 0, 0, 1], [1, 1, 0, 0], [0, 0, 0, 1], [0, 0, 0, 0], [1, 1, 0, 0] ])
sage: M = ''.join(str(x) for x in flatten(M)); M
'10011100000100001100'
sage: M == P
True
```

Generate a pair of random public/private keys. Use the public key to encrypt a plaintext. Then decrypt the resulting ciphertext using the private key. Finally, compare the decrypted message with the original plaintext.

```
sage: from sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser import BlumGoldwasser
sage: from sage.crypto.util import bin_to_ascii
sage: bg = BlumGoldwasser()
sage: pubkey, prikey = bg.random_key(10**4, 10**6)
sage: P = "A fixed plaintext."
sage: C = bg.encrypt(P, pubkey)
sage: M = bg.decrypt(C, prikey)
sage: bin_to_ascii(flatten(M)) == P
True
```

If \((p, q, a, b)\) is a private key, then \(n = pq\) is the corresponding public key. Furthermore, we have \(\gcd(p, q) = ap + bq = 1\).

```
sage: p, q, a, b = prikey
sage: pubkey == p * q
True
sage: gcd(p, q) == a*p + b*q == 1
True
```

\(\text{decrypt}(C, K)\)

Apply the Blum-Goldwasser scheme to decrypt the ciphertext \(C\) using the private key \(K\).

INPUT:

- \(C\) – a ciphertext resulting from encrypting a plaintext using the Blum-Goldwasser encryption algorithm. The ciphertext \(C\) must be of the form \(C = (c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_t, x_{t+1})\). Each \(c_i\) is a sub-block of binary string and \(x_{t+1}\) is the result of the \(t+1\)-th iteration of the Blum-Blum-Shub algorithm.
• K – a private key \((p, q, a, b)\) where \(p\) and \(q\) are distinct Blum primes and \(\gcd(p, q) = ap + bq = 1\).

OUTPUT:
• The plaintext resulting from decrypting the ciphertext \(C\) using the Blum-Goldwasser decryption algorithm.

ALGORITHM:
The Blum-Goldwasser decryption algorithm is described in Algorithm 8.56, page 309 of [MvOV1996]. The algorithm works as follows:
1. Let \(C\) be the ciphertext \(C = (c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_t, x_{t+1})\). Then \(t\) is the number of ciphertext sub-blocks and \(h\) is the length of each binary string sub-block \(c_i\).
2. Let \((p, q, a, b)\) be the private key whose corresponding public key is \(n = pq\). Note that \(\gcd(p, q) = ap + bq = 1\).
3. Compute \(d_1 = ((p + 1)/4)^{t+1} \mod (p - 1)\).
4. Compute \(d_2 = ((q + 1)/4)^{t+1} \mod (q - 1)\).
5. Let \(u = x_{t+1}^{d_1} \mod p\).
6. Let \(v = x_{t+1}^{d_2} \mod q\).
7. Compute \(x_0 = vap + ubq \mod n\).
8. For \(i\) from 1 to \(t\), do:
   1. Compute \(x_i = x_{i-1}^2 \mod p\).
   2. Let \(p_i\) be the \(h\) least significant bits of \(x_i\).
   3. Compute \(m_i = p_i \oplus c_i\).
9. The plaintext is \(m = m_1 m_2 \cdots m_t\).

EXAMPLES:
The following decryption example is taken from Example 8.57, pages 309–310 of [MvOV1996]. Here we decrypt a binary string:

```sage
sage: from sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser import BlumGoldwasser
sage: bg = BlumGoldwasser()

sage: p = 499; q = 547
sage: C = ([[0, 0, 1, 0], [0, 0, 0, 0], [1, 1, 0, 0], [1, 1, 1, 0], [0, 1, 0, 0]], 139680)

sage: K = bg.private_key(p, q); K
(499, 547, -57, 52)

sage: P = bg.decrypt(C, K); P
[[[1, 0, 0, 1], [1, 1, 0, 0], [0, 0, 0, 1], [0, 0, 0, 0], [1, 1, 0, 0]]

Convert the plaintext sub-blocks into a binary string:

```sage
sage: bin = BinaryStrings()

sage: bin(flatten(P))
10011100000100001100
```

Decrypt a longer ciphertext and convert the resulting plaintext into an ASCII string:

```sage
sage: bin = BinaryStrings()

sage: bin(flatten(P))
10011100000100001100
```
sage: from sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser import BlumGoldwasser
sage: from sage.crypto.util import bin_to_ascii
sage: bg = BlumGoldwasser()

sage: p = 78307; q = 412487
sage: K = bg.private_key(p, q)

sage: C = (\[
\begin{bmatrix}
1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
\end{bmatrix}, 3479653279)

sage: P = bg.decrypt(C, K)

sage: bin_to_ascii(flatten(P))
'Blum-Goldwasser encryption'

encrypt(P, K, seed=None)

Apply the Blum-Goldwasser scheme to encrypt the plaintext P using the public key K.

**INPUT:**

- P – a non-empty string of plaintext. The string ‘’ is an empty string, whereas ‘ ’ is a string consisting of one white space character. The plaintext can be a binary string or a string of ASCII characters. Where P is an ASCII string, then P is first encoded as a binary string prior to encryption.
- K – a public key, which is the product of two Blum primes.
- seed (default: None) if p and q are Blum primes and n = pq is a public key, then seed is a quadratic residue in the multiplicative group \((Z/nZ)^*\). If seed=None, then the function would generate its own random quadratic residue in \((Z/nZ)^*\). Where a value for seed is provided, it is your responsibility to ensure that the seed is a quadratic residue in the multiplicative group \((Z/nZ)^*\).

**OUTPUT:**

- The ciphertext resulting from encrypting P using the public key K. The ciphertext C is of the form \(C = (c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_t, x_{t+1})\). Each \(c_i\) is a sub-block of binary string and \(x_{t+1}\) is the result of the \(t+1\)-th iteration of the Blum-Blum-Shub algorithm.

**ALGORITHM:**
The Blum-Goldwasser encryption algorithm is described in Algorithm 8.56, page 309 of [MvOV1996]. The algorithm works as follows:

1. Let \(n\) be a public key, where \(n = pq\) is the product of two distinct Blum primes \(p\) and \(q\).
2. Let \(k = \lceil \log_2(n) \rceil \) and \(h = \lceil \log_2(k) \rceil \).
3. Let \(m = m_1 m_2 \cdots m_t\) be the message (plaintext) where each \(m_i\) is a binary string of length \(h\).
4. Choose a random seed \(x_0\), which is a quadratic residue in the multiplicative group \((Z/nZ)^*\). That is, choose a random \(r \in (Z/nZ)^*\) and compute \(x_0 = r^2 \mod n\).
5. For \(i\) from 1 to \(t\), do:
1. Let \( x_i = x_{i-1}^2 \mod n \).

2. Let \( p_i \) be the \( h \) least significant bits of \( x_i \).

3. Let \( c_i = p_i \oplus m_i \).

6. Compute \( x_{t+1} = x_t^2 \mod n \).

7. The ciphertext is \( c = (c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_t, x_{t+1}) \).

The value \( h \) in the algorithm is the sub-block length. If the binary string representing the message cannot be divided into blocks of length \( h \) each, then other sub-block lengths would be used instead. The sub-block lengths to fall back on are in the following order: 16, 8, 4, 2, 1.

EXAMPLES:

The following encryption example is taken from Example 8.57, pages 309–310 of [MvOV1996]. Here, we encrypt a binary string:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser import BlumGoldwasser
sage: bg = BlumGoldwasser()
sage: p = 499; q = 547; n = p * q
sage: P = "10011100000100001100"
```

```
\([[[0, 0, 1, 0], [0, 0, 0, 0], [1, 1, 0, 0], [1, 1, 0, 0], [0, 1, 0, 0]], 139680]\)
```

Convert the ciphertext sub-blocks into a binary string:

```
sage: bin = BinaryStrings()
sage: bin(flatten(C[0]))
00100000110011100100
```

Now encrypt an ASCII string. The result is random; no seed is provided to the encryption function so the function generates its own random seed:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser import BlumGoldwasser
sage: bg = BlumGoldwasser()
sage: K = 32300619509
sage: P = "Blum-Goldwasser encryption"
```

```
\([[[1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0], \[1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1], \[0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0], \[0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1], \[1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0], \[0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1], \[1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0], \[1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1], \[0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0], \[1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1], \[1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0], \[0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1], 3479653279]\]
```

`private_key(p, q)`

Return the Blum-Goldwasser private key corresponding to the distinct Blum primes \( p \) and \( q \).

INPUT:
• p – a Blum prime.
• q – a Blum prime.

OUTPUT:
• The Blum-Goldwasser private key \((p, q, a, b)\) where \(\gcd(p, q) = ap + bq = 1\).

Both p and q must be distinct Blum primes. Let \(p\) be a positive prime. Then \(p\) is a Blum prime if \(p\) is congruent to 3 modulo 4, i.e. \(p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}\).

EXAMPLES:
Obtain two distinct Blum primes and compute the Blum-Goldwasser private key corresponding to those two Blum primes:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser import BlumGoldwasser
sage: from sage.crypto.util import is_blum_prime
sage: bg = BlumGoldwasser()
sage: P = primes_first_n(10); P
[2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29]
sage: [is_blum_prime(_)
     for _ in P]
[False, True, False, True, True, False, False, True, True, False]
sage: bg.private_key(19, 23)
(19, 23, -6, 5)
```

Choose two distinct random Blum primes, compute the Blum-Goldwasser private key corresponding to those two primes, and test that the resulting private key \((p, q, a, b)\) satisfies \(\gcd(p, q) = ap + bq = 1\):

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.util import random_blum_prime
sage: p = random_blum_prime(10**4, 10**5)
sage: q = random_blum_prime(10**4, 10**5)
   ....: while q == p:
   ....:     q = random_blum_prime(10**4, 10**5)
   sage: p, q, a, b = bg.private_key(p, q)
   sage: gcd(p, q) == a*p + b*q == 1
True
```

\texttt{public_key}(p, q)

Return the Blum-Goldwasser public key corresponding to the distinct Blum primes p and q.

INPUT:
• p – a Blum prime.
• q – a Blum prime.

OUTPUT:
• The Blum-Goldwasser public key \(n = pq\).

Both p and q must be distinct Blum primes. Let \(p\) be a positive prime. Then \(p\) is a Blum prime if \(p\) is congruent to 3 modulo 4, i.e. \(p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}\).

EXAMPLES:
Obtain two distinct Blum primes and compute the Blum-Goldwasser public key corresponding to those two Blum primes:
Choose two distinct random Blum primes, compute the Blum-Goldwasser public key corresponding to those two primes, and test that the public key factorizes into Blum primes:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.util import random_blum_prime
sage: p = random_blum_prime(10**4, 10**5)
sage: q = random_blum_prime(10**4, 10**5)
sage: while q == p:
    ...:     q = random_blum_prime(10**4, 10**5)
...  
sage: n = bg.public_key(p, q)
sage: f = factor(n)
sage: is_blum_prime(f[0][0]); is_blum_prime(f[1][0])
True
True
```

```
sage: p * q == f[0][0] * f[1][0]
True
```

`random_key(lbound, ubound, ntries=100)`

Return a pair of random public and private keys.

**INPUT:**

- `lbound` – positive integer; the lower bound on how small each random Blum prime \( p \) and \( q \) can be. So we have \( 0 < \text{lower_bound} <= p, q <= \text{upper_bound} \). The lower bound must be distinct from the upper bound.

- `ubound` – positive integer; the upper bound on how large each random Blum prime \( p \) and \( q \) can be. So we have \( 0 < \text{lower_bound} <= p, q <= \text{upper_bound} \). The lower bound must be distinct from the upper bound.

- `ntries` – (default: \( 100 \)) the number of attempts to generate a random public/private key pair. If `ntries` is a positive integer, then perform that many attempts at generating a random public/private key pair.

**OUTPUT:**

- A random public key and its corresponding private key. Each randomly chosen \( p \) and \( q \) are guaranteed to be Blum primes. The public key is \( n = pq \), and the private key is \( (p, q, a, b) \) where \( \gcd(p, q) = ap + bq = 1 \).

**ALGORITHM:**

The key generation algorithm is described in Algorithm 8.55, page 308 of [MvOV1996]. The algorithm works as follows:

1. Let \( p \) and \( q \) be distinct large random primes, each congruent to 3 modulo 4. That is, \( p \) and \( q \) are Blum primes.
2. Let \( n = pq \) be the product of \( p \) and \( q \).

3. Use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute integers \( a \) and \( b \) such that \( \gcd(p, q) = ap + bq = 1 \).

4. The public key is \( n \) and the corresponding private key is \((p, q, a, b)\).

**Note:** Beware that there might not be any primes between the lower and upper bounds. So make sure that these two bounds are "sufficiently" far apart from each other for there to be primes congruent to 3 modulo 4. In particular, there should be at least two distinct primes within these bounds, each prime being congruent to 3 modulo 4.

**EXAMPLES:**

Choosing a random pair of public and private keys. We then test to see if they satisfy the requirements of the Blum-Goldwasser scheme:

```sage
from sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser import BlumGoldwasser
from sage.crypto.util import is_blum_prime

g = BlumGoldwasser()
pubkey, prikey = bg.random_key(10**4, 10**5)
p, q, a, b = prikey
is_blum_prime(p); is_blum_prime(q)
True
True
p == q
False
pubkey == p*q
True
gcd(p, q) == a*p + b*q == 1
True
```
class `sage.crypto.stream.LFSRCryptosystem`(field=None)

Bases: `SymmetricKeyCryptosystem`

Linear feedback shift register cryptosystem class

encoding(M)

class `sage.crypto.stream.ShrinkingGeneratorCryptosystem`(field=None)

Bases: `SymmetricKeyCryptosystem`

Shrinking generator cryptosystem class

encoding(M)

`sage.crypto.stream.blum_blum_shub`(length, seed=None, p=None, q=None, lbound=None, ubound=None, ntries=100)

The Blum-Blum-Shub (BBS) pseudorandom bit generator.

See the original paper by Blum, Blum and Shub [BBS1986]. The BBS algorithm is also discussed in section 5.5.2 of [MvOV1996].

INPUT:

- `length` – positive integer; the number of bits in the output pseudorandom bit sequence.
- `seed` – (default: `None`) if \( p \) and \( q \) are Blum primes, then `seed` is a quadratic residue in the multiplicative group \((\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})^*\) where \( n = pq \). If `seed=None`, then the function would generate its own random quadratic residue in \((\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})^*\). If you provide a value for `seed`, then it is your responsibility to ensure that the seed is a quadratic residue in the multiplicative group \((\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})^*\).
- `p` – (default: `None`) a large positive prime congruent to 3 modulo 4. Both \( p \) and \( q \) must be distinct. If `p=None`, then a value for `p` will be generated, where \( 0 < \text{lbound} \leq p \leq \text{ubound} \).
- `q` – (default: `None`) a large positive prime congruent to 3 modulo 4. Both \( p \) and \( q \) must be distinct. If `q=None`, then a value for `q` will be generated, where \( 0 < \text{lbound} \leq q \leq \text{ubound} \).
- `lbound` – (positive integer, default: `None`) the lower bound on how small each random primes \( p \) and \( q \) can be. So we have \( 0 < \text{lbound} \leq p, q \leq \text{ubound} \). The lower bound must be distinct from the upper bound.
- `ubound` – (positive integer, default: `None`) the upper bound on how large each random primes \( p \) and \( q \) can be. So we have \( 0 < \text{lbound} \leq p, q \leq \text{ubound} \). The lower bound must be distinct from the upper bound.
- `ntries` – (default: `100`) the number of attempts to generate a random Blum prime. If `ntries` is a positive integer, then perform that many attempts at generating a random Blum prime. This might or might not result in a Blum prime.
OUTPUT:

- A pseudorandom bit sequence whose length is specified by length.

Here is a common use case for this function. If you want this function to use pre-computed values for \( p \) and \( q \), you should pass those pre-computed values to this function. In that case, you only need to specify values for length, \( p \) and \( q \), and you do not need to worry about doing anything with the parameters lbound and ubound. The pre-computed values \( p \) and \( q \) must be Blum primes. It is your responsibility to check that both \( p \) and \( q \) are Blum primes.

Here is another common use case. If you want the function to generate its own values for \( p \) and \( q \), you must specify the lower and upper bounds within which these two primes must lie. In that case, you must specify values for length, lbound and ubound, and you do not need to worry about values for the parameters p and q.

The parameter ntries is only relevant when you want this function to generate \( p \) and \( q \).

Note: Beware that there might not be any primes between the lower and upper bounds. So make sure that these two bounds are “sufficiently” far apart from each other for there to be primes congruent to 3 modulo 4. In particular, there should be at least two distinct primes within these bounds, each prime being congruent to 3 modulo 4. This function uses the function random_blum_prime() to generate random primes that are congruent to 3 modulo 4.

ALGORITHM:
The BBS algorithm as described below is adapted from the presentation in Algorithm 5.40, page 186 of [MvOV1996].

1. Let \( L \) be the desired number of bits in the output bit sequence. That is, \( L \) is the desired length of the bit string.
2. Let \( p \) and \( q \) be two large distinct primes, each congruent to 3 modulo 4.
3. Let \( n = pq \) be the product of \( p \) and \( q \).
4. Select a random seed value \( s \in (\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})^* \), where \( (\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})^* \) is the multiplicative group of \( \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \).
5. Let \( x_0 = s^2 \mod n \).
6. For \( i \) from 1 to \( L \), do
   1. Let \( x_i = x_{i-1}^2 \mod n \).
   2. Let \( z_i \) be the least significant bit of \( x_i \).
7. The output pseudorandom bit sequence is \( z_1, z_2, \ldots, z_L \).

EXAMPLES:
A BBS pseudorandom bit sequence with a specified seed:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.stream import blum_blum_shub
sage: blum_blum_shub(length=6, seed=3, p=11, q=19)
```

```
110000
```

You could specify the length of the bit string, with given values for \( p \) and \( q \):

```
sage: blum_blum_shub(length=6, p=11, q=19) # random
```

```
001011
```

Or you could specify the length of the bit string, with given values for the lower and upper bounds:
Under some reasonable hypotheses, Blum-Blum-Shub [BBS1982] sketch a proof that the period of the BBS stream cipher is equal to $\lambda(\lambda(n))$, where $\lambda(n)$ is the Carmichael function of $n$. This is verified below in a few examples by using the function `lfsr_connection_polynomial()` (written by Tim Brock) which computes the connection polynomial of a linear feedback shift register sequence. The degree of that polynomial is the period.

```
sage: from sage.crypto.stream import blum_blum_shub
sage: from sage.arith.misc import carmichael_lambda
sage: carmichael_lambda(carmichael_lambda(7*11))
4
sage: s = [GF(2)(int(str(x))) for x in blum_blum_shub(60, p=7, q=11, seed=13)]
sage: lfsr_connection_polynomial(s)
x^3 + x^2 + x + 1
sage: carmichael_lambda(carmichael_lambda(11*23))
20
sage: s = [GF(2)(int(str(x))) for x in blum_blum_shub(60, p=11, q=23, seed=13)]
sage: lfsr_connection_polynomial(s)
x^19 + x^18 + x^17 + x^16 + x^15 + x^14 + x^13 + x^12 + x^11 + x^10 + x^9 + x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1
```
CHAPTER
ELEVEN

STREAM CIPHERS

class sage.crypto.stream_cipher.LFSRCipher(parent, poly, IS)
   Bases: SymmetricKeyCipher

Create a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) cipher.

INPUT:

- parent - parent
- poly - connection polynomial
- IS - initial state

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: FF = FiniteField(2)
sage: P.<x> = PolynomialRing(FF)
sage: E = LFSRCryptosystem(FF)
sage: E
LFSR cryptosystem over Finite Field of size 2
sage: IS = [ FF(a) for a in [0,1,1,1,0,1,1] ]
sage: g = x^7 + x + 1
sage: e = E((g,IS))
sage: B = BinaryStrings()
sage: m = B.encoding("THECATIN THEHAT")
sage: e(m)
001000110111101011101010101000110000000110101000101011100001011110010010000011111100100100011001101101000001111
sage: FF = FiniteField(2)
sage: P.<x> = PolynomialRing(FF)
sage: LFSR = LFSRCryptosystem(FF)
sage: e = LFSR((x^2+x+1,[FF(0),FF(1)]))
sage: B = e.domain()
sage: m = B.encoding("The cat in the hat."")
sage: e(m)
00111001110111101011110010011011101101110100001100001011010110010000001110101111001001110100110010001000
sage: m == e(e(m))
True
```

connection_polynomial()  
The connection polynomial defining the LFSR of the cipher.

EXAMPLES:
Cryptography, Release 10.1

```python
sage: k = GF(2)
sage: P.<x> = PolynomialRing( k )
sage: LFSR = LFSRCryptosystem( k )
sage: e = LFSR((x^2+x+1,[k(0), k(1)]))
sage: e.connection_polynomial()
x^2 + x + 1
```

**initial_state()**
The initial state of the LFSR cipher.

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: k = GF(2)
sage: P.<x> = PolynomialRing( k )
sage: LFSR = LFSRCryptosystem( k )
sage: e = LFSR((x^2+x+1,[k(0), k(1)]))
sage: e.initial_state()
[0, 1]
```

class sage.crypto.stream_cipher.ShrinkingGeneratorCipher

Bases: SymmetricKeyCipher

Create a shrinking generator cipher.

**INPUT:**

- parent - parent
- poly - connection polynomial
- IS - initial state

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: FF = FiniteField(2)
sage: P.<x> = PolynomialRing(FF)
sage: LFSR = LFSRCryptosystem(FF)
sage: IS_1 = [ FF(a) for a in [0,1,0,1,0,0,0] ]
sage: e1 = LFSR((x^7 + x + 1,IS_1))
sage: IS_2 = [ FF(a) for a in [0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,1] ]
sage: e2 = LFSR((x^9 + x^3 + 1,IS_2))
sage: E = ShrinkingGeneratorCryptosystem()
sage: e = E((e1,e2))
sage: e
Shrinking generator cipher on Free binary string monoid
```

**decimating_cipher()**
The LFSR cipher generating the decimating key stream.

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: FF = FiniteField(2)
sage: P.<x> = PolynomialRing(FF)
sage: LFSR = LFSRCryptosystem(FF)
sage: IS_1 = [ FF(a) for a in [0,1,0,1,0,0,0] ]
sage: e1 = LFSR((x^7 + x + 1,IS_1))
```

(continues on next page)
```python
sage: IS_2 = [ FF(a) for a in [0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,1] ]
sage: e2 = LFSR((x^9 + x^3 + 1,IS_2))
sage: E = ShrinkingGeneratorCryptosystem()
sage: e = E((e1,e2))
sage: e.decimating_cipher()
LFSR cipher on Free binary string monoid
```

**keystream_cipher()**

The LFSR cipher generating the output key stream.

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: FF = FiniteField(2)
sage: P.<x> = PolynomialRing(FF)
sage: LFSR = LFSRCryptosystem(FF)
sage: IS_1 = [ FF(a) for a in [0,1,0,1,0,0,0] ]
sage: e1 = LFSR((x^7 + x + 1,IS_1))
sage: IS_2 = [ FF(a) for a in [0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,1] ]
sage: e2 = LFSR((x^9 + x^3 + 1,IS_2))
sage: E = ShrinkingGeneratorCryptosystem()
sage: e = E((e1,e2))
sage: e.keystream_cipher()
LFSR cipher on Free binary string monoid
```
Stream ciphers have been used for a long time as a source of pseudo-random number generators. S. Golomb [Go1967] gives a list of three statistical properties that a sequence of numbers \( a = \{a_n\}_{n=1}^{\infty}, a_n \in \{0, 1\} \) should display to be considered “random”. Define the autocorrelation of \( a \) to be

\[
C(k) = C(k, a) = \lim_{N \to \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} (-1)^{a_n + a_{n+k}}.
\]

In the case where \( a \) is periodic with period \( P \), then this reduces to

\[
C(k) = \frac{1}{P} \sum_{n=1}^{P} (-1)^{a_n + a_{n+k}}.
\]

Assume \( a \) is periodic with period \( P \).

- balance: \( |\sum_{n=1}^{P} (-1)^{a_n}| \leq 1 \).
- low autocorrelation:

\[
C(k) = \begin{cases} 
1, & k = 0, \\
\varepsilon, & k \neq 0.
\end{cases}
\]

(For sequences satisfying these first two properties, it is known that \( \varepsilon = -1/P \) must hold.)

- proportional runs property: In each period, half the runs have length 1, one-fourth have length 2, etc. Moreover, there are as many runs of 1’s as there are of 0’s.

A general feedback shift register is a map \( f : \mathbb{F}_q^d \to \mathbb{F}_q^d \) of the form

\[
f(x_0, ..., x_{n-1}) = (x_1, x_2, ..., x_n),
\]

\[
x_n = C(x_0, ..., x_{n-1}),
\]

where \( C : \mathbb{F}_q^d \to \mathbb{F}_q \) is a given function. When \( C \) is of the form

\[
C(x_0, ..., x_{n-1}) = a_0x_0 + ... + a_{n-1}x_{n-1},
\]

for some given constants \( a_i \in \mathbb{F}_q \), the map is called a linear feedback shift register (LFSR).

Example of an LFSR: Let

\[
f(x) = a_0 + a_1x + ... + a_nx^n + ...,\]

\[
g(x) = b_0 + b_1x + ... + b_nx^n + ...,\]
be given polynomials in \( \mathbb{F}_2[x] \) and let

\[
h(x) = \frac{f(x)}{g(x)} = c_0 + c_1x + \ldots + c_nx^n + \ldots.
\]

We can compute a recursion formula which allows us to rapidly compute the coefficients of \( h(x) \) (take \( f(x) = 1 \)):

\[
c_n = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{-b_i}{b_0}c_{n-i}.
\]

The coefficients of \( h(x) \) can, under certain conditions on \( f(x) \) and \( g(x) \), be considered “random” from certain statistical points of view.

Example: For instance, if

\[
f(x) = 1, \quad g(x) = x^4 + x + 1,
\]

then

\[
h(x) = 1 + x + x^2 + x^3 + x^5 + x^7 + x^8 + \ldots.
\]

The coefficients of \( h \) are

\[
1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, \ldots.
\]

The sequence of 0, 1’s is periodic with period \( P = 2^4 - 1 = 15 \) and satisfies Golomb’s three randomness conditions. However, this sequence of period 15 can be “cracked” (i.e., a procedure to reproduce \( g(x) \)) by knowing only 8 terms! This is the function of the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [Mas1969], implemented in berlekamp_massey.py.

AUTHORS:

- Timothy Brock (2006-04-17): added \texttt{lfsr_autocorrelation} and \texttt{lfsr_connection_polynomial}.

\begin{verbatim}
sage.crypto.lfsr.lfsr_autocorrelation(L, p, k)
INPUT:
    • L – a periodic sequence of elements of ZZ or GF(2); must have length p
    • p – the period of L
    • k – an integer between 0 and p
OUTPUT: autocorrelation sequence of L
EXAMPLES:
sage: F = GF(2)
sage: o = F(0)
sage: l = F(1)
sage: key = [l,o,o,l]; fill = [l,l,o,l]; n = 20
sage: s = lfsr_sequence(key,fill,n)
sage: lfsr_autocorrelation(s,15,7)
4/15
sage: lfsr_autocorrelation(s,int(15),7)
4/15
\end{verbatim}
Cryptography, Release 10.1

sage.crypto.lfsr.lfsr_connection_polynomial(s)

INPUT:

• s – a sequence of elements of a finite field of even length

OUTPUT:

• C(x) – the connection polynomial of the minimal LFSR.

This implements the algorithm in section 3 of J. L. Massey’s article [Mas1969].

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: F = GF(2)
sage: F
Finite Field of size 2
sage: o = F(0); l = F(1)
sage: key = [l,o,o,l]; fill = [l,l,o,l]; n = 20
sage: s = lfsr_sequence(key,fill,n); s
[1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0]
sage: lfsr_connection_polynomial(s)
x^4 + x + 1
sage: from sage.matrix.berlekamp_massey import berlekamp_massey
sage: berlekamp_massey(s)
x^4 + x^3 + 1
```

Notice that berlekamp_massey returns the reverse of the connection polynomial (and is potentially must faster than this implementation).

sage.crypto.lfsr.lfsr_sequence(key, fill, n)

Create an LFSR sequence.

INPUT:

• key – a list of finite field elements, [c_0, c_1, ..., c_k]

• fill – the list of the initial terms of the LFSR sequence, [x_0, x_1, ..., x_k]

• n – number of terms of the sequence that the function returns

OUTPUT:

The LFSR sequence defined by x_{n+1} = c_k x_n + ... + c_0 x_{n-k} for n ≥ k.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: F = GF(2); l = F(1); o = F(0)
sage: F = GF(2); S = LaurentSeriesRing(F,'x'); x = S.gen()
sage: fill = [l,l,o,l]; key = [1,o,o,l]; n = 20
sage: L = lfsr_sequence(key,fill,20); L
[1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0]
sage: from sage.matrix.berlekamp_massey import berlekamp_massey
sage: g = berlekamp_massey(L); g
x^4 + x^3 + 1
```
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{sage: } \ & \text{fill} = [1, 1, 0, 1]; \ \text{key} = [1, 0, 0, 0]; \ n = 20 \\
\text{sage: } \ & L = \text{lfsr_sequence(key, fill, 20)}; \ L \\
& [1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1] \\
\text{sage: } \ & g = \text{berlekamp_massey}(L); \ g \\
& x^4 + 1 \\
\text{sage: } \ & (1+x)/(g.\text{reverse()}+O(x^{20})) \\
& 1 + x + x^4 + x^5 + x^8 + x^9 + x^{12} + x^{13} + x^{16} + x^{17} + O(x^{20}) \\
\text{sage: } \ & (1+x+x^3)/(g.\text{reverse()}+O(x^{20})) \\
& 1 + x + x^3 + x^4 + x^5 + x^7 + x^8 + x^9 + x^{11} + x^{12} + x^{13} + x^{15} + x^{16} + x^{17} + O(x^{20}) \\
& \quad \rightarrow x^{19} + O(x^{20})
\end{align*}
\]
CHAPTER
THIRTEEN

UTILITY FUNCTIONS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHY

Miscellaneous utility functions for cryptographic purposes.

AUTHORS:
- Minh Van Nguyen (2009-12): initial version with the following functions: ascii_integer, ascii_to_bin, bin_to_ascii, has_blum_prime, is_blum_prime, least_significant_bits, random_blum_prime.

`sage.crypto.util.ascii_integer(B)`

Return the ASCII integer corresponding to the binary string B.

**INPUT:**
- B – a non-empty binary string or a non-empty list of bits. The number of bits in B must be 8.

**OUTPUT:**
- The ASCII integer corresponding to the 8-bit block B.

**EXAMPLES:**
The ASCII integers of some binary strings:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.util import ascii_integer
sage: bin = BinaryStrings()
sage: B = bin.encoding("A"); B
01000001
sage: ascii_integer(B)
65
sage: B = bin.encoding("C"); list(B)
[0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1]
```

```
sage: ascii_integer(list(B))
67
sage: ascii_integer("01000100")
68
sage: ascii_integer([0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1])
69
```

`sage.crypto.util.ascii_to_bin(A)`

Return the binary representation of the ASCII string A.

**INPUT:**
- A – a string or list of ASCII characters.

**OUTPUT:**
- The binary representation of A.
ALGORITHM:

Let \( A = a_0a_1 \cdots a_{n-1} \) be an ASCII string, where each \( a_i \) is an ASCII character. Let \( c_i \) be the ASCII integer corresponding to \( a_i \) and let \( b_i \) be the binary representation of \( c_i \). The binary representation \( B \) of \( A \) is \( B = b_0b_1 \cdots b_{n-1} \).

EXAMPLES:

The binary representation of some ASCII strings:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.util import ascii_to_bin
sage: ascii_to_bin("A")
01000001
sage: ascii_to_bin("Abc123")
010000010110001001100011001100010011001000110011
```

The empty string is different from the string with one space character. For the empty string and the empty list, this function returns the same result:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.util import ascii_to_bin
sage: ascii_to_bin(" ")
00100000
sage: ascii_to_bin([])
```

This function also accepts a list of ASCII characters. You can also pass in a list of strings:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.util import ascii_to_bin
sage: ascii_to_bin(["A", "b", "c", "1", "2", "3")
010000010110001001100011001100010011001000110011
sage: ascii_to_bin(["A", "bc", "1", "23")]
010000010110001001100011001100010011001000110011
```

```
sage.crypto.util.bin_to_ascii(B)
```

Return the ASCII representation of the binary string \( B \).

INPUT:

- \( B \) – a non-empty binary string or a non-empty list of bits. The number of bits in \( B \) must be a multiple of 8.

OUTPUT:

- The ASCII string corresponding to \( B \).

ALGORITHM:

Consider a block of bits \( B = b_0b_1 \cdots b_{n-1} \) where each sub-block \( b_i \) is a binary string of length 8. Then the total number of bits is a multiple of 8 and is given by \( 8n \). Let \( c_i \) be the integer representation of \( b_i \). We can consider \( c_i \) as the integer representation of an ASCII character. Then the ASCII representation \( A \) of \( B \) is \( A = a_0a_1 \cdots a_{n-1} \).

EXAMPLES:

Convert some ASCII strings to their binary representations and recover the ASCII strings from the binary representations:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.util import ascii_to_bin
sage: ascii_to_bin("Abc")
```

(continues on next page)
This function also accepts strings and lists of bits:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.util import bin_to_ascii
sage: bin_to_ascii("010000010110001001100011")
'Abc'
sage: bin_to_ascii([0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1])
'A'
```

`sage.crypto.util.has_blum_prime(lbound, ubound)`

Determine whether or not there is a Blum prime within the specified closed interval.

**INPUT:**

- `lbound` – positive integer; the lower bound on how small a Blum prime can be. The lower bound must be distinct from the upper bound.
- `ubound` – positive integer; the upper bound on how large a Blum prime can be. The lower bound must be distinct from the upper bound.

**OUTPUT:**

- **True** if there is a Blum prime \( p \) such that \( lbound \leq p \leq ubound \). **False** otherwise.

**ALGORITHM:**

Let \( L \) and \( U \) be distinct positive integers. Let \( P \) be the set of all odd primes \( p \) such that \( L \leq p \leq U \). Our main focus is on Blum primes, i.e. odd primes that are congruent to 3 modulo 4, so we assume that the lower bound \( L > 2 \). The closed interval \([L, U]\) has a Blum prime if and only if the set \( P \) has a Blum prime.

**EXAMPLES:**

Testing for the presence of Blum primes within some closed intervals. The interval \([4, 100]\) has a Blum prime, the smallest such prime being 7. The interval \([24, 28]\) has no primes, hence no Blum primes.

```
sage: from sage.crypto.util import has_blum_prime
sage: has_blum_prime(4, 100)
True
sage: has_blum_prime(24, 28)
False
```

(continues on next page)
\texttt{sage: has_blum_prime(24, 28)}
\begin{verbatim}
False
\end{verbatim}

\begin{Verbatim}
\begin{verbatim}
\texttt{\textbf{sage.crypto.util.is_blum_prime}(n)}
\end{verbatim}
\end{Verbatim}

Determine whether or not \( n \) is a Blum prime.

\textbf{INPUT:}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \( n \) a positive prime.
\end{itemize}

\textbf{OUTPUT:}
\begin{itemize}
  \item True if \( n \) is a Blum prime; False otherwise.
\end{itemize}

Let \( n \) be a positive prime. Then \( n \) is a Blum prime if \( n \) is congruent to 3 modulo 4, i.e. \( n \equiv 3 \pmod{4} \).

\textbf{EXAMPLES:}

Testing some integers to see if they are Blum primes:

\begin{Verbatim}
\begin{verbatim}
sage: from sage.crypto.util import is_blum_prime
sage: from sage.crypto.util import random_blum_prime
sage: is_blum_prime(101)
False
sage: is_blum_prime(7)
True
sage: p = random_blum_prime(10**3, 10**5)
sage: is_blum_prime(p)
True
\end{verbatim}
\end{Verbatim}

\begin{Verbatim}
\begin{verbatim}
\texttt{\textbf{sage.crypto.util.least_significant_bits}(n, k)}
\end{verbatim}
\end{Verbatim}

Return the \( k \) least significant bits of \( n \).

\textbf{INPUT:}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \( n \) – an integer.
  \item \( k \) – a positive integer.
\end{itemize}

\textbf{OUTPUT:}
\begin{itemize}
  \item The \( k \) least significant bits of the integer \( n \). If \( k=1 \), then return the parity bit of the integer \( n \). Let \( b \) be the binary representation of \( n \), where \( m \) is the length of the binary string \( b \). If \( k \geq m \), then return the binary representation of \( n \).
\end{itemize}

\textbf{EXAMPLES:}

Obtain the parity bits of some integers:

\begin{Verbatim}
\begin{verbatim}
sage: from sage.crypto.util import least_significant_bits
sage: least_significant_bits(0, 1)
[0]
sage: least_significant_bits(2, 1)
[0]
sage: least_significant_bits(3, 1)
[1]
sage: least_significant_bits(-2, 1)
\end{verbatim}
\end{Verbatim}
Obtain the 4 least significant bits of some integers:

\begin{verbatim}
sage: least_significant_bits(-3, 4)
[0, 1, 0, 1]
sage: least_significant_bits(101, 4)
[0, 1, 0, 1]
sage: least_significant_bits(-101, 4)
[0, 1, 0, 1]
sage: least_significant_bits(124, 4)
[1, 1, 0, 0]
sage: least_significant_bits(-124, 4)
[1, 1, 0, 0]
\end{verbatim}

The binary representation of 123:

\begin{verbatim}
sage: n = 123; b = n.binary(); b
'1111011'
sage: least_significant_bits(n, len(b))
[1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1]
\end{verbatim}

\texttt{sage.crypto.util.random\_blum\_prime(lbound, ubound, ntries=100)}

A random Blum prime within the specified bounds.

Let $p$ be a positive prime. Then $p$ is a Blum prime if $p$ is congruent to 3 modulo 4, i.e. $p \equiv 3 \mod 4$.

**INPUT:**

- \texttt{lbound} – positive integer; the lower bound on how small a random Blum prime $p$ can be. So we have $0 < \texttt{lbound} \leq p \leq \texttt{ubound}$. The lower bound must be distinct from the upper bound.
- \texttt{ubound} – positive integer; the upper bound on how large a random Blum prime $p$ can be. So we have $0 < \texttt{lbound} \leq p \leq \texttt{ubound}$. The lower bound must be distinct from the upper bound.
- \texttt{ntries} – (default: 100) the number of attempts to generate a random Blum prime. If \texttt{ntries} is a positive integer, then perform that many attempts at generating a random Blum prime. This might or might not result in a Blum prime.

**OUTPUT:**

- A random Blum prime within the specified lower and upper bounds.

**Note:** Beware that there might not be any primes between the lower and upper bounds. So make sure that these two bounds are “sufficiently” far apart from each other for there to be primes congruent to 3 modulo 4. In particular, there should be at least two distinct Blum primes within the specified bounds.

**EXAMPLES:**

Choose a random prime and check that it is a Blum prime:

\begin{verbatim}
sage: from sage.crypto.util import random_blum_prime
sage: p = random_blum_prime(10**4, 10**5)
sage: is_prime(p)
True
\end{verbatim}
\begin{Verbatim}
\texttt{sage: mod(p, 4) == 3}
\texttt{True}
\end{Verbatim}
Those functions are used for example in LFSR based ciphers like the filter generator or the combination generator. This module allows to study properties linked to spectral analysis, and also algebraic immunity.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: R.<x> = GF(2^8, 'a')[]
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: B = BooleanFunction( x^254 )  # the Boolean function Tr(x^254)
sage: B
Boolean function with 8 variables
sage: B.nonlinearity()
112
sage: B.algebraic_immunity()
4
```

AUTHOR:

- Rusydi H. Makarim (2016-10-13): add functions related to linear structures
- Rusydi H. Makarim (2016-07-09): add is_plateaued()
- Yann Laigle-Chapuy (2010-02-26): add basic arithmetic
- Yann Laigle-Chapuy (2009-08-28): first implementation

class `sage.crypto.boolean_function.BooleanFunction`

Bases: `SageObject`

This module implements Boolean functions represented as a truth table.

We can construct a Boolean Function from either:

- an integer - the result is the zero function with x variables;
- a list - it is expected to be the truth table of the result. Therefore it must be of length a power of 2, and its elements are interpreted as Booleans;
- a string - representing the truth table in hexadecimal;
- a Boolean polynomial - the result is the corresponding Boolean function;
- a polynomial P over an extension of GF(2) - the result is the Boolean function with truth table ( Tr(P(x)) for x in GF(2^k) )

EXAMPLES:

from the number of variables:
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: BooleanFunction(5)
Boolean function with 5 variables

from a truth table:

sage: BooleanFunction([1,0,0,1])
Boolean function with 2 variables

note that elements can be of different types:

sage: B = BooleanFunction([False, sqrt(2)])
sage: B
Boolean function with 1 variable
sage: [b for b in B]
[False, True]

from a string:

sage: BooleanFunction("111e")
Boolean function with 4 variables

from a sage.rings.polynomial.pbori.BooleanPolynomial:

sage: R.<x,y,z> = BooleanPolynomialRing(3)
sage: P = x*y
sage: BooleanFunction( P )
Boolean function with 3 variables

from a polynomial over a binary field:

sage: R.<x> = GF(2^8,'a')[]
sage: B = BooleanFunction( x^7 )
sage: B
Boolean function with 8 variables

two failure cases:

sage: BooleanFunction(sqrt(2))
Traceback (most recent call last):
  ... TypeError: unable to init the Boolean function

sage: BooleanFunction([1, 0, 1])
Traceback (most recent call last):
  ... ValueError: the length of the truth table must be a power of 2

**absolute_indicator**(*args, **kwds)**

Deprecated: Use **absolute_indicator()** instead. See github issue #28001 for details.

**absolute_autocorrelation**()

Return the absolute autocorrelation of the function.

**EXAMPLES:**
absolute_indicator()

Return the absolute indicator of the function.

The absolute indicator is defined as the maximal absolute value of the autocorrelation.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: B = BooleanFunction("7969817CC5893BA6AC326E47619F5AD0")
sage: B.absolute_indicator()
32
```

The old method’s name contained a typo, it is deprecated:

```python
sage: B.absolut_indicator()
```

```
 doctest:warning
...
DeprecationWarning: absolut_indicator is deprecated. Please use absolute_indicator instead.
See https://github.com/sagemath/sage/issues/28001 for details.
```

absolute_walsh_spectrum()

Return the absolute Walsh spectrum fo the function.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: B = BooleanFunction("7969817CC5893BA6AC326E47619F5AD0")
sage: sorted(B.absolute_walsh_spectrum().items())
[(0, 64), (16, 64)]
sage: B = BooleanFunction("0113077C165E76A8")
sage: B.absolute_walsh_spectrum()
{8: 64}
```

algebraic_degree()

Return the algebraic degree of this Boolean function.

The algebraic degree of a Boolean function is defined as the degree of its algebraic normal form. Note that the degree of the constant zero function is defined to be equal to -1.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: B.<x0, x1, x2, x3> = BooleanPolynomialRing()
sage: f = BooleanFunction(x1*x2 + x1*x2*x3 + x1)
sage: f.algebraic_degree()
3
sage: g = BooleanFunction([0, 0])
```

(continues on next page)
sage: g.algebraic_degree()
-1

```python
algebraic_immunity(annihilator=False)
Return the algebraic immunity of the Boolean function.
This is the smallest integer $i$ such that there exists a non trivial annihilator for self or self.

INPUT:
- annihilator – boolean (default: False); if True, returns also an annihilator of minimal degree

EXAMPLES:
```}

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: R.<x0,x1,x2,x3,x4,x5> = BooleanPolynomialRing(6)
sage: B = BooleanFunction(x0*x1 + x1*x2 + x2*x3 + x3*x4 + x4*x5)
sage: B.algebraic_immunity(annihilator=True)
(2, x0*x1 + x1*x2 + x2*x3 + x3*x4 + x4*x5 + 1)
sage: B[0] +=1
sage: B.algebraic_immunity()
2
```

```python
algebraic_normal_form()
Return the `sage.rings.polynomial.pbori.BooleanPolynomial` corresponding to the algebraic normal form.

EXAMPLES:
```}

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: B = BooleanFunction([0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1])
sage: P = B.algebraic_normal_form()
sage: P
x0*x1*x2 + x0 + x1*x2 + x1 + x2
```

```python
annihilator(d, dim=False)
Return (if it exists) an annihilator of the boolean function of degree at most $d$, that is a Boolean polynomial $g$ such that

$$f(x)g(x) = 0 \forall x.$$ 

INPUT:
- $d$ – an integer;
- dim – a Boolean (default: False), if True, return also the dimension of the annihilator vector space.

EXAMPLES:
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: f = BooleanFunction("7969817CC5893BA6AC326E47619F5AD0")
sage: f.annihilator(1) is None
True
sage: g = BooleanFunction( f.annihilator(3) )
sage: set([ fi*g(i) for i,fi in enumerate(f) ])
{0}

autocorrelation()

Return the autocorrelation of the function, defined by
\[ \Delta f(j) = \sum_{i \in \{0,1\}^n} (-1)^{f(i) \oplus f(i \oplus j)}. \]

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: B = BooleanFunction("03")
sage: B.autocorrelation()
(8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)

correlation_immunity()

Return the maximum value \( m \) such that the function is correlation immune of order \( m \).

A Boolean function is said to be correlation immune of order \( m \), if the output of the function is statistically independent of the combination of any \( m \) of its inputs.

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: B = BooleanFunction("7969817CC5893BA6AC326E47619F5AD0")
sage: B.correlation_immunity()
2

derivative(\( u \))

Return the derivative in direction of \( u \)

INPUT:

* \( u \) – either an integer or a tuple/list of \( \mathbb{F}_2 \) elements of length equal to the number of variables

The derivative of \( f \) in direction of \( u \) is defined as \( x \mapsto f(x) + f(x + u) \).

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: f = BooleanFunction([0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1])
sage: f.derivative(1).algebraic_normal_form()
1
sage: u = [1,0,0]
sage: f.derivative(u).algebraic_normal_form()
1
sage: v = vector(GF(2), u)
sage: f.derivative(u).algebraic_normal_form()
1
sage: f.derivative(8).algebraic_normal_form()
Traceback (most recent call last):
...
IndexError: index out of bound

has_linear_structure()
Return True if this function has a linear structure.

An \( n \)-variable Boolean function \( f \) has a linear structure if there exists a nonzero \( a \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \) such that \( f(x \oplus a) \oplus f(x) \) is a constant function.

See also:

is_linear_structure(), linear_structures().

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: f = BooleanFunction([0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0])
sage: f.has_linear_structure()
True
sage: f.autocorrelation()
(16, -16, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
sage: g = BooleanFunction([0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1])
sage: g.has_linear_structure()
False
sage: g.autocorrelation()
(16, 4, 4, 4, 4, -4, -4, -4, -4, 4, -4, -4, -4, 4, -4, -4)
```

is_balanced()
Return True if the function takes the value True half of the time.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: B = BooleanFunction(1)
sage: B.is_balanced()
False
sage: B[0] = True
sage: B.is_balanced()
True
```

is_bent()
Return True if the function is bent.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: B = BooleanFunction("0113077C165E76A8")
sage: B.is_bent()
True
```

is_linear_structure(val)
Return True if val is a linear structure of this Boolean function.

INPUT:
• val – either an integer or a tuple/list of $\mathbb{F}_2$ elements of length equal to the number of variables

See also:

`has_linear_structure()`, `linear_structures()`.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: f = BooleanFunction([0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0])
sage: f.is_linear_structure(1)
True
sage: l = [1, 0, 0, 1]
sage: f.is_linear_structure(l)
True
sage: v = vector(GF(2), l)
sage: f.is_linear_structure(v)
True
sage: f.is_linear_structure(7)
False
sage: f.is_linear_structure(20)  # parameter is out of range
Traceback (most recent call last):
  ... IndexError: index out of range
sage: v = vector(GF(3), [1, 0, 1, 1])
sage: f.is_linear_structure(v)
Traceback (most recent call last):
  ... TypeError: base ring of input vector must be GF(2)
sage: v = vector(GF(2), [1, 0, 1, 1, 1])
sage: f.is_linear_structure(v)
Traceback (most recent call last):
  ... TypeError: input vector must be an element of a vector space with dimension 4
sage: f.is_linear_structure('X')  # failure case
Traceback (most recent call last):
  ... TypeError: cannot compute is_linear_structure() using parameter X
```

`is_plateaued()`

Return `True` if this function is plateaued, i.e. its Walsh transform takes at most three values 0 and $\pm \lambda$, where $\lambda$ is some positive integer.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: R.<x0, x1, x2, x3> = BooleanPolynomialRing()
sage: f = BooleanFunction(x0*x1 + x2 + x3)
sage: f.walsh_hadamard_transform()
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, 8, -8)
sage: f.is_plateaued()
True
```

`is_symmetric()`

Return `True` if the function is symmetric, i.e. invariant under permutation of its input bits.

Another way to see it is that the output depends only on the Hamming weight of the input.
EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: B = BooleanFunction(5)
sage: B[3] = 1
sage: B.is_symmetric()
False
sage: V_B = [0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0]
sage: for i in srange(32): B[i] = V_B[i.popcount()]
sage: B.is_symmetric()
True
```

**linear_structures()**

Return all linear structures of this Boolean function as a vector subspace of $\mathbb{F}_2^n$.

See also:

*is_linear_structure()*, *has_linear_structure()*.  

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: f = BooleanFunction([0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0])
sage: LS = f.linear_structures()
sage: LS.dimension()
2
sage: LS.basis_matrix()
[1 0 0 0]
[0 0 0 1]
sage: LS.list()
[(0, 0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0, 1)]
```

**nonlinearity()**

Return the nonlinearity of the function.

This is the distance to the linear functions, or the number of output ones need to change to obtain a linear function.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: B = BooleanFunction(5)
sage: B.nonlinearity()
2
sage: B = BooleanFunction("0113077C165E76A8")
sage: B.nonlinearity()
28
```

**nvariables()**

The number of variables of this function.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: BooleanFunction(4).nvariables()
4
```
resiliency_order()

Return the maximum value $m$ such that the function is resilient of order $m$.

A Boolean function is said to be resilient of order $m$ if it is balanced and correlation immune of order $m$.

If the function is not balanced, we return -1.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: B = BooleanFunction("077CE5A2F8831A5DF8831A5D077CE5A2699669966969666999665AA5A55A")
sage: B.resiliency_order()
3
```

sum_of_square_indicator()

Return the sum of square indicator of the function.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: B = BooleanFunction("7969817CC5893BA6AC326E47619F5AD0")
sage: B.sum_of_square_indicator()
32768
```

truth_table(format='bin')

The truth table of the Boolean function.

INPUT: a string representing the desired format, can be either

- ‘bin’ (default) : we return a tuple of Boolean values
- ‘int’ : we return a tuple of 0 or 1 values
- ‘hex’ : we return a string representing the truth_table in hexadecimal

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: R.<x,y,z> = BooleanPolynomialRing(3)
sage: B = BooleanFunction( x*y*z + z + y + 1 )
sage: B.truth_table()
(True, True, False, False, False, False, True, False)
sage: B.truth_table(format='int')
(1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0)
sage: B.truth_table(format='hex')
'43'
```

```python
sage: BooleanFunction('00ab').truth_table(format='hex')
'00ab'
```

```python
sage: H = '0abbacadabbacad0'
sage: len(H)
16
sage: T = BooleanFunction(H).truth_table(format='hex')
sage: T == H
True
sage: H = H * 4
```
sage: T = BooleanFunction(H).truth_table(format='hex')
sage: T == H
True
sage: H = H * 4
sage: T = BooleanFunction(H).truth_table(format='hex')
sage: T == H
True
sage: len(T)
256
sage: B.truth_table(format='oct')
Traceback (most recent call last):
...ValueError: unknown output format

\textbf{walsh_hadamard_transform}()

Compute the Walsh Hadamard transform \(W\) of the function \(f\).

\[
W(j) = \sum_{i \in \{0,1\}^n} (-1)^{f(i) \oplus i \cdot j}
\]

\textbf{EXAMPLES:}

sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: R.<x> = GF(2^3,'a')[]
sage: B = BooleanFunction( x^3 )
sage: B.walsh_hadamard_transform()
(0, -4, 0, 4, 0, 4, 0, 4)

\textbf{class sage.crypto.boolean_function.BooleanFunctionIterator}

Bases: object

Iterator through the values of a Boolean function.

\textbf{EXAMPLES:}

sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: B = BooleanFunction(3)
sage: type(B.__iter__())
<class 'sage.crypto.boolean_function.BooleanFunctionIterator'>

\textbf{sage.crypto.boolean_function.random_boolean_function}(n)

Return a random Boolean function with \(n\) variables.

\textbf{EXAMPLES:}

sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import random_boolean_function
sage: B = random_boolean_function(9)
sage: B.nvariables()
9
sage: while not (210 < B.nonlinearity() < 220):
  ....: B = random_boolean_function(9)

\textbf{sage.crypto.boolean_function.unpickle_BooleanFunction}(bool_list)

Specific function to unpickle Boolean functions.

\textbf{EXAMPLES:}
sage: from sage.crypto.boolean_function import BooleanFunction
sage: B = BooleanFunction([0,1,1,0])

sage: loads(dumps(B)) == B  # indirect doctest
True
S-BOXES AND THEIR ALGEBRAIC REPRESENTATIONS

class sage.crypto.sbox.SBox

    Bases: SageObject

A substitution box or S-box is one of the basic components of symmetric key cryptography. In general, an S-box takes \( m \) input bits and transforms them into \( n \) output bits. This is called an \( m \times n \) S-box and is often implemented as a lookup table. These S-boxes are carefully chosen to resist linear and differential cryptanalysis [He2002].

This module implements an S-box class which allows an algebraic treatment and determine various cryptographic properties.

EXAMPLES:

We consider the S-box of the block cipher PRESENT [BKLPPRSV2007]:

\[
\begin{align*}
    \text{sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox} \\
    \text{sage: S = SBox(12, 5, 6, 11, 9, 0, 10, 13, 3, 14, 15, 8, 4, 7, 1, 2); S} \\
    (12, 5, 6, 11, 9, 0, 10, 13, 3, 14, 15, 8, 4, 7, 1, 2) \\
    \text{sage: S(1)} \\
    5 \\
\end{align*}
\]

Note that by default bits are interpreted in big endian order. This is not consistent with the rest of Sage, which has a strong bias towards little endian, but is consistent with most cryptographic literature:

\[
\begin{align*}
    \text{sage: S([0, 0, 0, 1])} \\
    [0, 1, 0, 1] \\
    \text{sage: S = SBox(12, 5, 6, 11, 9, 0, 10, 13, 3, 14, 15, 8, 4, 7, 1, 2, big_endian=False); S} \\
    \text{sage: S(1)} \\
    5 \\
    \text{sage: S([0, 0, 0, 1])} \\
    [1, 1, 0, 0] \\
\end{align*}
\]

Now we construct an SBox object for the 4-bit small scale AES S-Box (cf. sage.crypto.mq.sr):

\[
\begin{align*}
    \text{sage: sr = mq.SR(1,1,1,4, allow_zero_inversions=True)} \\
    \text{sage: S = SBox([sr.sub_byte(e) for e in list(sr.k)]); S} \\
    (6, 5, 2, 9, 4, 7, 3, 12, 14, 15, 10, 0, 8, 1, 13, 11) \\
\end{align*}
\]

AUTHORS:

- Rusydi H. Makarim (2016-03-31) : added more functions to determine related cryptographic properties
- Yann Laigle-Chapuy (2009-07-01): improve linear and difference matrix computation
autocorrelation_table()

Return the autocorrelation table corresponding to this S-Box.

for an \(m \times n\) S-Box \(S\), its autocorrelation table entry at row \(a \in \mathbb{F}_{2}^{m}\) and column \(b \in \mathbb{F}_{2}^{n}\) (considering their integer representation) is defined as:

\[
\sum_{x \in \mathbb{F}_{2}^{m}} (-1)^{b \cdot S(x) \oplus b \cdot S(x \oplus a)}.
\]

Equivalently, the columns \(b\) of autocorrelation table correspond to the autocorrelation spectrum of component function \(b \cdot S(x)\).

EXAMPLES:

```sage
from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
S = SBox(7,6,0,4,2,5,1,3)
S.autocorrelation_table()
```

```
[ [ 8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8  8]
 [ 8  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  -8]
 [ 8  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0]
 [ 8  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0]
 [ 8  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0]
 [ 8  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0]
 [ 8  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0]
 [ 8  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0]
```

boomerang_connectivity_table()

Return the boomerang connectivity table (BCT) for this S-Box.

Boomerang connectivity matrix of an invertible \(m \times m\) S-Box \(S\) is an \(2^{m} \times 2^{m}\) matrix with entry at row \(\Delta_i \in \mathbb{F}_{2}^{m}\) and column \(\Delta_o \in \mathbb{F}_{2}^{m}\) equal to

\[
|\{x \in \mathbb{F}_{2}^{m} | S^{-1}(S(x) \oplus \Delta_o) \oplus S^{-1}(S(x \oplus \Delta_i) \oplus \Delta_o) = \Delta_i\}|.
\]

For more results concerning boomerang connectivity matrix, see [CHPSS18]. The algorithm used here is the one from Dunkelman [Du2018].

EXAMPLES:

```sage
from sage.crypto.sboxes import PRESENT
PRESENT.boomerang_connectivity_table()
```

```
[ [16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16]
 [16 0 4 4 0 16 4 4 4 4 0 0 4 4 0 0]
 [16 0 0 6 0 4 6 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 0]
 [16 2 0 6 2 4 4 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0]
 [16 0 0 0 0 4 2 2 0 6 2 0 6 0 2 0]
 [16 2 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 6 2 2 4 2 0 0]
 [16 4 2 0 4 0 2 0 2 0 0 4 2 0 4 8]
```

(continues on next page)
boomerang_uniformity()

Return the boomerang uniformity

The boomerang uniformity is defined as the highest entry in the boomerang connectivity table, ignoring the first row and column.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.sboxes import AES
sage: AES.boomerang_uniformity()
6
```

cnf(xi=None, yi=None, format=None)

Return a representation of this S-Box in conjunctive normal form.

This function examines the truth tables for each output bit of the S-Box and thus has complexity $n \times 2^m$ for an $m \times n$ S-Box.

INPUT:

- **xi** – (default: 1...m) indices for the input variables
- **yi** – (default: m+1 ... m+n) indices for the output variables
- **format** – (default: None) output format, see below

FORMATS:

- **None** – return a list of tuples of integers where each tuple represents a clause, the absolute value of an integer represents a variable and the sign of an integer indicates inversion
- **symbolic** – a string that can be parsed by the SymbolicLogic package
- **dimacs** – a string in DIMACS format which is the gold standard for SAT-solver input (cf. http://www.satlib.org/)
- **dimacs_headless** – a string in DIMACS format, but without the header; this is useful for concatenation of outputs

EXAMPLES:

We give a very small example to explain the output format:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox(1,2,0,3); S
(1, 2, 0, 3)
sage: cnf = S.cnf(); cnf
[(1, 2, -3), (1, 2, 4), (1, -2, 3), (1, -2, -4),
 (16 8 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 8 16)]
```
This output completely describes the S-Box. For instance, we can check that $S([0, 1]) \rightarrow [1, 0]$ satisfies every clause if the first input bit corresponds to the index 1 and the last output bit corresponds to the index 3 in the output.

We can convert this representation to the DIMACS format:

```sage
print(S.cnf(format='dimacs'))
p cnf 4 8
1 2 -3 0
1 2 4 0
1 -2 3 0
1 -2 -4 0
-1 2 -3 0
-1 2 -4 0
-1 -2 3 0
-1 -2 4 0
```

For concatenation we can strip the header:

```sage
print(S.cnf(format='dimacs_headless'))
1 2 -3 0
1 2 4 0
1 -2 3 0
1 -2 -4 0
-1 2 -3 0
-1 2 -4 0
-1 -2 3 0
-1 -2 4 0
```

This might be helpful in combination with the $x_i$ and $y_i$ parameter to assign indices manually:

```sage
print(S.cnf(xi=[10, 20], yi=[30, 40], format='dimacs_headless'))
10 20 -30 0
10 20 40 0
10 -20 30 0
10 -20 -40 0
-10 20 -30 0
-10 20 -40 0
-10 -20 30 0
-10 -20 40 0
```

We can also return a string which is parse-able by the `SymbolicLogic` package:

```sage
log = SymbolicLogic()
s = log.statement(S.cnf(format='symbolic'))
log.truthtable(s)[1:]
[[False, False, False, False, False],
 [False, False, False, True, False],
 [False, False, True, False, False],
 [False, False, True, True, True],
 [False, False, True, False, True],
 [False, False, True, True, False],
 [False, False, True, True, True]]
```

(continues on next page)
This function respects endianness of the S-Box:

```
sage: S = SBox(1,2,0,3, big_endian=False); S
(1, 2, 0, 3)
sage: cnf = S.cnf(); cnf
[(1, 2, -4), (1, 2, 3),
 (-1, 2, 4), (-1, 2, -3),
(1, -2, -4), (1, -2, -3),
(-1, -2, 4), (-1, -2, 3)]
```

S-Boxes with m!=n also work:

```
sage: o = list(range(8)) + list(range(8)) sage: shuffle(o) sage: S = SBox(o) sage: S.is_permutation() False
sage: len(S.cnf()) == 3*2^4 True
```

`component_function(b)`

Return a Boolean function corresponding to the component function $b \cdot S(x)$.

If $S$ is an $m \times n$ S-Box, then $b \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ and $\cdot$ denotes dot product of two vectors.

**INPUT:**

- $b$ – either an integer or a list/tuple/vector of $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ elements of length self.output_size()

**EXAMPLES:**

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([7,6,0,4,2,5,1,3])
sage: f3 = S.component_function(3)
sage: f3.algebraic_normal_form()
x0*x1 + x0*x2 + x0 + x2
sage: f5 = S.component_function([1, 0, 1])
sage: f5.algebraic_normal_form()
x0*x2 + x0 + x1*x2
```

`derivative(u)`

Return the derivative in direction of $u$

**INPUT:**

- $u$ – either an integer or a tuple/list of $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ elements of length equal to $m$
The derivative of $F$ in direction of $u$ is defined as $x \mapsto F(x) + F(x + u)$.

**EXAMPLES:**

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: s = SBox(0,1,2,3)
sage: s.derivative(1)
(1, 1, 1, 1)
sage: s.derivative([1,0])
(1, 1, 1, 1)
```

**difference_distribution_table()**

Return difference distribution table (DDT) $A$ for this S-box.

The rows of $A$ encode the differences $\Delta I$ of the input and the columns encode the difference $\Delta O$ for the output. The bits are ordered according to the endianess of this S-box. The value at $A[\Delta I, \Delta O]$ encodes how often $\Delta O$ is the actual output difference given $\Delta I$ as input difference.

See [He2002] for an introduction to differential cryptanalysis.

**EXAMPLES:**

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox(7,6,0,4,2,5,1,3)
sage: S.difference_distribution_table()
[8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
[0 2 2 0 2 2 0 2]
[0 0 2 2 0 2 2 2]
[0 2 0 2 2 0 2 2]
[0 2 0 2 2 0 2 2]
[0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0]
[0 2 2 0 2 2 0 2]
[0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2]
```

**differential_branch_number()**

Return differential branch number of this S-Box.

The differential branch number of an S-Box $S$ is defined as

$$\min_{v, w \neq v} \{\text{wt}(v \oplus w) + \text{wt}(S(v) \oplus S(w))\},$$

where $\text{wt}(x)$ denotes the Hamming weight of vector $x$.

**EXAMPLES:**

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox(7,6,0,4,2,5,1,3)
sage: S.differential_branch_number()
```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([12,5,6,11,9,0,10,13,3,14,15,8,4,7,1,2])
sage: S.differential_branch_number()
3

differential_uniformity()
Return the difference probability of the difference with the highest probability in absolute terms, i.e. how often it occurs in total.
Equivalently, this is equal to the differential uniformity of this S-Box.

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([7,6,0,4,2,5,1,3])
sage: S.maximal_difference_probability_absolute()
2

Note: This code is mainly called internally.

fixed_points()
Return a list of all fixed points of this S-Box.

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([0,1,3,6,7,4,5,2])
sage: S.fixed_points()
[0, 1]

from_bits(x, n=None)
Return integer for bitstring x of length n.

INPUT:

- x – a bitstring
- n – bit length (optional)

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([7,6,0,4,2,5,1,3])
sage: S.from_bits([1,1,0])
6
sage: S( S.from_bits([1,1,0]) )
1
sage: S.from_bits( S([1,1,0]) )
1

has_linear_structure()
Return True if there exists a nonzero component function of this S-Box that has a linear structure.
See also:

`is_linear_structure()`, `linear_structures()`.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox(12,5,6,11,9,0,10,13,3,14,15,8,4,7,1,2)
sage: S.has_linear_structure()
True
```

`input_size()`  
Return the input size of this S-Box.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([0, 3, 2, 1, 1, 3, 2, 0])
sage: S.input_size()
3
```

`interpolation_polynomial(k=None)`  
Return a univariate polynomial over an extension field representing this S-box.

If m is the input length of this S-box then the extension field is of degree m.

If the output length does not match the input length then a `TypeError` is raised.

INPUT:

- k – (optional) an instance of $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox(7,6,0,4,2,5,1,3)
sage: f = S.interpolation_polynomial()
sage: f
(a^2 + a + 1)*x^6 + a^2*x^5 + (a + 1)*x^4 + (a^2 + a)*x^3 + x^2 + a*x + a^2 + a + 1
sage: a = f.base_ring().gen()
sage: f(0), S(0)
(a^2 + a + 1, 7)
sage: f(a^2 + 1), S(5)
(a^2 + 1, 5)
```

**Note:** The method-internal call to the S-box initially used a different endianess for handling finite field elements. This changed in github issue #25633, by calling the S-box directly.

`inverse()`  
Return the inverse of this S-Box.

Note that the S-Box must be invertible, otherwise it will raise a `TypeError`.

EXAMPLES:
```python
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([0, 1, 3, 6, 7, 4, 5, 2])
```
```python
sage: Sinv = S.inverse()
```
```python
sage: [Sinv(S(i)) for i in range(8)]
```
```python
[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]
```

`is_almost_bent()`

Return True if this S-Box is an almost bent (AB) function.

An $m \times m$ S-Box $S$, for $m$ odd, is called almost bent if its nonlinearity is equal to $2^{m-1} - 2^{(m-1)/2}$.

EXAMPLES:
```python
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([0,1,3,6,7,4,5,2])
```
```python
sage: S.is_almost_bent()
```
```
True
```

`is_apn()`

Return True if this S-Box is an almost perfect nonlinear (APN) function.

An $m \times m$ S-Box $S$ is called almost perfect nonlinear if for every nonzero $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}_2^m$ and every $\beta \in \mathbb{F}_2^m$, the equation $S(x) \oplus S(x \oplus \alpha) = \beta$ has 0 or 2 solutions. Equivalently, the differential uniformity of $S$ is equal to 2.

EXAMPLES:
```python
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([0,1,3,6,7,4,5,2])
```
```python
sage: S.is_apn()
```
```
True
```
```python
sage: S.differential_uniformity()
```
```
2
```

`is_balanced()`

Return True if this S-Box is balanced.

An S-Box is balanced if all its component functions are balanced.

EXAMPLES:
```python
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([12,5,6,11,9,0,10,13,3,14,15,8,4,7,1,2])
```
```python
sage: S.is_balanced()
```
```
True
```

`is_bent()`

Return True if this S-Box is bent, i.e. its nonlinearity is equal to $2^{m-1} - 2^{m/2-1}$ where $m$ is the input size of the S-Box.

EXAMPLES:
```python
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
```
```python
sage: R.<x> = GF(2**2, 'a')[]
```
```python
sage: base = R.base_ring()
```
```python
sage: a = base.gen()
```
\textbf{sage: } G = a * x^2 + 1 \\
\textbf{sage: } S = SBox([G(x * y**(14)) for x in sorted(base) for y in sorted(base)]) \\
\textbf{sage: } S.is_bent() \\
\text{True} \\
\textbf{sage: } S.nonlinearity() \\
6 \\
\textbf{sage: } S.linear_approximation_table() \\
\begin{bmatrix}
 8 & -2 & 2 & -2 \\
 0 & -2 & 2 & -2 \\
 0 & -2 & 2 & -2 \\
 0 & -2 & 2 & -2 \\
 0 & -2 & 2 & -2 \\
 0 & -2 & 2 & -2 \\
 0 & -2 & 2 & -2 \\
 0 & -2 & -2 & 2 \\
 0 & 2 & 2 & 2 \\
 0 & 2 & -2 & -2 \\
 0 & 2 & -2 & -2 \\
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 0 & 2 & 2 & 2 \\
 0 & -2 & 2 & -2 \\
 0 & -2 & -2 & 2 \\
 0 & -2 & -2 & 2 \\
 0 & -2 & -2 & 2 \\
 0 & -2 & -2 & 2 \\
 0 & -2 & -2 & 2 \\
 0 & -2 & -2 & 2 \\
 0 & -2 & 2 & -2 \\
\end{bmatrix}

\textbf{is_involution()} 
Return True if this S-Box is an involution, i.e. the inverse S-Box is equal itself.

\textbf{EXAMPLES:}

\begin{center}
\textbf{sage: } from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox \\
\textbf{sage: } S = SBox([x**254 for x in sorted(GF(2**8))]) \\
\textbf{sage: } S.is_involution() \\
\text{True}
\end{center}

\textbf{is_linear_structure}(a, b) 
Return True if $a$ is a linear structure of the component function $b \cdot S(x)$ where $S$ is this $m \times n$ S-Box.

\textbf{INPUT:}

\begin{itemize}
  \item $a$ – either an integer or a tuple of $F_2$ elements of length equal to the input size of SBox
  \item $b$ – either an integer or a tuple of $F_2$ elements of length equal to the output size of SBox
\end{itemize}

\textbf{See also:}
\texttt{linear_structures()}, \texttt{has_linear_structure()}

\textbf{EXAMPLES:}

\begin{center}
\textbf{sage: } from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox \\
\textbf{sage: } S = SBox([12,5,6,11,9,0,10,13,3,14,15,8,4,7,1,2]) \\
\textbf{sage: } S.component_function(1).autocorrelation() \\
\begin{bmatrix}16, -16, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0\end{bmatrix} \\
\textbf{sage: } S.is_linear_structure(1, 1) \\
\text{True}
\end{center}
sage: S.is_linear_structure([1, 0, 0, 1], [0, 0, 0, 1])
True
sage: S.is_linear_structure([0, 1, 1, 1], 1)
False

is_monomial_function()
Return True if this S-Box is a monomial/power function.

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([0,1,3,6,7,4,5,2])
sage: S.is_monomial_function()
False
sage: S_poly = S.interpolation_polynomial(); S_poly
(a + 1)*x^6 + (a^2 + a + 1)*x^5 + (a^2 + a)*x^4
+ (a^2 + 1)*x^3 + a^2*x^2 + a*x
sage: all([S(x) == S_poly(x) for x in S_poly.base_ring()])
True
sage: S = SBox(0,3,2,1)
sage: S.interpolation_polynomial()
x^2
sage: S.is_monomial_function()
True

is_permutation()
Return True if this S-Box is a permutation.

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox(7,6,0,4,2,5,1,3)
sage: S.is_permutation()
True
sage: S = SBox(3,2,0,0,2,1,1,3)
sage: S.is_permutation()
False

is_plateaued()
Return True if this S-Box is plateaued, i.e. for all nonzero \( b \in F_2^n \) the Boolean function \( b \cdot S(x) \) is plateaued.

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox(0, 3, 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 5)
sage: S.is_plateaued()
True

linear_approximation_table(scale='absolute_bias')
Return linear approximation table (LAT) \( A \) for this S-box.
The entry $A[\alpha, \beta]$ corresponds to the probability $Pr[\alpha \cdot x = \beta \cdot S(x)]$, where $S$ is this S-box mapping $n$-bit inputs to $m$-bit outputs. There are three typical notations for this probability used in the literature:

- $Pr[\alpha \cdot x = \beta \cdot S(x)] = 1/2 + e(\alpha, \beta)$, where $e(\alpha, \beta)$ is called the bias,
- $2 \cdot Pr[\alpha \cdot x = \beta \cdot S(x)] = 1 + c(\alpha, \beta)$, where $c(\alpha, \beta) = 2 \cdot e(\alpha, \beta)$ is the correlation, and
- $2^{(m+1)} \cdot Pr[\alpha \cdot x = \beta \cdot S(x)] = 2^m + \tilde{S}(\alpha, \beta)$, where $\tilde{S}(\alpha, \beta)$ is the Fourier coefficient of $S$.

See [He2002] for an introduction to linear cryptanalysis.

**INPUT:**

- `scale` - string to choose the scaling for the LAT, one of
  - “bias”: elements are $e(\alpha, \beta)$
  - “correlation”: elements are $c(\alpha, \beta)$
  - “absolute_bias”: elements are $2^m \cdot e(\alpha, \beta)$ (default)
  - “fourier_coefficient”: elements are $\tilde{S}(\alpha, \beta)$

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox(7, 6, 0, 4, 2, 5, 1, 3)
sage: lat_abs_bias = S.linear_approximation_table()
sage: lat_abs_bias
[[4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
 [0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, -2, 0],
 [0, 0, 2, 2, 0, 0, 2, 0],
 [0, 2, 2, -2, 0, 2, 0, 2],
 [0, 2, 0, 2, 2, 2, 0, 2],
 [0, -2, -2, 0, 2, 2, 0, 2],
 [0, -2, -2, 0, -2, 2, 0, 2],
 [0, -2, 0, -2, 0, 2, -2, 0]]

sage: lat_abs_bias/(1 << S.input_size()) == S.linear_approximation_table(scale="bias")
True

sage: lat_abs_bias/(1 << (S.input_size()-1)) == S.linear_approximation_table(scale="correlation")
True

sage: lat_abs_bias*2 == S.linear_approximation_table(scale="fourier_coefficient")
True
```

According to this table the first bit of the input is equal to the third bit of the output 6 out of 8 times:

```python
sage: for i in srange(8): print(S.to_bits(i)[0] == S.to_bits(S(i))[2])
False
False
True
True
False
True
False
True
```

(continues on next page)
linear_branch_number()

Return linear branch number of this S-Box.

The linear branch number of an S-Box $S$ is defined as

$$\min_{\alpha \neq 0, \beta \neq 0, \text{LAM}(\alpha, \beta) \neq 0} \{\text{wt}(\alpha) + \text{wt}(\beta)\},$$

where LAM$(\alpha, \beta)$ is the entry at row $\alpha$ and column $\beta$ of linear approximation matrix correspond to this S-Box. The wt$(x)$ denotes the Hamming weight of $x$.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([12,5,6,11,9,0,10,13,3,14,15,8,4,7,1,2])
sage: S.linear_branch_number()
2
```

linear_structures()

Return a list of 3-valued tuple $(b, \alpha, c)$ such that $\alpha$ is a $c$-linear structure of the component function $b \cdot S(x)$. A Boolean function $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2$ is said to have a $c$-linear structure if there exists a nonzero $\alpha$ such that $f(x) \oplus f(x \oplus \alpha)$ is a constant function $c$.

An $m \times n$ S-Box $S$ has a linear structure if there exists a component function $b \cdot S(x)$ that has a linear structure.

The three valued tuple $(b, \alpha, c)$ shows that $\alpha$ is a $c$-linear structure of the component function $b \cdot S(x)$. This implies that for all output differences $\beta$ of the S-Box correspond to input difference $\alpha$, we have $b \cdot \beta = c$.

See also:

is_linear_structure(), has_linear_structure()

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([0,1,3,6,7,4,5,2])
sage: S.linear_structures()
[(1, 1, 1), (2, 2, 1), (3, 3, 1), (4, 4, 1), (5, 5, 1), (6, 6, 1), (7, 7, 1)]
```

linearity()

Return the linearity of this S-Box.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = mq.SR(1, 4, 4, 8).sbox()
sage: S.linearity()
32
```

max_degree()

Return the maximal algebraic degree of all its component functions.

EXAMPLES:
maximal_difference_probability()

Return the difference probability of the difference with the highest probability in the range between 0.0 and 1.0 indicating 0% or 100% respectively.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([12,5,6,11,9,0,10,13,3,14,15,8,4,7,1,2])
sage: S.maximal_difference_probability()
3
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([7,6,0,4,2,5,1,3])
sage: S.maximal_difference_probability()
0.25
```

maximal_difference_probability_absolute()

Return the difference probability of the difference with the highest probability in absolute terms, i.e. how often it occurs in total.

Equivalently, this is equal to the differential uniformity of this S-Box.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([7,6,0,4,2,5,1,3])
sage: S.maximal_difference_probability_absolute()
2
```

Note: This code is mainly called internally.

maximal_linear_bias_absolute()

Return maximal linear bias, i.e. how often the linear approximation with the highest bias is true or false minus $2^{n-1}$.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([7,6,0,4,2,5,1,3])
sage: S.maximal_linear_bias_absolute()
2
```

maximal_linear_bias_relative()

Return maximal bias of all linear approximations of this S-box.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([7,6,0,4,2,5,1,3])
sage: S.maximal_linear_bias_relative()
0.25
```

min_degree()

Return the minimal algebraic degree of all its component functions.
EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([12,5,6,11,9,0,10,13,3,14,15,8,4,7,1,2])
sage: S.min_degree()
2
```

**nonlinearity()**

Return the nonlinearity of this S-Box.

The nonlinearity of an S-Box is defined as the minimum nonlinearity of all its component functions.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = mq.SR(1,4,4,8).sbox()
sage: S.nonlinearity()
112
```

**output_size()**

Return the output size of this S-Box.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([0, 3, 2, 1, 1, 3, 2, 0])
sage: S.output_size()
2
```

**polynomials**

**polynomials**(*X=None, Y=None, degree=2, groebner=False*)

Return a list of polynomials satisfying this S-box.

First, a simple linear fitting is performed for the given degree (cf. for example [BC2003]). If 
groebner=True a Groebner basis is also computed for the result of that process.

**INPUT:**

- **X** – (optional) input variables
- **Y** – (optional) output variables
- **degree** – (default: 2) integer > 0
- **groebner** – (default: False) calculate a reduced Groebner basis of the spanning polynomials to obtain
  more polynomials

**EXAMPLES:**

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox(7,6,0,4,2,5,1,3)
sage: P = S.ring()
```

By default, this method returns an indirect representation:

```
sage: S.polynomials()
[x0*x2 + x1 + y1 + 1,
x0*x1 + x1 + x2 + y0 + y1 + y2 + 1,
x0*y1 + x0 + x2 + y0 + y2,]
```

(continues on next page)
\[x_0*y_0 + x_0*y_2 + x_1 + x_2 + y_0 + y_1 + y_2 + 1,
\]
\[x_1*x_2 + x_0 + x_1 + x_2 + y_2 + 1,
\]
\[x_0*y_0 + x_1*y_0 + x_0 + x_2 + y_1 + y_2,
\]
\[x_0*y_0 + x_1*y_1 + x_1 + y_1 + 1,
\]
\[x_1*y_2 + x_1 + x_2 + y_0 + y_1 + y_2 + 1,
\]
\[x_0*y_0 + x_2*y_0 + x_1 + x_2 + y_1 + 1,
\]
\[x_2*y_1 + x_0 + y_1 + y_2,
\]
\[x_2*y_2 + x_1 + y_1 + 1,
\]
\[y_0*y_1 + x_0 + x_2 + y_0 + y_1 + y_2,
\]
\[y_0*y_2 + x_1 + x_2 + y_0 + y_1 + 1,
\]
\[y_1*y_2 + x_2 + y_0\]

We can get a direct representation by computing a lexicographical Groebner basis with respect to the right variable ordering, i.e. a variable ordering where the output bits are greater than the input bits:

```sage
sage: P.<y0,y1,y2,x0,x1,x2> = PolynomialRing(GF(2),6,order='lex')
sage: S.polynomials([x0,x1,x2],[y0,y1,y2], groebner=True)
[y0 + x0*x1 + x0*x2 + x0 + x1*x2 + x1 + 1,
y1 + x0*x2 + x1 + 1,
y2 + x0 + x1*x2 + x1 + x2 + 1]
```

**ring()**

Create, return, and cache a polynomial ring for S-box polynomials.

**EXAMPLES:**

```sage
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox(7,6,0,4,2,5,1,3)
sage: S.ring()
Multivariate Polynomial Ring in x0, x1, x2, y0, y1, y2 over Finite Field of size 2
```

**solutions(X=None, Y=None)**

Return a dictionary of solutions to this S-box.

**INPUT:**

- **X** – (optional) input variables
- **Y** – (optional) output variables

**EXAMPLES:**

```sage
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox([7,6,0,4,2,5,1,3])
sage: F = S.polynomials()
sage: s = S.solutions()
sage: any(f.subs(_s) for f in F for _s in s)
False
```

**to_bits(x, n=None)**

Return bitstring of length \(n\) for integer \(x\). The returned bitstring is guaranteed to have length \(n\).

**INPUT:**

- **x** – an integer
• n – bit length (optional)

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: S = SBox(7,6,0,4,2,5,1,3)
```
```
sage: S.to_bits(6)
[1, 1, 0]
```
```
sage: S.to_bits(S(6))
[0, 0, 1]
```
```
sage: S(S.to_bits(6))
[0, 0, 1]
```

```
sage.crypto.sbox.feistel_construction(*args)
Return an S-Box constructed by Feistel structure using smaller S-Boxes in args. The number of round in the
construction is equal to the number of S-Boxes provided as input. For more results concerning the differential
uniformity and the nonlinearity of S-Boxes constructed by Feistel structures see [CDL2015].
```
```
INPUT:
```
• args – a finite iterable SBox objects
```
```
EXAMPLES:
```
Suppose we construct an 8 × 8 S-Box with 3-round Feistel construction from the S-Box of PRESENT:
```
```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import SBox
sage: s = SBox(12,5,6,11,9,0,10,13,3,14,15,8,4,7,1,2)
```
```
sage: from sage.crypto.sbox import feistel_construction
sage: S = feistel_construction(s, s, s)
```
```
The properties of the constructed S-Box can be easily examined:
```
```
sage: S.nonlinearity()
96
sage: S.differential_branch_number()
2
sage: S.linear_branch_number()
2
```

```
sage.crypto.sbox.misty_construction(*args)
Return an S-Box constructed by MISTY structure using smaller S-Boxes in args. The number of round in the
construction is equal to the number of S-Boxes provided as input. For further result related to the nonlinearity and differential uniformity of the constructed S-Box one may consult [CDL2015].
```
```
INPUT:
```
• args – a finite iterable SBox objects
```
```
EXAMPLES:
```
We construct an 8 × 8 S-Box using 3-round MISTY structure with the following 4 × 4 S-Boxes S1, S2, S3 (see
Example 2 in [CDL2015]):
```
```
```
The properties of the constructed S-Box can be easily examined:

```sage
sage: S.differential_uniformity()
sage: S.linearity()
```
This module provides the following SBoxes:

**constructions**
- BrackenLeander ([BraLea2008])
- CarletTangTangLiao ([CTTL2014])
- Gold ([Gol1968])
- Kasami ([Kas1971])
- Niho ([Dob1999a])
- Welch ([Dob1999b])

**9 bit to 9 bit**
- DryGASCON256 ([Rio2019])

**8 bit to 8 bit**
- AES (FlexAEAD [NX2019]) ([DR2002])
- Anubis ([BR2000a])
- ARIA_s2 ([KKPSSSYLLCHH2004])
- BelT ([Bel2011])
- Camellia ([AIKMMNT2001])
- CMEA ([WSK1997])
- Chiasmus ([STW2013])
- CLEFIA_S0, CLEFIA_S1 ([SSAMI2007])
- Crypton_0_5 ([Lim])
- Crypton_1_0_S0, ..., Crypton_1_0_S3 ([Lim2001])
- CS_cipher ([SV2000])
- CSA ([WW2005])
- CSS ([BD2004])
- DBlock ([WZY2015])
- E2 ([KMAUTOM2000])
- Enocoro ([WFYTP2008])
• Fantomas ([GLSV2014])
• FLY ([KG2016])
• Fox ([VJ2004])
• Iceberg ([SPRQL2004])
• Iraqi (Wikipedia article Iraqi_block_cipher)
• iScream ([GLSVJGK2014])
• Kalyna_p0, ..., Kalyna_p3 ([OGKRKBDDP2015])
• Khazad ([BR2000b])
• Kuznyechik (Kuznechik, Streebog, Strıboğ) ([Fed2015])
• Lilliput-AE ([ABCFHLLMRT2019])
• MD2 ([Kal1992])
• newDES ([Sco1985])
• Picaro ([PRC2012])
• Safer ([Mas1994])
• Scream ([CDL2015],[GLSVJGK2014])
• SEED_S0, SEED_S1 ([LYCL2005])
• SKINNY_8 (ForkSkinny_8 [ALPRRV2019], Remus_8 [IKMP2019A], Romulus [IKMP2019B]) ([BKLMPSSS2016])
• Skipjack ([US1998])
• SNOW_3G_sq ([ETS2006a])
• SMS4 ([Ltd06])
• Turing ([RH2003b])
• Twofish_p0, Twofish_p1 ([SKW1998])
• Whirlpool ([BR2000c])
• Zorro ([GGNS2013])
• ZUC_S0, ZUC_S1 ([ETS2011])

7 bit to 7 bit
• Wage ([AAGMRZ2019])

6 bit to 6 bit
• Fides_6 ([BBKMW2013])
• APN_6 ([BDMW2010])
• SC2000_6 ([SYTIYTT2002])

5 bit to 5 bit
• Ascon (ISAP [DEMMMPU2019]) ([DEMS2016])
• DryGASCON128 ([Rio2019])
• Fides_5 ([BBKMW2013])
• SC2000_5 ([SYTIYYTT2002])
• Shamash ([IPM2019])
• SYCON ([SMS2019])

4 bit to 4 bit

• Elephant ([BCDM2019])
• KNOT ([ZDYBZW2019])
• Pyjamask_4 ([GJPRSS2019])
• SATURNIN_0, SATURNIN_1 ([CDLNPSS2019])
• Spook (Clyde, Shadow) ([BBBCDGLLMPPSW2019])
• TRIFLE ([IDGMPSS2019])
• Yarara, Coral ([MP2019])
• DES_S1_1, ..., DES_S1_4, ..., DES_S8_4 ([U.S1999])
• Lucifer_S0, Lucifer_S1 ([Sor1984])
• GOST_1, ..., GOST_8 (http://www.cypherpunks.ru/pygost/)
• GOST2_1, GOST2_2 (http://www.cypherpunks.ru/pygost/)
• Magma_1, ..., Magma_8 ([Fed2015])
• GOST_IETF_1, ..., GOST_IETF_8 (http://www.cypherpunks.ru/pygost/)
• Hummingbird_2_S1, ..., Hummingbird_2_S4 ([ESSS2011])
• LBlock_0, ..., LBlock_9 ([WZ2011])
• SERPENT_S0, ..., SERPENT_S7 ([BAK1998])
• KLEIN ([GNL2011])
• MIBS ([ISSK2009])
• Midori_Sb0 (MANTIS, CRAFT), Midori_Sb1 ([BBISHAR2015])
• Noekeon ([DPVAR2000])
• Piccolo ([SIHMAS2011])
• Panda ([YWHWXSW2014])
• PRESENT (CiliPadi [ZJRRS2019], PHOTON [BCDGNPY2019], ORANGE [CN2019]) ([BKLPSSV2007])
• GIFT (Fountain_1, HYENA [CDJN2019], TGIF [IKMPSSS2019]) ([BPPSSST2017])
• Fountain_1, Fountain_2, Fountain_3, Fountain_4 ([Zha2019])
• Pride ([ADKLPY2014])
• PRINCE ([BCGKKKNPRTY2012])
• Prost ([KLLRSY2014])
• Qarma_sigma0, Qarma_sigma1 (Qameleon [ABBDHR2019]), Qarma_sigma2 ([Ava2017])
• REC_0 (earlier version of [ZBLRYV2015])
• Rectangle ([ZBLRYV2015])
Cryptography, Release 10.1

- SC2000_4 ([SYYTIYTT2002])
- SKINNY_4 (ForkSkinny_4 [ALPRRV2019], Remus_4 [IKMP2019A]) ([BJKLMPSSS2016])
- TWINE ([SMMM2013])
- Luffa_v1 ([DCSW2008])
- Luffa ([DCSW2008])
- BLAKE_1, ..., BLAKE_9 ([AHMP2008])
- JH_S0, JH_S1 ([Wu2009])
- SMASH_256_S1, ..., SMASH_256_S3 ([Knu2005])
- Anubis_S0, Anubis_S1 ([BR2000a])
- CLEFIA_SS0, ..., CLEFIA_SS3 ([SSAMI2007])
- Enocoro_S4 ([WFYP2008])
- Iceberg_S0, Iceberg_S1 ([SPRQL2004])
- Khazad_P, Khazad_Q ([BR2000b])
- Whirlpool_E, Whirlpool_R ([BR2000c])
- CS_cipher_F, CS_cipher_G ([SV2000])
- Fox_S1, ..., Fox_S3 ([VJ2004])
- Twofish_Q0_T0, ..., Twofish_Q0_T3, Twofish_Q1_T0, ..., Twofish_Q1_T3 ([SKWWHF1998])
- Kuznyechik_nu0, Kuznyechik_nu1, Kuznyechik_sigma, Kuznyechik_phi ([BPU2016])
- UDCIKMP11 ([UDCIKMP2011])
- Optimal_S0, ..., Optimal_S15 ([LP2007])
- Serpent_type_S0, ..., Serpent_type_S19 ([LP2007])
- Golden_S0, ..., Golden_S3 ([Saa2011])
- representatives for all 302 affine equivalence classes ([idCa2007])

3 bit to 3 bit

- SEA ([SPGQ2006])
- PRINTcipher ([KLPR2010])
- Pyjamask_3 ([GJKPRSS2019])

Additionally this modules offers a dictionary sboxes of all implemented above S-boxes for the purpose of easy iteration over all available S-boxes.

EXAMPLES:

We can print the S-Boxes with differential uniformity 2:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.sboxes import sboxes
sage: sorted(name for name, s in sboxes.items()
    ....:     if s.differential_uniformity() == 2)
['APN_6',
 'Fides_5',
 'Fides_6',
 'PRINTcipher',

(continues on next page)```
AUTHOR:

- Leo Perrin: initial collection of sboxes
- Friedrich Wiemer (2017-05-12): refactored list for inclusion in Sage
- Lukas Stennes (2019-06-25): added NIST LWC round 1 candidates

```
sage.crypto.sboxes.bracken_leander(n)

Return the Bracken-Leander construction.

For \( n = 4^k \) and odd \( k \), the construction is \( x \mapsto x^{2^k+2^k+1} \) over \( F_{2^n} \).

INPUT:

- \( n \) -- size of the S-Box

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sboxes import bracken_leander
sage: sbox = bracken_leander(12); [sbox(i) for i in range(8)]
[0, 1, 2742, 4035, 1264, 408, 1473, 1327]
```
```
sage.crypto.sboxes.carlet_tang_tang_liao(n, c=None, bf=None)

Return the Carlet-Tang-Tang-Liao construction.

See [CTTL2014] for its definition.

INPUT:

- \( n \) -- integer, the bit length of inputs and outputs, has to be even and >= 6
- \( c \) -- element of \( F_{2^n-1} \) used in the construction
  (default: random element)
- \( f \) -- Function from \( F_{2^n} \) to \( F_2 \) or BooleanFunction on \( n-1 \) bits
  (default: \( x \mapsto (1/(x+1)).\text{trace}() \))

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.sboxes import carlet_tang_tang_liao as cttl
sage: cttl(6).differential_uniformity() in [4, 64]
True
```
```
sage.crypto.sboxes.gold(n, i)

Return the Gold function defined by \( x \mapsto x^{2^i+1} \) over \( F_{2^n} \).

INPUT:

- \( n \) -- size of the S-Box
- \( i \) -- a positive integer

EXAMPLES:

```
```
sage: from sage.crypto.sboxes import gold
sage: gold(3, 1)
(0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 2)
sage: gold(3, 1).differential_uniformity()
2
sage: gold(4, 2)
(0, 1, 6, 6, 7, 7, 7, 6, 1, 7, 1, 6, 1, 6, 7, 1)

sage.crypto.sboxes.kasami(n, i)
Return the Kasami function defined by $x \mapsto x^{2^i - 2^{i/2} + 1}$ over $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$.

INPUT:

• n – size of the S-Box
• i – a positive integer

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.sboxes import kasami
sage: kasami(3, 1)
(0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 2)
sage: from sage.crypto.sboxes import gold
sage: kasami(3, 1) == gold(3, 1)
True
sage: kasami(4, 2)
(0, 1, 13, 11, 14, 9, 6, 7, 10, 4, 15, 2, 8, 3, 5, 12)
sage: kasami(4, 2) != gold(4, 2)
True

sage.crypto.sboxes.monomial_function(n, e)
Return an S-Box as a function $x^e$ defined over $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$.

INPUT:

• n – size of the S-Box (i.e. the degree of the finite field extension)
• e – exponent of the monomial function

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.sboxes import monomial_function
sage: S = monomial_function(7, 3)
sage: S.differential_uniformity()
2
sage: S.input_size()
7
sage: S.is_permutation()
True

sage.crypto.sboxes.niho(n)
Return the Niho function over $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$.

It is defined by $x \mapsto x^{2^i + 2^{s-1}}$ with $s = t/2$ if $t$ is even or $s = (3t + 1)/2$ if $t$ is odd.

INPUT:

• n – size of the S-Box
Examples:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.sboxes import niho
sage: niho(3)
(0, 1, 7, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)
sage: niho(3).differential_uniformity()
2
```

`sage.crypto.sboxes.v(n)`

Return the Welch function defined by $x \mapsto x^{2^{(n-1)/2}+3}$ over $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$.

**INPUT:**

- `n` – size of the S-Box

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.sboxes import welch
sage: welch(3)
(0, 1, 7, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)
sage: welch(3).differential_uniformity()
2
```

`sage.crypto.sboxes.welch(n)`

Return the Welch function defined by $x \mapsto x^{2^{(n-1)/2}+3}$ over $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$.

**INPUT:**

- `n` – size of the S-Box

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.sboxes import welch
sage: welch(3)
(0, 1, 7, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)
sage: welch(3).differential_uniformity()
2
```
Chapter 16. S-Boxes used in cryptographic schemes
ABSTRACT BASE CLASS FOR GENERATORS OF POLYNOMIAL SYSTEMS

AUTHOR:
Martin Albrecht <malb@informatik.uni-bremen.de>

class sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator.MPolynomialSystemGenerator
    Bases: SageObject

    Abstract base class for generators of polynomial systems.

    block_order()
    Return a block term ordering for the equation systems generated by self.
    EXAMPLES:

    sage: from sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator import MPolynomialSystemGenerator
    sage: msg = MPolynomialSystemGenerator()
    sage: msg.block_order()
    Traceback (most recent call last):
    ...NotImplementedError

    polynomial_system(P=None, K=None)
    Return a tuple F,s for plaintext P and key K where F is a polynomial system and s a dictionary which maps key variables to their solutions.
    INPUT:
    P – plaintext (vector, list) K – key (vector, list)
    EXAMPLES:

    sage: from sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator import MPolynomialSystemGenerator
    sage: msg = MPolynomialSystemGenerator()
    sage: msg.polynomial_system()
    Traceback (most recent call last):
    ...NotImplementedError

    random_element()
    Return random element. Usually this is a list of elements in the base field of length ‘blocksize’.
    EXAMPLES:
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator import MPolynomialSystemGenerator
sage: msg = MPolynomialSystemGenerator()
sage: msg.random_element()
Traceback (most recent call last):
  ...  NotImplementedError

ring()
Return the ring in which the system is defined.

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator import MPolynomialSystemGenerator
sage: msg = MPolynomialSystemGenerator()
sage: msg.ring()
Traceback (most recent call last):
  ...  NotImplementedError

sbox()
Return SBox object for self.

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator import MPolynomialSystemGenerator
sage: msg = MPolynomialSystemGenerator()
sage: msg.sbox()
Traceback (most recent call last):
  ...  AttributeError: '<class 'sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator.MPolynomialSystemGenerator'> object has no attribute '_sbox'

varformatstr(name)
Return format string for a given name ‘name’ which is understood by print et al.

Such a format string is used to construct variable names. Typically those format strings are somewhat like ‘name%02d%02d’ such that rounds and offset in a block can be encoded.

INPUT:
    name -- string

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator import MPolynomialSystemGenerator
sage: msg = MPolynomialSystemGenerator()
sage: msg.varformatstr('K')
Traceback (most recent call last):
  ...  NotImplementedError

vars(name, round)
Return a list of variables given a name ‘name’ and an index ‘round’.
INPUT:

name – string round – integer index

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator import MPolynomialSystemGenerator
sage: msg = MPolynomialSystemGenerator()
```

```python
sage: msg.vars('K', 0)
Traceback (most recent call last):
...\nNotImplementedError
```

`varstrs(name, round)`

Return a list of variable names given a name ‘name’ and an index ‘round’.

This function is typically used by self._vars.

INPUT:

name – string round – integer index

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator import MPolynomialSystemGenerator
```

```python
sage: msg = MPolynomialSystemGenerator()
```

```python
sage: msg.varstrs('K', i)
Traceback (most recent call last):
...\nNotImplementedError
```
SMALL SCALE VARIANTS OF THE AES (SR) POLYNOMIAL SYSTEM GENERATOR

Sage supports polynomial system generation for small scale (and full scale) AES variants over $\mathbb{F}_2$ and $\mathbb{F}_{2^e}$. Also, Sage supports both the specification of SR as given in the papers [CMR2005] and [CMR2006] and a variant of SR* which is equivalent to AES.

SR is a family of parameterizable variants of the AES suitable as a framework for comparing different cryptanalytic techniques that can be brought to bear on the AES. It is different from Mini-AES, whose purpose is as a teaching tool to help beginners understand the basic structure and working of the full AES.

AUTHORS:

- Martin Albrecht (2007-09): initial version
- Niles Johnson (2010-08): (github issue #3893) random_element() should pass on *args and **kwds.

EXAMPLES:

We construct SR(1,1,1,4) and study its properties.

```
sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 1, 1, 4)
```

n is the number of rounds, r the number of rows in the state array, c the number of columns in the state array, and e the degree of the underlying field.

```
sage: sr.n, sr.r, sr.c, sr.e
(1, 1, 1, 4)
```

By default variables are ordered reverse to as they appear, e.g.:

```
sage: print(sr.R.repr_long())
```

```
Polynomial Ring
  Base Ring : Finite Field in a of size 2^4
  Size : 20 Variables
  Block 0 : Ordering : deglex
    Names : k100, k101, k102, k103, x100, x101, x102, x103, w100, w101, ...
    w102, w103, s000, s001, s002, s003, k000, k001, k002, k003
```

However, this can be prevented by passing in reverse_variables=False to the constructor.

For SR(1, 1, 1, 4) the ShiftRows matrix isn’t that interesting.:
Cryptography, Release 10.1

sage: sr.ShiftRows
[1 0 0 0]
[0 1 0 0]
[0 0 1 0]
[0 0 0 1]

Also, the MixColumns matrix is the identity matrix.:

sage: sr.MixColumns
[1 0 0 0]
[0 1 0 0]
[0 0 1 0]
[0 0 0 1]

Lin, however, is not the identity matrix.:

sage: sr.Lin
[a^2 + 1 1 a^3 + a^2 a^2 + 1]
[a a 1 a^3 + a^2 + a + 1]
[a^3 + a a^2 a^2 1]
[1 a^3 a + 1 a + 1]

M and Mstar are identical for SR(1, 1, 1, 4):

sage: sr.M
[a^2 + 1 1 a^3 + a^2 a^2 + 1]
[a a 1 a^3 + a^2 + a + 1]
[a^3 + a a^2 a^2 1]
[1 a^3 a + 1 a + 1]

sage: sr.Mstar
[a^2 + 1 1 a^3 + a^2 a^2 + 1]
[a a 1 a^3 + a^2 + a + 1]
[a^3 + a a^2 a^2 1]
[1 a^3 a + 1 a + 1]

However, for larger instances of SR Mstar is not equal to M:

sage: sr = mq.SR(10,4,4,8)
True

We can compute a Groebner basis for the ideals spanned by SR instances to recover all solutions to the system.:

sage: sr = mq.SR(1,1,1,4, gf2=True, polybori=True)
sage: K = sr.base_ring()
sage: a = K.gen()
sage: K = [a]
sage: P = [1]
sage: F,s = sr.polynomial_system(P=P, K=K)
sage: F.groebner_basis()
\[k100, k101 + 1, k102, k103 + k003,
x100 + 1, x101 + k003 + 1, x102 + k003 + 1,\]
Note that the order of \texttt{k000}, \texttt{k001}, \texttt{k002} and \texttt{k003} is little endian. Thus the result \texttt{k002 + 1}, \texttt{k001}, \texttt{k000} indicates that the key is either \(a\) or \(a + 1\). We can verify that both keys encrypt \(P\) to the same ciphertext:

\begin{verbatim}
 sage: sr(P,[a])
 [0]
sage: sr(P,[a+1])
 [0]
\end{verbatim}

All solutions can easily be recovered using the variety function for ideals:

\begin{verbatim}
sage: I = F.ideal()
sage: for V in I.variety():
 ....:     for k,v in sorted(V.items()):
 ....:         print("{} {}").format(k, v))
 ....:     print("\n")
k003 0
k002 1
k001 0
k000 0
s003 1
s002 0
s001 0
s000 1
w103 1
w102 1
w101 0
w100 0
x103 0
x102 1
x101 1
x100 1
k103 0
k102 0
k101 1
k100 0
k003 1
k002 1
k001 0
k000 0
s003 0
s002 1
s001 1
s000 1
w103 0
w102 1
w101 0
w100 0
\end{verbatim}
We can also verify the correctness of the variety by evaluating all ideal generators on all points:

```python
sage: for V in I.variety():
    ....:     for f in I.gens():
    ....:         if f.subs(V) != 0:
    ....:             print("epic fail")
```

Note that the S-Box object for SR can be constructed with a call to `sr.sbox()`:

```python
sage: sr = mq.SR(1,1,1,4, gf2=True, polybori=True)
```

For example, we can now study the difference distribution table of `S`:

```python
sage: S.difference_distribution_table()
```

```
[16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 [0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0
 [0 2 0 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 [0 2 4 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
 [0 0 0 2 4 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 2
 [0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 4 2 0 0 2 0 2
 [0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 [0 4 0 0 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
 [0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
 [0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 [0 0 2 4 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
 [0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 4 2 0 0 2 0 2
 [0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
 [0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 4 2 0 0 0 0
 [0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
 [0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 4 2 0 0 2 0 2
 [0 0 0 2 0 2 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
 [0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 4 0 0 0 0
 [0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
 [0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 4 2 0 0 2 0 2
 [0 0 0 2 0 2 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
 [0 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 0 0 0
```

or use `S` to find alternative polynomial representations for the S-Box:

```python
sage: S.polynomials(degree=3)
```

```
[x0*x1 + x1*x2 + x0*x3 + x0*y2 + x1 + y0 + y1 + 1,
 x0*x1 + x0*x2 + x0*y0 + x0*y1 + x0*y2 + x1 + x2 + y0 + y1 + y2,
 x0*x1 + x0*x2 + x0*x3 + x1*x3 + x0*y0 + x0*y1 + x0*y3 + x1 + y0 + y1 + y2,
 x0*x1 + x0*x2 + x0*x3 + x1*x3 + x1*y0 + x1*y3 + x0 + x1,
 x0*x3 + x1*x3 + x0*y1 + x0*y2 + x1*y3 + x0 + x1 + x2 + x3 + y0 + y1 + y3 + 1,
 x1*x1 + x1*x3 + x2*x3 + x0*y0 + x0*y2 + x0*y3 + x2 + y0 + y3,
 x0*x3 + x1*x3 + x0*y0 + x2*y0 + x0*y2 + x0 + x2 + x3 + y3,
 x0*x3 + x1*x3 + x0*y0 + x2*y0 + x0*y3 + x2 + y0 + y3,
```

(continues on next page)
\(x_0^*x_1 + x_0^*x_2 + x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_1 + x_2^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_1 + y_0 + y_1 + 1,\)
\(x_0^*x_3 + x_1^*x_3 + x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_1 + x_0^*y_3 + x_2^*y_3 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*x_1 + x_0^*x_2 + x_3^*y_0 + x_0^*y_1 + x_0^*y_3 + y_0,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_1 + x_3^*y_1 + x_0 + x_2 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_3^*y_2 + y_0,\)
\(x_0^*x_1 + x_0^*x_2 + x_0^*x_3 + x_1^*x_3 + x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_3^*y_3 + y_0,\)
\(x_0^*x_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0^*y_4 + y_0 + y_1 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*x_1 + x_0^*x_2 + x_0^*x_3 + x_0^*y_1 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*x_1 + x_0^*x_2 + x_0^*x_3 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*x_1 + x_0^*x_2 + x_0^*x_3 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*x_1 + x_3^*x_3 + x_0^*x_3 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*x_2 + x_0^*y_0 + y_0 + y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*x_1 + x_0^*x_2 + x_1^*x_3 + x_0^*y_2 + y_0 + y_3 + y_0,\)
\(x_0^*x_1 + x_0^*y_0 + y_1^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3 + 1,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_1 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_3^*y_1 + x_0^*x_3 + x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_1 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_3^*y_2 + x_0^*x_2 + x_0^*x_3 + x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_1 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_3^*y_3 + x_0^*y_4 + y_0 + y_1 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*x_2x_3 + x_0^*y_0 + y_0 + y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*x_1 + x_1^*x_3 + x_0^*x_3 + x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_1 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*x_2 + x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_1 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*x_1 + x_0^*x_2 + x_0^*x_3 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + y_0 + y_1 + y_3 + 1,\)
\(x_0^*x_1 + x_0^*x_2 + x_0^*x_3 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3 + 1,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*x_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\(x_0^*y_0 + x_0^*y_2 + x_0^*y_3 + x_0 + y_0 + y_3,\)
\[ x_2^\ast x_3^\ast y_3, \]
\[ x_2^\ast y_0^\ast y_1 + x_0^\ast x_2 + x_0^\ast x_3 + x_0^\ast y_0 + x_0^\ast y_1 + x_0^\ast y_2 + x_0, \]
\[ x_2^\ast y_0^\ast y_2 + x_0^\ast x_2 + x_1^\ast x_3 + x_0^\ast y_0 + x_0^\ast y_3 + x_0 + x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + y_0 + y_1 + y_3 + 1, \]
\[ x_2^\ast y_1^\ast y_3 + x_0^\ast x_3 + x_1^\ast x_3 + x_0^\ast y_0 + x_0^\ast y_1 + x_0^\ast y_3 + y_0 + y_3, \]
\[ x_2^\ast y_2^\ast y_3 + x_0^\ast x_1 + x_0^\ast x_2 + x_1^\ast x_3 + x_0^\ast y_0 + x_0^\ast y_3 + x_0 + x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + y_0 + y_1 + y_3 + 1, \]
\[ x_3^\ast y_0^\ast y_1 + x_0^\ast x_3 + x_0^\ast y_1 + x_0 + x_2 + x_3 + y_3, \]
\[ x_3^\ast y_0^\ast y_2 + x_0^\ast y_0 + y_0, \]
\[ x_3^\ast y_0^\ast y_3 + x_1^\ast x_3 + x_0^\ast y_1 + x_0^\ast y_3 + y_0, \]
\[ x_3^\ast y_1^\ast y_2 + x_0^\ast x_2 + x_0^\ast x_3 + x_0^\ast y_3 + x_2 + x_3 + y_3, \]
\[ x_3^\ast y_1^\ast y_3 + x_0^\ast x_2 + x_0^\ast x_3 + x_0^\ast y_0 + x_0^\ast y_2 + x_0, \]
\[ x_3^\ast y_2^\ast y_3 + x_0^\ast x_2 + x_0^\ast x_3 + x_1^\ast x_3 + x_0^\ast y_0 + x_0^\ast y_1 + x_0^\ast y_3 + x_0 + y_0, \]
\[ y_0^\ast y_1^\ast y_2 + x_0^\ast x_3 + x_0 + x_2 + x_3 + y_3, \]
\[ y_0^\ast y_1^\ast y_3 + x_0^\ast x_2 + x_0^\ast y_0 + x_0^\ast y_2 + x_0^\ast y_3, \]
\[ y_0^\ast y_2^\ast y_3 + x_0^\ast x_3 + x_1^\ast x_3 + x_0^\ast y_0 + x_0^\ast y_1 + y_0, \]
\[ y_1^\ast y_2^\ast y_3 + x_0^\ast x_1 + x_0^\ast x_2 + x_1^\ast x_3 + x_0^\ast y_0 + x_0^\ast y_3 + x_0 + x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + y_0 + y_1 + y_3 + 1 \]

sage: S.interpolation_polynomial()
\[(a^2 + 1)x^{14} + a^2x^{13} + x^{12} + a^2x^{11} + ax^{10} + (a^3 + a)x^9 +
(a^3 + 1)x^7 + (a^3 + a^2 + a)x^6 + a^2x^5 + (a + 1)x^4 + a^2x^3 +
(a^3 + a^2 + a)x^2 + (a^3 + 1)x + a^2 + a\]

The \texttt{SR\_gf2\_2} gives an example how use alternative polynomial representations of the S-Box for construction of polynomial systems.

REFERENCES:

- [CMR2005]
- [CMR2006]
- [MR2002]

\texttt{class} \texttt{sage.crypto.mq.sr.AllowZeroInversionsContext(sr)}

Bases: \texttt{object}

Temporarily allow zero inversion.

\texttt{sage.crypto.mq.sr.SR(n=1, r=1, c=1, e=4, star=False, **kwargs)}

Return a small scale variant of the AES polynomial system constructor subject to the following conditions:

INPUT:

- \texttt{n} - the number of rounds (default: 1)
- \texttt{r} - the number of rows in the state array (default: 1)
- \texttt{c} - the number of columns in the state array (default: 1)
- \texttt{e} - the exponent of the finite extension field (default: 4)
- \texttt{star} - determines if SR\* or SR should be constructed (default: False)
- \texttt{aes_mode} - as the SR key schedule specification differs slightly from the AES key schedule, this parameter controls which schedule to use (default: True)
- \texttt{gf2} - generate polynomial systems over \(\mathbb{F}_2\) rather than over \(\mathbb{F}_{2^e}\) (default: False)
- \texttt{polybori} - use the \texttt{BooleanPolynomialRing} as polynomial representation (default: True, \(\mathbb{F}_2\) only)
• **order** - a string to specify the term ordering of the variables (default: `deglex`)

• **postfix** - a string which is appended after the variable name (default: '')

• **allow_zero_inversions** - a boolean to control whether zero inversions raise an exception (default: `False`)

• **correct_only** - only include correct inversion polynomials (default: `False`, \( F_2 \) only)

• **biaffine_only** - only include bilinear and biaffine inversion polynomials (default: `True`, \( F_2 \) only)

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 1, 1, 4)
sage: ShiftRows = sr.shift_rows_matrix()
sage: MixColumns = sr.mix_columns_matrix()
sage: Lin = sr.lin_matrix()
sage: M = MixColumns * ShiftRows * Lin
sage: print(sr.hex_str_matrix(M))
5 1 C 5
2 2 1 F
A 4 4 1
1 8 3 3
```

```python
sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 2, 1, 4)
sage: ShiftRows = sr.shift_rows_matrix()
sage: MixColumns = sr.mix_columns_matrix()
sage: Lin = sr.lin_matrix()
sage: M = MixColumns * ShiftRows * Lin
sage: print(sr.hex_str_matrix(M))
F 3 7 F A 2 B A
A A 5 6 8 8 4 9
7 8 8 2 D C C 3
4 6 C C 5 E F F
A 2 B A F 3 7 F
8 8 4 9 A A 5 6
D C C 3 7 8 8 2
5 E F F 4 6 C C
```

```python
sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 2, 2, 4)
sage: ShiftRows = sr.shift_rows_matrix()
sage: MixColumns = sr.mix_columns_matrix()
sage: Lin = sr.lin_matrix()
sage: M = MixColumns * ShiftRows * Lin
sage: print(sr.hex_str_matrix(M))
F 3 7 F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 A 2 B A
A A 5 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 4 9
7 8 8 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 D C C 3
4 6 C C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 E F F
A 2 B A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F 3 7 F
8 8 4 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 A A 5 6
D C C 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 8 8 2
5 E F F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 C C
0 0 0 0 A 2 B A F 3 7 F 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 8 8 4 9 A A 5 6 0 0 0 0
```

(continues on next page)
Small Scale Variants of the AES.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 1, 1, 4)
sage: ShiftRows = sr.shift_rows_matrix()
sage: MixColumns = sr.mix_columns_matrix()
sage: Lin = sr.lin_matrix()
sage: M = MixColumns * ShiftRows * Lin
sage: print(sr.hex_str_matrix(M))
5 1 C 5
2 2 1 F
A 4 4 1
1 8 3 3
```

add_round_key(d, key)

Perform the AddRoundKey operation on d using key.

INPUT:

- d - state array or something coercible to a state array
- key - state array or something coercible to a state array

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: sr = mq.SR(10, 4, 4, 4)
sage: D = sr.random_state_array()
sage: K = sr.random_state_array()
sage: sr.add_round_key(D, K) == K + D
True
```

base_ring()

Return the base field of self as determined by self.e.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: sr = mq.SR(10, 2, 2, 4)
sage: sr.base_ring().polynomial()
a^4 + a + 1
```

The Rijndael polynomial:

```
sage: sr = mq.SR(10, 4, 4, 8)
sage: sr.base_ring().polynomial()
a^8 + a^4 + a^3 + a + 1
```
block_order()

Return a block order for self where each round is a block.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: sr = mq.SR(2, 1, 1, 4)
sage: sr.block_order()
Block term order with blocks:
(Degree lexicographic term order of length 16,
 Degree lexicographic term order of length 16,
 Degree lexicographic term order of length 4)
```

```python
sage: P = sr.ring(order='block')
sage: print(P.repr_long())
Polynomial Ring
 Base Ring : Finite Field in a of size 2^4
  Size : 36 Variables
 Block 0 : Ordering : deglex
   Names : k200, k201, k202, k203, x200, x201, x202, x203, w200,
   → w201, w202, w203, s100, s101, s102, s103
 Block 1 : Ordering : deglex
   Names : k100, k101, k102, k103, x100, x101, x102, x103, w100,
   → w101, w102, w103, s000, s001, s002, s003
 Block 2 : Ordering : deglex
   Names : k000, k001, k002, k003
```

hex_str(M, typ='matrix')

Return a hex string for the provided AES state array/matrix.

INPUT:

- M - state array
- typ - controls what to return, either 'matrix' or 'vector' (default: 'matrix')

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: sr = mq.SR(2, 2, 2, 4)
sage: k = sr.base_ring()
sage: A = matrix(k, 2, 2, [1, k.gen(), 0, k.gen()^2])
sage: sr.hex_str(A)
'1 2 \n 0 4 \n'
sage: sr.hex_str(A, typ='vector')
'1024'
```

hex_str_matrix(M)

Return a two-dimensional AES-like representation of the matrix M.

That is, show the finite field elements as hex strings.

INPUT:

- M - an AES state array

EXAMPLES:
sage: sr = mq.SR(2, 2, 2, 4)
sage: k = sr.base_ring()
sage: A = matrix(k, 2, 2, [1, k.gen(), 0, k.gen()^2])
sage: sr.hex_str_matrix(A)
'1 2
0 4'  

`hex_str_vector(M)`

Return a one-dimensional AES-like representation of the matrix M.

That is, show the finite field elements as hex strings.

INPUT:
* M - an AES state array

EXAMPLES:

```sage
sage: sr = mq.SR(2, 2, 2, 4)
sage: k = sr.base_ring()
sage: A = matrix(k, 2, 2, [1, k.gen(), 0, k.gen()^2])
sage: sr.hex_str_matrix(A)
'1 2
0 4'
```

`is_state_array(d)`

Return `True` if `d` is a state array, i.e. has the correct dimensions and base field.

EXAMPLES:

```sage
sage: sr = mq.SR(2, 2, 4, 8)
sage: k = sr.base_ring()
sage: sr.is_state_array( matrix(k, 2, 4) )
True
sage: sr.is_state_array( matrix(k, 4, 4) )
False
```

`key_schedule(kj, i)`

Return `ki` for a given `i` and `kj` with `j = i - 1`.

EXAMPLES:

```sage
sage: sr = mq.SR(10, 4, 4, 8, star=True, allow_zero_inversions=True)
sage: ki = sr.state_array()
sage: for i in range(10):
....:     ki = sr.key_schedule(ki, i+1)
sage: print(sr.hex_str_matrix(ki))
```

`key_schedule_polynomials(i)`

Return polynomials for the `i`-th round of the key schedule.

INPUT:
• $i$ - round ($0 \leq i \leq n$)

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 1, 1, 4, gf2=True, polybori=False)
```

The 0-th subkey is the user provided key, so only conjugacy relations or field polynomials are added.:  

```python
sage: sr.key_schedule_polynomials(0)
(k000^2 + k000, k001^2 + k001, k002^2 + k002, k003^2 + k003)
```

The 1-th subkey is derived from the user provided key according to the key schedule which is non-linear.:  

```python
sage: sr.key_schedule_polynomials(1)
(k100 + s000 + s001 + s003 + 1,
 k102 + s000 + s001 + s002 + 1,
 k103 + s001 + s002 + s003 + 1,
 k100^2 + k100, k101^2 + k101, k102^2 + k102, k103^2 + k103,
 s000^2 + s000, s001^2 + s001, s002^2 + s002, s003^2 + s003,
 s000*k000 + s000*k003 + s001*k002 + s002*k001 + s003*k000,
 s000*k000 + s000*k001 + s001*k000 + s002*k002 + s003*k001,
 s000*k001 + s000*k002 + s001*k000 + s001*k001 + s002*k000 + s002*k003 +
   s003*k002,
 s000*k000 + s000*k001 + s000*k003 + s001*k001 + s002*k000 + s002*k002 +
   s003*k000 + k000,
 s000*k002 + s001*k000 + s001*k001 + s001*k003 + s002*k001 + s003*k000 +
   s003*k002 + k001,
 s000*k000 + s000*k001 + s000*k002 + s001*k002 + s002*k000 + s002*k001 +
   s002*k003 + s003*k001 + k002,
 s000*k001 + s001*k000 + s001*k002 + s002*k000 + s003*k001 + s003*k003 + k003,
 s000*k000 + s000*k002 + s000*k003 + s001*k000 + s001*k001 + s002*k002 +
   s003*k000 + s000,
 s000*k001 + s000*k003 + s001*k001 + s001*k002 + s002*k000 + s002*k003 +
   s003*k001 + s001,
 s000*k000 + s000*k002 + s001*k000 + s001*k002 + s001*k003 + s002*k000 +
   s002*k001 + s003*k002 + s002,
 s000*k001 + s000*k002 + s001*k000 + s001*k003 + s002*k001 + s003*k003 + s003,
 s000*k002 + s001*k001 + s002*k000 + s003*k003 + 1)
```

**mix_columns**($d$)

Perform the MixColumns operation on $d$.

**INPUT:**

• $d$ - state array or something coercible to a state array

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: sr = mq.SR(10, 4, 4, 4)
sage: E = sr.state_array() + 1; E
[1 0 0 0]
[0 1 0 0]
[0 0 1 0]
[0 0 0 1]
```
sage: sr.mix_columns(E)
[  a  a + 1  1  1]
[  1  a  a + 1  1]
[  1  1  a  a + 1]
[a + 1  1  1  a]

new_generator(**kwds)
Return a new SR instance equal to this instance except for the parameters passed explicitly to this function.

INPUT:

• **kwds - see the SR constructor for accepted parameters

EXAMPLES:

sage: sr = mq.SR(2,1,1,4); sr
SR(2,1,1,4)
sage: sr.ring().base_ring()
Finite Field in a of size 2^4

sage: sr2 = sr.new_generator(gf2=True); sr2
SR(2,1,1,4)
sage: sr2.ring().base_ring()
Finite Field of size 2
sage: sr3 = sr2.new_generator(correct_only=True)
sage: len(sr2.inversion_polynomials_single_sbox())
20
sage: len(sr3.inversion_polynomials_single_sbox())
19

polynomial_system(P=None, K=None, C=None)
Return a polynomial system for this small scale AES variant for a given plaintext-key pair.

If neither P, K nor C are provided, a random pair (P, K) will be generated. If P and C are provided no K needs to be provided.

INPUT:

• P - vector, list, or tuple (default: None)
• K - vector, list, or tuple (default: None)
• C - vector, list, or tuple (default: None)

EXAMPLES:

sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 1, 1, 4, gf2=True, polybori=True)
sage: P = sr.vector([0, 0, 1, 0])
sage: K = sr.vector([1, 0, 0, 1])
sage: F, s = sr.polynomial_system(P, K)

This returns a polynomial system:

sage: F
Polynomial Sequence with 36 Polynomials in 20 Variables

and a solution:
This solution is not the only solution that we can learn from the Groebner basis of the system.

In particular we have two solutions:

In the following example we provide C explicitly:

Alternatively, we can use symbols for the P and C. First, we have to create a polynomial ring:

Now, we can construct the purely symbolic equation system:

We show that the (returned) key is a solution to the returned system:

random_element(elem_type='vector', *args, **kwds)

Return a random element for self. Other arguments and keywords are passed to random_* methods.
INPUT:

- `elem_type` - either `vector` or `state array` (default: `vector`)

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: sr = mq.SR()
sage: sr.random_element().parent()
Full MatrixSpace of 4 by 1 dense matrices over Finite Field in a of size 2^4
sage: sr.random_element('state_array').parent()
Full MatrixSpace of 1 by 1 dense matrices over Finite Field in a of size 2^4
```

Passes extra positional or keyword arguments through:

```python
sage: sr.random_element(density=0)
[0]
[0]
[0]
[0]
```

**random_state_array(**`*args`, **`**kwds`)

Return a random element in `MatrixSpace(self.base_ring(), self.r, self.c)`.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: sr = mq.SR(2, 2, 2, 4)
sage: sr.random_state_array().parent()
Full MatrixSpace of 2 by 2 dense matrices over Finite Field in a of size 2^4
```

**random_vector(**`*args`, **`**kwds`)

Return a random vector as it might appear in the algebraic expression of `self`.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: mq.SR(2, 2, 2, 4).random_vector().parent()
Full MatrixSpace of 16 by 1 dense matrices over Finite Field in a of size 2^4
```

**Note:** \( \phi \) was already applied to the result.

**ring(**`order=None`, **`reverse_variables=None`)**

Construct a ring as a base ring for the polynomial system.

By default, variables are ordered in the reverse of their natural ordering, i.e. the reverse of as they appear.

INPUT:

- `order` - a monomial ordering (default: `None`)
- `reverse_variables` - reverse rounds of variables (default: `True`)

The variable assignment is as follows:

- \( k_{i,j,l} \) - subkey round \( i \) word \( j \) conjugate/bit \( l \)
- \( s_{i,j,l} \) - subkey inverse round \( i \) word \( j \) conjugate/bit \( l \)
- \( w_{i,j,l} \) - inversion input round \( i \) word \( j \) conjugate/bit \( l \)
- \( x_{i,j,l} \) - inversion output round \( i \) word \( j \) conjugate/bit \( l \)
Note that the variables are ordered in column major ordering in the state array and that the bits are ordered in little endian ordering.

For example, if \(x_{0,1,0}\) is a variable over \(\mathbb{F}_2\) for \(r = 2\) and \(c = 2\) then refers to the most significant bit of the entry in the position \((1,0)\) in the state array matrix.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: sr = mq.SR(2, 1, 1, 4)
sage: P = sr.ring(order='block')
sage: print(P.repr_long())
Polynomial Ring
    Base Ring : Finite Field in a of size 2^4
    Size : 36 Variables
    Block 0 : Ordering : deglex
        Names : k200, k201, k202, k203, x200, x201, x202, x203, w200,
                w201, w202, w203, s100, s101, s102, s103
    Block 1 : Ordering : deglex
        Names : k100, k101, k102, k103, x100, x101, x102, x103, w100,
                w101, w102, w103, s000, s001, s002, s003
    Block 2 : Ordering : deglex
        Names : k000, k001, k002, k003
```

```
round_polynomials(i, plaintext=None, ciphertext=None)
Return list of polynomials for a given round \(i\).
If \(i == 0\) a plaintext must be provided, if \(i == n\) a ciphertext must be provided.

INPUT:
  • \(i\) - round number
  • plaintext - optional plaintext (mandatory in first round)
  • ciphertext - optional ciphertext (mandatory in last round)

OUTPUT: tuple

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 1, 1, 4)
sage: k = sr.base_ring()
sage: p = [k.random_element() for _ in range(sr.r*sr.c)]
sage: sr.round_polynomials(0, plaintext=p)
(w100 + k000..., w101 + k001..., w102 + k002..., w103 + k003...)
```

```
sbox(inversion_only=False)
Return an S-Box object for this SR instance.

INPUT:
  • inversion_only - do not include the \(\mathbb{F}_2\) affine map when computing the S-Box (default: \texttt{False})

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: sr = mq.SR(1,2,2,4, allow_zero_inversions=True)
sage: S = sr.sbox(); S
(6, 11, 5, 4, 2, 14, 7, 10, 9, 13, 15, 12, 3, 1, 0, 8)
```
```
sage: sr.sub_byte(0)
a^2 + a
sage: sage_eval(str(sr.sub_byte(0)), {'a':2})
6
sage: S(0)
6

sage: sr.sub_byte(1)
a^3 + a + 1
sage: sage_eval(str(sr.sub_byte(1)), {'a':2})
11
sage: S(1)
11

sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 2, 2, 8, allow_zero_inversions=True)
sage: S = sr.sbox(); S
sage: sr.sub_byte(0)
a^6 + a^5 + a + 1
sage: sage_eval(str(sr.sub_byte(0)), {'a':2})
99
sage: S(0)
99

sage: sr.sub_byte(1)
a^6 + a^5 + a^4 + a^3 + a^2
sage: sage_eval(str(sr.sub_byte(1)), {'a':2})
124
sage: S(1)
124

sage: sr = mq.SR(1,2,2,4, allow_zero_inversions=True)
sage: S = sr.sbox(inversion_only=True); S
(0, 1, 9, 14, 13, 11, 7, 6, 15, 2, 12, 5, 10, 4, 3, 8)

sage: S(0)
0
sage: S(1)
1

sage: S(sr.k.gen())
\(a^3 + a + 1\)

sbox_constant()

Return the S-Box constant which is added after \(L(x^{-1})\) was performed. That is 0x63 if e == 8 or 0x6 if e == 4.

EXAMPLES:

sage: sr = mq.SR(10, 1, 1, 8)
sage: sr.sbox_constant()
\(a^6 + a^5 + a + 1\)

shift_rows(d)

Perform the ShiftRows operation on d.

INPUT:

* d - state array or something coercible to a state array

EXAMPLES:

sage: sr = mq.SR(10, 4, 4, 4)
sage: E = sr.state_array() + 1; E
[[1 0 0 0]
 [0 1 0 0]
 [0 0 1 0]
 [0 0 0 1]]

sage: sr.shift_rows(E)
[[1 0 0 0]
 [1 0 0 0]
 [1 0 0 0]
 [1 0 0 0]]

state_array(d=None)

Convert the parameter to a state array.

INPUT:

* d - a matrix, a list, or a tuple (default: None)

EXAMPLES:
sage: sr = mq.SR(2, 2, 2, 4)
sage: k = sr.base_ring()
sage: e1 = [k.from_integer(e) for e in range(2^2)]; e1
[0, 1, a, a + 1]
sage: e2 = sr.phi( Matrix(k, 2^2, 1, e1) )
sage: sr.state_array(e1)  # note the column major ordering
[ 0  a]
[ 1  a + 1]
sage: sr.state_array(e2)
[ 0  a]
[ 1  a + 1]
sage: sr.state_array()
[0 0]
[0 0]

sub_byte(b)

Perform SubByte on a single byte/halfbyte b.

A ZeroDivision exception is raised if an attempt is made to perform an inversion on the zero element. This can be disabled by passing allow_zero_inversion=True to the constructor. A zero inversion can result in an inconsistent equation system.

INPUT:

• b - an element in self.base_ring()

EXAMPLES:

The S-Box table for $\mathbb{F}_{2^4}$:

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
0 & a^2 + a & a^3 + a & a^3 + 1 \\
a & a^2 + 1 & a^3 & 0 \\
a^2 & a & 0 & a^2 + a + 1 \\
a^3 & a^3 + 1 & a^3 + a^2 & 0 \\
a + 1 & a^2 & a^2 + 1 & a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 \\
a^2 + a & a^2 + a + 1 & a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 & 0 \\
a^2 + 1 & a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 & a^3 + a^2 & a^3 + a \\
a^3 + a & a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 & a^3 + a + 1 & a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 \\
a^3 + a + 1 & a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 & a^3 + a + 1 & a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 \\
a^3 + a^2 & a^3 + a^2 + 1 & a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 & a^3 + a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 \\
a^3 + a^2 + a & a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 & a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 & a^3 + a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 \\
a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 & a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 & a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 & a^3 + a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 \\
a^3 + 1 & a^3 + a^2 + 1 & a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 & a^3 + a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 \\
a^3 + a^2 + 1 & a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 & a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 & a^3 + a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 \\
a^3 + 1 & a^3 + a^2 + 1 & a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 & a^3 + a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 \\
1 & a^3 + 1 & a^3 + a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 & 1 \\
1 & a^3 + 1 & a^3 + a^3 + a^2 + a + 1 & 1 \\
\end{array}
\]

sub_bytes(d)

Perform the non-linear transform on d.

INPUT:
• d - state array or something coercible to a state array

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: sr = mq.SR(2, 1, 2, 8, gf2=True)
sage: k = sr.base_ring()
sage: A = Matrix(k, 1, 2, [k(1), k.gen()])
sage: sr.sub_bytes(A)
[ a^6 + a^5 + a^4 + a^3 + a^2 a^6 + a^5 + a^4 + a^2 + a + 1]
```

```python
varformatstr(name, n=None, rc=None, e=None)
```

Return a format string which is understood by print et al.

If a numerical value is omitted, the default value of `self` is used. The numerical values (n, rc, e) are used to determine the width of the respective fields in the format string.

INPUT:

• name - name of the variable
• n - number of rounds (default: None)
• rc - number of rows * number of cols (default: None)
• e - exponent of base field (default: None)

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 2, 2, 4)
sage: sr.varformatstr('x')
'x%01d%01d%01d'
sage: sr.varformatstr('x', n=1000)
'x%03d%03d%03d'
```

```python
variable_dict()
```

Return a dictionary to access variables in `self.R` by their names.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: sr = mq.SR(1,1,1,4)
sage: sr.variable_dict()
{'k000': k000, 'k001': k001, 'k002': k002, 'k003': k003, 'k100': k100, 'k101': k101, 'k102': k102, 'k103': k103, 's000': s000, 's001': s001, 's002': s002, 's003': s003, 'w100': w100, 'w101': w101, 'w102': w102, 'w103': w103, 'x100': x100,
```
sage: sr = mq.SR(10, 1, 1, 4, gf2=True)
sage: sr.variable_dict()
{'k000': k000, 'k001': k001, 'k002': k002, 'k003': k003, 'k100': k100, 'k101': k101, 'k102': k102, 'k103': k103, 's000': s000, 's001': s001, 's002': s002, 's003': s003, 'w100': w100, 'w101': w101, 'w102': w102, 'w103': w103, 'x100': x100, 'x101': x101, 'x102': x102, 'x103': x103}

vars(name, nr, rc=None, e=None)

Return a list of variables in self.

INPUT:

• name - variable name
• nr - number of round to create variable strings for
• rc - number of rounds * number of columns in the state array (default: None)
• e - exponent of base field (default: None)

EXAMPLES:

sage: sr = mq.SR(10, 1, 2, 4)
sage: sr.vars('x', 2)
(x200, x201, x202, x203, x210, x211, x212, x213)

varstr(name, nr, rc, e)

Return a string representing a variable for the small scale AES subject to the given constraints.

INPUT:

• name - variable name
• nr - number of round to create variable strings for
• rc - row*column index in state array
• e - exponent of base field
EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: sr = mq.SR(10, 1, 2, 4)
sage: sr.varstr('x', 2, 1, 1)
'x211'
```

```python
def varstrs(name, nr, rc=None, e=None):
    Return a list of strings representing variables in self.
    INPUT:
    • name - variable name
    • nr - number of round to create variable strings for
    • rc - number of rows * number of columns in the state array (default: None)
    • e - exponent of base field (default: None)
```

```python
sage: sr = mq.SR(10, 1, 2, 4)
sage: sr.varstrs('x', 2)
(['x200', 'x201', 'x202', 'x203', 'x210', 'x211', 'x212', 'x213'])
```

class sage.crypto.mq.sr.SR_gf2(n=1, r=1, c=1, e=4, star=False, **kwargs)
Bases: SR_generic

Small Scale Variants of the AES polynomial system constructor over F_2. See help for SR.

```python
sage: sr = mq.SR(gf2=True)
sage: sr
SR(1,1,1,4)
```

```python
def antiphi(l)
    The operation \( \phi^{-1} \) from [MR2002] or the inverse of self.phi.
    INPUT:
    • l - a vector in the sense of self.is_vector
```

```python
sage: sr = mq.SR(gf2=True)
sage: A = sr.random_state_array()
sage: sr.antiphi(sr.phi(A)) == A
True
```

```python
def field_polynomials(name, i, l=None)
    Return list of field polynomials for a given round i and name name.
    INPUT:
    • name - variable name
    • i - round number
    • l - length of variable list (default: None = r*c)
```

```python
```
```
sage: sr = mq.SR(3, 1, 1, 8, gf2=True, polybori=False)
sage: sr.field_polynomials('x', 2)
[x200^2 + x200, x201^2 + x201,
x202^2 + x202, x203^2 + x203,
x204^2 + x204, x205^2 + x205,
x206^2 + x206, x207^2 + x207]

sage: sr = mq.SR(3, 1, 1, 8, gf2=True, polybori=True)
sage: sr.field_polynomials('x', 2)
[]

inversion_polynomials(xi, wi, length)

Return polynomials to represent the inversion in the AES S-Box.

INPUT:

• xi - output variables
• wi - input variables
• length - length of both lists

EXAMPLES:

sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 1, 1, 8, gf2=True)
sage: xi = sr.vars('x', 1)
sage: wi = sr.vars('w', 1)
sage: sr.inversion_polynomials(xi, wi, len(xi))[:3]
[x100*w100 + x100*w102 + x100*w103 + x100*w107 + x101*w101 + x101*w102 +
 → x101*w106 + x102*w100 + x102*w101 + x102*w105 + x103*w100 + x103*w104 +
 → x104*w103 + x105*w102 + x106*w101 + x107*w100,
 x100*w101 + x100*w103 + x100*w104 + x101*w100 + x101*w102 + x101*w103 +
 → x101*w107 + x102*w101 + x102*w102 + x102*w106 + x103*w100 + x103*w101 +
 → x103*w105 + x104*w100 + x104*w104 + x105*w103 + x106*w102 + x107*w101,
 x100*w102 + x100*w104 + x100*w105 + x101*w101 + x101*w103 + x101*w104 +
 → x102*w100 + x102*w102 + x102*w103 + x102*w107 + x103*w101 + x103*w102 +
 → x103*w106 + x104*w100 + x104*w101 + x104*w105 + x105*w100 + x105*w104 +
 → x106*w103 + x107*w102]

inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(x=None, w=None, biaffine_only=None, correct_only=None)

Return inversion polynomials of a single S-Box.

INPUT:

• xi - output variables
• wi - input variables
• length - length of both lists

EXAMPLES:

sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 1, 1, 8, gf2=True)
sage: len(sr.inversion_polynomials_single_sbox())
24
sage: len(sr.inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(correct_only=True))
23

(continues on next page)
\begin{verbatim}
sage: len(sr.inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(biaffine_only=False))
40
sage: len(sr.inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(biaffine_only=False, correct_only=True))
39

sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 1, 1, 8, gf2=True)
sage: l0 = sr.inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(); len(l0)
24
sage: l1 = sr.inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(correct_only=True); len(l1)
23
sage: l2 = sr.inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(biaffine_only=False); len(l2)
40
sage: l3 = sr.inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(biaffine_only=False, correct_only=True); len(l3)
39
sage: set(l0) == set(sr._inversion_polynomials_single_sbox())
True
sage: set(l1) == set(sr._inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(correct_only=True))
True
sage: set(l2) == set(sr._inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(biaffine_only=False))
True
sage: set(l3) == set(sr._inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(biaffine_only=False, correct_only=True))
True

sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 1, 1, 4, gf2=True)
sage: l0 = sr.inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(); len(l0)
12
sage: l1 = sr.inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(correct_only=True); len(l1)
11
sage: l2 = sr.inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(biaffine_only=False); len(l2)
20
sage: l3 = sr.inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(biaffine_only=False, correct_only=True); len(l3)
19
sage: set(l0) == set(sr._inversion_polynomials_single_sbox())
True
sage: set(l1) == set(sr._inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(correct_only=True))
True
sage: set(l2) == set(sr._inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(biaffine_only=False))
True
sage: set(l3) == set(sr._inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(biaffine_only=False, correct_only=True))
True
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{is_vector}(d)

Return \texttt{True} if the given matrix satisfies the conditions for a vector as it appears in the algebraic expression of \texttt{self}.
INPUT:

• d - matrix

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: sr = mq.SR(gf2=True)
sage: sr
SR(1,1,1,4)
sage: k = sr.base_ring()
sage: A = Matrix(k, 1, 1, [k.gen()])
sage: B = sr.vector(A)
sage: sr.is_vector(A)
False
sage: sr.is_vector(B)
True
```

lin_matrix(length=None)

Return the Lin matrix.

If no length is provided, the standard state space size is used. The key schedule calls this method with an explicit length argument because only self.r S-Box applications are performed in the key schedule.

INPUT:

• length - length of state space (default: None)

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 1, 1, 4, gf2=True)
sage: sr.lin_matrix()
[1 0 1 1]
[1 1 0 1]
[1 1 1 0]
[0 1 1 1]
```

mix_columns_matrix()

Return the MixColumns matrix.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 2, 2, 4, gf2=True)
sage: s = sr.random_state_array()
sage: r1 = sr.mix_columns(s)
sage: r2 = sr.state_array(sr.mix_columns_matrix() * sr.vector(s))
sage: r1 == r2
True
```

phi(l, diffusion_matrix=False)

The operation $\phi$ from [MR2002]

Given a list/matrix of elements in $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$, return a matching list/matrix of elements in $\mathbb{F}_2$.

INPUT:

• l - element to perform $\phi$ on.

• diffusion_matrix - if True, the given matrix l is transformed to a matrix which performs the same operation over $\mathbb{F}_2$ as l over $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ (default: False).
EXAMPLES:

```
sage: sr = mq.SR(2, 1, 2, 4, gf2=True)
sage: k = sr.base_ring()
sage: A = matrix(k, 1, 2, [k.gen(), 0] )
sage: sr.phi(A)
[[0 0]
 [0 0]
 [1 0]
 [0 0]]
```

`shift_rows_matrix()`

Return the ShiftRows matrix.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 2, 2, 4, gf2=True)
sage: s = sr.random_state_array()
sage: r1 = sr.shift_rows(s)
sage: r2 = sr.state_array( sr.shift_rows_matrix() * sr.vector(s) )
sage: r1 == r2
True
```

`vector(d=None)`

Constructs a vector suitable for the algebraic representation of SR.

**INPUT:**

- `d` - values for vector (default: None)

**EXAMPLES:**

```
sage: sr = mq.SR(gf2=True)
sage: sr
SR(1,1,1,4)
sage: k = sr.base_ring()
sage: A = Matrix(k, 1, 1, [k.gen()])
sage: sr.vector(A)
[0]
[0]
[1]
[0]
```

`class sage.crypto.mq.sr.SR_gf2_2(n=1, r=1, c=1, e=4, star=False, **kwargs)`

This is an example how to customize the SR constructor.

In this example, we replace the S-Box inversion polynomials by the polynomials generated by the S-Box class.

`inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(x=None, w=None, biaffine_only=None, correct_only=None, groebner=False)`

Return inversion polynomials of a single S-Box.

**INPUT:**

- `x` - output variables (default: None)
- `w` - input variables (default: None)
• biaffine_only - ignored (always False)
• correct_only - ignored (always True)
• groebner - precompute the Groebner basis for this S-Box (default: False).

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.sr import SR_gf2_2
sage: e = 4
sage: sr = SR_gf2_2(1, 1, 1, e)
sage: P = PolynomialRing(GF(2), ['x%d' % i for i in range(e)] + ['w%d' % i for i in range(e)], order='lex')
sage: X, W = P.gens()[:e], P.gens()[e:]
sage: sr.inversion_polynomials_single_sbox(X, W, groebner=True)
[x0 + w0*w1*w2 + w0*w1 + w0*w2 + w0 + w1 + w2,
 x1 + w0*w1*w3 + w0*w3 + w0 + w1*w3 + w1 + w2*w3,
 x2 + w0*w2*w3 + w0*w2 + w0 + w1*w2 + w1*w3 + w2*w3,
 x3 + w0*w1*w2 + w0 + w1*w2*w3 + w1*w2 + w1*w3 + w1 + w2 + w3]
```

```
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.sr import SR_gf2_2
sage: e = 4
sage: sr = SR_gf2_2(1, 1, 1, e)
sage: sr.inversion_polynomials_single_sbox()
[w3*w0 + w3*x2 + w3*x0 + w3 + w1*x2 + w1 + w0 + x2 + x0,
 w3*w1 + w3*x3 + w3 + w2*x0 + w2 + w1*x3 + w1 + x3 + x2 + x1,
 w3*w2 + w3*w1 + w3*x2 + w3 + w2*x3 + x2 + x1,
 w3*w3 + w3*w1 + w3*x3 + w3 + w2*x0 + x2 + x1 + x0,
 w3*w2 + w3*w1 + w3*x3 + w3*w0 + w2*w0 + w2*x0 + w1 + x3 + x2 + x1 + x0,
 w3*w3 + w3*w1 + w3*x3 + w3*x0 + w2*x0 + w1 + x3 + x2 + x1 + x0,
 w3*w2 + w3*x1 + w3 + w2*w0 + w1 + w0 + w1*x0 + w1 + x3 + x2 + x1 + x0,
 w3*w3 + w3*w1 + w3*w0 + w3 + w2*x1 + w1 + x3 + x2 + x1 + x0,
 w3*w1 + w3 + w1 + x3 + x2 + x1,
 w3*w3 + w3*x0 + w3 + w1*x2 + w1 + w0 + x2 + x0,
 w3*w2 + w3*w1 + w3*x2 + w3*x1 + w1 + w0 + x2 + x0,
 w3*w3 + w3*w1 + w3*x3 + w3*w0 + w2*w0 + w1 + x3 + x2 + x1,
 w3*w2 + w3*w1 + w3*x3 + w3 + w2*w0 + w1 + w0 + x2 + x3 + x2,
 w3*w3 + w3*w1 + w3*x0 + w2*x0 + w1 + w0 + x2 + x3 + x2,
 w3*x0 + w3*x2 + w2*w0 + w0*x0 + w0 + x3 + x1,
 w3*x3 + w3*x0 + w2*w0 + w1 + w0*x0 + w0 + x3 + x2,
 w3*x2 + w3*w0 + w3*x2 + w2*w0 + w1 + w0 + x3 + x2,
 w3*x3 + w3*x1 + w2*w0 + w1 + x3 + x2 + x1]```
EXAMPLES:
```
sage: sr = mq.SR()
sage: A = sr.random_state_array()
sage: sr.antiphi(sr.phi(A)) == A
True
```

**field_polynomials** *(name, i, l=None)*

Return list of conjugacy polynomials for a given round *i* and name *name*.

**INPUT:**
- name - variable name
- i - round number
- l - \(r^c\) (default: None)

**EXAMPLES:**
```
sage: sr = mq.SR(3, 1, 1, 8)
sage: sr.field_polynomials('x', 2)
[x200^2 + x201,
 x201^2 + x202,
 x202^2 + x203,
 x203^2 + x204,
 x204^2 + x205,
 x205^2 + x206,
 x206^2 + x207,
 x207^2 + x200]
```

**inversion_polynomials** *(xi, wi, length)*

Return polynomials to represent the inversion in the AES S-Box.

**INPUT:**
- xi - output variables
- wi - input variables
- length - length of both lists

**EXAMPLES:**
```
sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 1, 1, 8)
sage: R = sr.ring()
sage: xi = Matrix(R, 8, 1, sr.vars('x', 1))
sage: wi = Matrix(R, 8, 1, sr.vars('w', 1))
sage: sr.inversion_polynomials(xi, wi, 8)
[x100^w100 + 1,
 x101^w101 + 1,
 x102^w102 + 1,
 x103^w103 + 1,
 x104^w104 + 1,
 x105^w105 + 1,
 x106^w106 + 1,
 x107^w107 + 1]
```
is_vector($d$)

Return True if $d$ can be used as a vector for self.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: sr = mq.SR()
sage: sr
SR(1,1,1,4)
sage: k = sr.base_ring()
sage: A = Matrix(k, 1, 1, [k.gen()])
sage: B = sr.vector(A)
sage: sr.is_vector(A)
False
sage: sr.is_vector(B)
True
```

lin_matrix($length$=None)

Return the Lin matrix.

If no $length$ is provided, the standard state space size is used. The key schedule calls this method with an explicit length argument because only self.r S-Box applications are performed in the key schedule.

INPUT:

- $length$ - length of state space (default: None)

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 1, 1, 4)
sage: sr.lin_matrix()
[ a^2 + 1 1 a^3 + a^2 a^2 + 1]
[ a a 1 a^3 + a^2 + a + 1]
[ a^3 + a a^2 a^2 1]
[ 1 a^3 a + 1 a + 1]
```

mix_columns_matrix()

Return the MixColumns matrix.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 2, 2, 4)
sage: s = sr.random_state_array()
sage: r1 = sr.mix_columns(s)
sage: r2 = sr.state_array(sr.mix_columns_matrix() * sr.vector(s))
sage: r1 == r2
True
```

phi($l$)

The operation $\phi$ from [MR2002]

Projects state arrays to their algebraic representation.

INPUT:

- $l$ - element to perform $\phi$ on.

EXAMPLES:
\begin{verbatim}
sage: sr = mq.SR(2, 1, 2, 4)
sage: k = sr.base_ring()
sage: A = matrix(k, 1, 2, [k.gen(), 0] )
sage: sr.phi(A)
\begin{bmatrix}
  a  & 0  \\
  a^2 & 0  \\
  a + 1 & 0  \\
  a^2 + 1 & 0
\end{bmatrix}
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{shift\_rows\_matrix()}

Return the ShiftRows matrix.

\textbf{EXAMPLES:}

\begin{verbatim}
sage: sr = mq.SR(1, 2, 2, 4)
sage: s = sr.random_state_array()
sage: r1 = sr.shift_rows(s)
sage: r2 = sr.state_array( sr.shift_rows_matrix() * sr.vector(s) )
sage: r1 == r2
True
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{vector}(d=None)

Constructs a vector suitable for the algebraic representation of SR, i.e. BES.

\textbf{INPUT:}

\begin{itemize}
\item d - values for vector, must be understood by \texttt{self.phi} (default: None)
\end{itemize}

\textbf{EXAMPLES:}

\begin{verbatim}
sage: sr = mq.SR()
sage: sr
SR(1,1,1,4)
sage: k = sr.base_ring()
sage: A = Matrix(k, 1, 1, [k.gen()])
sage: sr.vector(A)
\begin{bmatrix}
  a  \\
  a^2  \\
  a + 1  \\
  a^2 + 1
\end{bmatrix}
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{sage.crypto.mq.sr.test\_consistency}(max\_n=2, **kwargs)

Test all combinations of r, c, e and n in (1, 2) for consistency of random encryptions and their polynomial systems. \( \mathbb{F}_2 \) and \( \mathbb{F}_{2^e} \) systems are tested. This test takes a while.

\textbf{INPUT:}

\begin{itemize}
\item max\_n – maximal number of rounds to consider (default: 2)
\item kwargs – are passed to the SR constructor
\end{itemize}
Rijndael-GF is an algebraic implementation of the AES cipher which seeks to provide a fully generalized algebraic representation of both the whole AES cipher as well as its individual components.

This class is an algebraic implementation of the Rijndael-GF extension of the AES cipher, as described in [DR2002]. The AES cipher itself is defined to operate on a state in $(\mathbb{F}_2)^{8 \times n_t}$ where $n_t \in \{16, 20, 24, 28, 32\}$. Rijndael-GF is a generalization of AES which allows for operations in $(\mathbb{F}_2^n)^{8 \times n_t}$, enabling more algebraically sophisticated study of AES and its variants. This implementation of Rijndael-GF is suitable for learning purposes, for comparison to other algebraic ciphers, and for studying various techniques of algebraic cryptanalysis of AES. This cipher is different from Mini-AES, which is a teaching tool for beginners to understand the basic structure of AES.

An algebraic implementation of Rijndael-GF is achieved by recognizing that for each round component function $\phi$ of AES (SubBytes, ShiftRows, etc.) operating on state matrices, every entry of the output matrix $B = \phi(A)$ is representable as a polynomial with variables being the entries of the input state matrix $A$. Correspondingly, this implementation of Rijndael-GF provides a RijndaelGF.Round_Component_Poly_Constr class which allows for creation of these such polynomials. For each round component function $\phi$ of Rijndael-GF there exists a Round_Component_Poly_Constr object with a `__call__` method of the form `__call__(i, j)` which returns a polynomial representing $\phi(A)_{i,j}$ in terms of the entries of $A$. There additionally are various methods provided which allow for easy polynomial evaluation and for simple creation of Round_Component_Poly_Constr objects representing more complex aspects of the cipher.

This approach to implementing Rijndael-GF bears some similarity to the multivariate quadratic (MQ) systems utilized in SR, in that the MQ systems also seek to describe the AES cipher as a system of algebraic equations. Despite this initial similarity though, Rijndael-GF and SR are quite different as this implementation seeks to provide a fully generalized algebraic representation of both the whole AES cipher as well as its individual components, while SR is instead a family of parameterizable variants of the AES suitable as a framework for comparing different cryptanalytic techniques that can be brought to bear on the AES.

AUTHORS:
- Thomas Gagne (2015-06): initial version

EXAMPLES:
We build Rijndael-GF with a block length of 4 and a key length of 6:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 6)
```

We can encrypt plaintexts and decrypt ciphertexts by calling the encrypt and decrypt methods or by calling the Rijndael-GF object explicitly. Note that the default input format is a hex string.

```python
sage: plaintext = '00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff'
sage: key = '000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f1011121314151617'
sage: rgf.encrypt(plaintext, key)
```
We can also use binary strings as input and output.

```
sage: plain = '111010111000000111101101101001100110010011011111100011011100111110011100111010011001110110100011100000011111011'  # change dimensions for this example
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 4)

sage: rgf.encrypt(plain, key) == expected_ciphertext
True
```

To build polynomials representing entries of the output matrix $B = \phi(A)$ for any round component function $\phi$, each of the round component functions (SubBytes, ShiftRows, and MixColumns) have a `Round_Component_Poly_Constr` object associated with it for building polynomials. These objects can be accessed by calling their getter functions: `rgf.sub_bytes_poly()`, `rgf.shift_rows_poly()`, and `rgf.mix_columns_poly()`. Each returned object has a `__call__` method which takes an index $i,j$ and an algorithm flag (‘encrypt’ or ‘decrypt’) and returns a polynomial representing $\phi(A)_{i,j}$ in terms of the entries of $A$, where $A$ is an arbitrary state matrix and $\phi$ is the round component function associated with that particular `Round_Component_Poly_Constr` object. Some of these objects’ `__call__` methods also have additional keywords to modify their behavior, and so we describe the usage of each object below.

```
sage: sr_pc = rfg.shift_rows_poly_constr()
sage: a13 = sr_pc(1, 2)

sage: mc_pc = rfg.mix_columns_poly_constr()
sage: a21 = mc_pc(2, 3, algorithm='decrypt')
```

[DR2002] demonstrates an example of encryption which takes the plaintext ‘3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734’ and the key ‘2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c’ and returns the ciphertext ‘3902dc1925dc116a8409850b1dfb9732’. We can use this example to demonstrate the correctness of this implementation:

```
sage: rfg = RijndaelGF(4, 6)  # revert to previous dimensions
```

```
sage: rfg = RijndaelGF(4, 4)  # change dimensions for this example
sage: rfg.encrypt(plain, key) == expected_ciphertext
True
```

```
sage: rfg = RijndaelGF(4, 6)  # revert to previous dimensions
```

```
sage: rfg = RijndaelGF(4, 4)  # change dimensions for this example
sage: rfg.encrypt(plain, key) == expected_ciphertext
True
```

```
sage: sr_pc = rfg.shift_rows_poly_constr()
sage: a13 = sr_pc(1, 2)

sage: mc_pc = rfg.mix_columns_poly_constr()
sage: a21 = mc_pc(2, 3, algorithm='decrypt')
```

```
sage: mc_pc = rfg.mix_columns_poly_constr()
sage: a21 = mc_pc(2, 3, algorithm='decrypt')
```

```
sage: mc_pc = rfg.mix_columns_poly_constr()
sage: a21 = mc_pc(2, 3, algorithm='decrypt')
```

```
sage: mc_pc = rfg.mix_columns_poly_constr()
sage: a21 = mc_pc(2, 3, algorithm='decrypt')
```
rgf.sub_bytes_poly() has a single keyword no_inversion=False, which when set to True returns only the affine transformation step of SubBytes. Below describes the usage of rgf.sub_bytes_poly().

```
sage: sb_pc = rgf.sub_bytes_poly_constr()
sage: sb_pc(1, 2)
(x^2 + 1)*a12^254 +
(x^3 + 1)*a12^253 +
(x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + 1)*a12^251 +
(x^5 + x^2 + 1)*a12^247 +
(x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2)*a12^239 +
a12^223 +
(x^7 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + 1)*a12^191 +
(x^7 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1)*a12^127 +
(x^6 + x^5 + x + 1)
sage: sb_pc(2, 3, no_inversion=True)
(x^7 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1)*a23^128 +
(x^7 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + 1)*a23^64 +
a23^32 +
(x^7 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2)*a23^16 +
(x^5 + x^2 + 1)*a23^8 +
(x^7 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + 1)*a23^4 +
(x^3 + 1)*a23^2 +
(x^2 + 1)*a23 +
(x^6 + x^5 + x + 1)
```

Because of the order of the affine transformation and the inversion step in SubBytes, calling rgf.sub_bytes_poly()(i, j, algorithm='decrypt') results in a polynomial with thousands of terms which takes a very long time to compute. Hence, when using the decryption version of rgf.sub_bytes_poly() with the intention of evaluating the polynomials it constructs, it is recommended to first call rgf.sub_bytes_poly()(i, j, algorithm='decrypt', no_inversion=True) to get a polynomial representing only the inverse affine transformation, evaluate this polynomial for a particular input block, then finally perform the inversion step after the affine transformation polynomial has been evaluated.

```
sage: inv_affine = sb_pc(1, 2, algorithm='decrypt',
.....: no_inversion=True)
sage: state = rgf._hex_to_GF('ff87968431d86a516451fa773ad009')
sage: evaluated = inv_affine(state.list())
sage: result = evaluated * -1
sage: rgf._GF_to_hex(result)
'79'
```

We can see how the variables of these polynomials are organized in A:

```
sage: rgf.state_vrs
[a00 a01 a02 a03]
[a10 a11 a12 a13]
[a20 a21 a22 a23]
[a30 a31 a32 a33]
```

The final Round_Component_Poly_Constr object we have not discussed yet is add_round_key_poly, which corresponds to the AddRoundKey round component function. This object differs from the other Round_Component_Poly_Constr objects in that it returns polynomials with variables being entries of an input state A as well as entries of various subkeys. Since there are \( N_r \) subkeys to choose from, add_round_key_poly has a keyword of round=0 to select which subkey to use variables from.
We can see how key variables are organized in the original key (the key used to build the rest of the subkeys) below. Note that because key variables are subkey entries, if the key length is longer than the block length we will have entries from multiple subkeys in the original key matrix.

```
sage: rgf.key_vrs
[k000 k001 k002 k003 k100 k101]
k010 k011 k012 k013 k110 k111]
k20 k21 k22 k23 k120 k121]
k30 k31 k32 k33 k130 k131]
```

We can evaluate any of these constructed polynomials for a particular input state (in essence, calculate $\phi(A)_{i,j}$) as such:

```
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 6)
sage: state = rgf._hex_to_GF('fe7b5170fe7c8e93477f7e4bf6b98071')
sage: poly = mc_pc(3, 2, algorithm='decrypt')
sage: poly(state.list())
x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^2 + x
```

We can use the apply_poly method to build a matrix whose $i,j$th entry equals the polynomial $\phi_{pol}(i, j)$ evaluated for a particular input state, where $\phi_{pol}$ is the Round_Component_Poly_Constr object associated with the round component function $\phi$. Essentially, apply_poly calculates $\phi(A)$, where $A$ is our input state. Calling apply_poly is equivalent to applying the round component function associated this Round_Component_Poly_Constr object to $A$.

```
sage: state = rgf._hex_to_GF('c4cedcabe694694e4b23bfdd6fb522fa')
sage: result = rgf.apply_poly(state, rgf.sub_bytes_poly_constr())
sage: rgf._GF_to_hex(result)
'1c8b86628e22f92fb32608c1a8d5932d'
sage: result == rgf.sub_bytes(state)
True
```

Alternatively, we can pass a matrix of polynomials as input to apply_poly, which will then return another matrix of polynomials. For example, `rgf.state_vrs` can be used as input to make each $i,j$th entry of the output matrix equal $\phi_{pol_{constr}(i,j)}$, where $\phi_{pol_{constr}}$ is our inputted Round_Component_Poly_Constr object. This matrix can then be passed through again and so on, demonstrating how one could potentially build a matrix of polynomials representing the entire cipher.

```
sage: state = rgf.apply_poly(rgf.state_vrs, rgf.shift_rows_poly_constr())
sage: state
[a00 a01 a02 a03]
[a11 a12 a13 a10]
[a22 a23 a20 a21]
[a33 a30 a31 a32]
sage: rgf.apply_poly(state, rgf.add_round_key_poly_constr())
[a00 + k000 a01 + k001 a02 + k002 a03 + k003]
```

(continues on next page)
For any of these Round_Component_Poly_Constr objects, we can change the keywords of its \_\_call\_\_ method when apply\_poly invokes it by passing apply\_poly a dictionary mapping keywords to their values.

```python
sage: rgf.apply_poly(rgf.state_vrs, rgf.add_round_key_poly_constr(),
    ....: poly_constr_attr={'round': 5})
[a00 + k500 a01 + k501 a02 + k502 a03 + k503]
[a10 + k510 a11 + k511 a12 + k512 a13 + k513]
[a20 + k520 a21 + k521 a22 + k522 a23 + k523]
[a30 + k530 a31 + k531 a32 + k532 a33 + k533]
```

We can build our own Round_Component_Poly_Constr objects which correspond to the composition of multiple round component functions with the compose method. To do this, if we pass two Round_Component_Poly_Constr objects to compose where the first object corresponds to the round component function \( f \) and the second to the round component function \( g \), compose will return a new Round_Component_Poly_Constr object corresponding to the function \( g \circ f \). This returned Round_Component_Poly_Constr object will have the arguments of \_\_call\_\_(row, col, algorithm='encrypt') and when passed an index \( i,j \) will return \( g(f(A))_{i,j} \) in terms of the entries of \( A \).

```python
sage: rcpc = rgf.compose(rgf.shift_rows_poly_constr(),
    ....: rgf.mix_columns_poly_constr())
sage: rcpc
A polynomial constructor of a round component of Rijndael-GF block cipher with block length 4, key length 6, and 12 rounds.
sage: rcpc(2, 1)
a01 + a12 + x*a23 + (x + 1)*a30
sage: state = rgf._hex_to_GF('afb73eb1cd1b85162280f27fb20d585')
sage: result = rgf.apply_poly(state, rcpc)
sage: new_state = rgf.shift_rows(state)
sage: new_state = rgf.mix_columns(new_state)
sage: result == new_state
True
sage: rcpc = rgf.compose(rgf.mix_columns_poly_constr(),
    ....: shift_rows_poly_constr())
sage: result = rgf.apply_poly(state, rcpc, algorithm='decrypt')
sage: new_state = rgf.mix_columns(state, algorithm='decrypt')
sage: new_state = rgf.shift_rows(new_state, algorithm='decrypt')
sage: new_state == result
True
```

Alternatively, we can use compose to build the polynomial output of a Round_Component_Poly_Constr object corresponding to the composition of multiple round functions like above without having to explicitly build our own Round_Component_Poly_Constr object. To do this, we simply make the first input a Round_Component_Poly_Constr object corresponding to a round component function \( f \) and make the second input a polynomial representing \( g(A)_{i,j} \) for a round component function \( g \). Given this, compose will return a polynomial representing \( g(f(A))_{i,j} \) in terms of the entries of \( A \).

```python
sage: poly = rgf.mix_columns_poly_constr()(0, 3)
sage: poly
```

If we use `algorithm='decrypt'` as an argument to `compose`, then the value of `algorithm` will be passed directly to the first argument of `compose` when it is called, provided the second argument is a polynomial. Setting this flag does nothing if both arguments are `Round_Component_Poly_Constr` objects, since the returned `Round_Component_Poly_Constr` object’s `__call__` method must have its own `algorithm` keyword defaulted to ‘encrypt’.

```
sage: poly = rgf.shift_rows_poly_constr()(2, 1)
sage: rgf.compose(rgf.sub_bytes_poly_constr(), poly, algorithm='decrypt')
(x^3 + x^2 + 1)*a03 + (x^3 + 1)*a13 + (x^3 + x^2 + x)*a23 + (x^3 + x + 1)*a33
```

```
sage: state = rgf._hex_to_GF('80121e0776fd1d8a8d8c31bc965d1fee')
sage: with_decrypt = rgf.compose(rgf.sub_bytes_poly_constr(),
....: rgf.shift_rows_poly_constr(), algorithm='decrypt')
sage: result_wd = rgf.apply_poly(state, with_decrypt)
sage: no_decrypt = rgf.compose(rgf.sub_bytes_poly_constr(),
....: rgf.shift_rows_poly_constr())
```
We can also pass keyword dictionaries of \( f\_\text{attr} \) and \( g\_\text{attr} \) to \( \text{compose} \) to make \( f \) and \( g \) use those keywords during polynomial creation.

\[
\text{sage: } \text{rcpc} = \text{rgf.compose(rgf.add_round_key_poly_constr(),} \\
\text{.....: } \text{rgf.add_round_key_poly_constr(),} \\
\text{.....: } \text{f\_attr={'round' : 4}, g\_attr={'round' : 7})} \\
\text{sage: } \text{rcpc}(1, 2) \\
\text{a12 + k412 + k712}
\]

In addition to building polynomial representations of state matrices, we can also build polynomial representations of elements of the expanded key with the \( \text{expand_key_poly} \) method. However, since the key schedule is defined recursively, it is impossible to build polynomials for the key schedule in the same manner as we do for the round component functions. Consequently, \( \text{expand_round_key_poly}() \) is not a \( \text{Round\_Component\_Poly\_Constr} \) object. Instead, \( \text{expand_key_poly} \) is a method which takes an index \( i,j \) and a round number \( \text{round} \), and returns a polynomial representing the \( i,j \)th entry of the \( \text{round} \)th round key. This polynomial’s variables are entries of the original key we built above.

\[
\text{sage: } \text{rgf.expand_key_poly(1, 2, 0)} \\
\text{k012} \\
\text{sage: } \text{rgf.expand_key_poly(1, 1, 1)} \\
\text{k111} \\
\text{sage: } \text{rgf.expand_key_poly(1, 2, 1)} \\
\text{(x^2 + 1)*k121^{254} +} \\
\text{(x^3 + 1)*k121^{253} +} \\
\text{(x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + 1)*k121^{251} +} \\
\text{(x^5 + x^2 + 1)*k121^{247} +} \\
\text{(x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2)*k121^{239} +} \\
\text{k121^{223} +} \\
\text{(x^7 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + 1)*k121^{191} +} \\
\text{(x^7 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1)*k121^{127} +} \\
\text{k010 +} \\
\text{(x^6 + x^5 + x)}
\]

Since \( \text{expand_key_poly} \) is not actually a \( \text{Round\_Component\_Poly\_Constr} \) object, we cannot use it as input to \( \text{apply_poly} \) or \( \text{compose} \).

\[
\text{sage: } \text{rgf.apply_poly(state, rgf.expand_key_poly)} \\
\text{Traceback (most recent call last):} \\
\text{...} \\
\text{TypeError: keyword 'poly_constr' must be a Round\_Component\_Poly\_Constr} \\
\text{sage: } \text{rgf.compose(rgf.expand_key_poly, rgf.sub_bytes_poly_constr())} \\
\text{Traceback (most recent call last):} \\
\text{...} \\
\text{TypeError: keyword 'f' must be a Round\_Component\_Poly\_Constr}
\]

\textbf{class} \ sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf.Rijndael1GF\( (Nb, Nk, state\_chr='a', key\_chr='k') \)

\hspace{1cm} \text{Bases:} \ SageObject

\hspace{1cm} \text{An algebraically generalized version of the AES cipher.}
INPUT:

- **Nb** – The block length of this instantiation. Must be between 4 and 8.
- **Nk** – The key length of this instantiation. Must be between 4 and 8.
- **state_chr** – The variable name for polynomials representing elements from state matrices.
- **key_chr** – The variable name for polynomials representing elements of the key schedule.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(6, 8)
sage: rgf
Rijndael-GF block cipher with block length 6, key length 8, and 14 rounds.
```

By changing **state_chr** we can alter the names of variables in polynomials representing elements from state matrices.

```python
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 6, state_chr='myChr')
sage: rgf.mix_columns_poly_constr()(3, 2)
(x + 1)*myChr02 + myChr12 + myChr22 + x*myChr32
```

We can also alter the name of variables in polynomials representing elements from round keys by changing **key_chr**.

```python
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 6, key_chr='myKeyChr')
sage: rgf.expand_key_poly(1, 2, 1)
(x^2 + 1)*myKeyChr121^254 +
(x^3 + 1)*myKeyChr121^253 +
(x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + 1)*myKeyChr121^251 +
(x^5 + x^2 + 1)*myKeyChr121^247 +
(x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2)*myKeyChr121^239 +
myKeyChr121^223 +
(x^7 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + 1)*myKeyChr121^191 +
(x^7 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1)*myKeyChr121^127 +
myKeyChr010 +
(x^6 + x^5 + x)
```

```python
class Round_Component_Poly_Constr(polynomial_constr, rgf, round_component_name=None)
   _bases: SageObject
    An object which constructs polynomials representing round component functions of a RijndaelGF object.

    INPUT:

    - **polynomial_constr** – A function which takes an index **row**, **col** and returns a polynomial representing the **row**, **col** th entry of a matrix after a specific round component function has been applied to it. This polynomial must be in terms of entries of the input matrix to that round component function and of entries of various subkeys. **polynomial_constr** must have arguments of the form `polynomial_constr(row, col, algorithm='encrypt', **kwargs)` and must be able to be called as `polynomial_constr(row, col)`.
    - **rgf** – The RijndaelGF object whose state entries are represented by polynomials returned from `polynomial_constr`.
    - **round_component_name** – The name of the round component function this object corresponds to as a string. Used solely for display purposes.
```
EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import *
    ...: RijndaelGF
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 4)
```
```
sage: rctp = RijndaelGF.Round_Component_Poly_Constr(  
    ...: rgf._shift_rows_pc, rgf, "Shift Rows")
sage: rctp
A polynomial constructor for the function 'Shift Rows' of Rijndael-GF block cipher with block length 4, key length 4, and 10 rounds.
```

If \( \phi \) is the round component function to which this object corresponds to, then \( \text{__call__}(i,j) = \phi(A)_{i,j} \)
where \( A \) is an arbitrary input matrix. Note that the polynomial returned by \( \text{__call__}(i,j) \) will be in terms of the entries of \( A \).

```python
sage: rctp = RijndaelGF.Round_Component_Poly_Constr(  
    ...: rgf._mix_columns_pc, rgf, "Mix Columns")
sage: poly = rctp(1, 2); poly
a02 + x*a12 + (x + 1)*a22 + a32
sage: state = rgf._hex_to_GF(  
    ...: 'd1876c0f79c4300ab45594add66ff41f')
sage: result = rgf.mix_columns(state)
sage: result[1,2] == poly(state.list())
True
```

Invoking this object's \( \text{__call__} \) method passes its arguments directly to \( \text{polynomial_constr} \) and returns the result. In a sense, \( \text{Round_Component_Poly_Constr} \) acts as a wrapper for the \( \text{polynomial_constr} \) method and helps ensure that each \( \text{Round_Component_Poly_Constr} \) object will act similarly.

```python
sage: all(rgf._mix_columns_pc(i, j) == rctp(i, j)  
    ...: for i in range(4) for j in range(4))
True
```

Since all keyword arguments of \( \text{polynomial_constr} \) must have a default value except for \( \text{row} \) and \( \text{col} \), we can always call a \( \text{Round_Component_Poly_Constr} \) object by \( \text{__call__}(\text{row}, \text{col}) \). Because of this, methods such as \( \text{apply_poly} \) and \( \text{compose} \) will only call \( \text{__call__}(\text{row}, \text{col}) \) when passed a \( \text{Round_Component_Poly_Constr} \) object. In order to change this object's behavior and force methods such as \( \text{apply_poly} \) to use non-default values for keywords we can pass dictionaries mapping keywords to non-default values as input to \( \text{apply_poly} \) and \( \text{compose} \).

```python
sage: rgf.apply_poly(rgf.state_vrs,  
    ...: rgf.add_round_key_poly_constr(),  
    ...: poly_constr_attr={'round' : 9})
[a00 + k900 a01 + k901 a02 + k902 a03 + k903]  
[a10 + k910 a11 + k911 a12 + k912 a13 + k913]  
[a20 + k920 a21 + k921 a22 + k922 a23 + k923]  
[a30 + k930 a31 + k931 a32 + k932 a33 + k933]
```

```python
sage: fn = rgf.compose(rgf.add_round_key_poly_constr(),  
    ...: rgf.add_round_key_poly_constr(),  
    ...: f_attr={'round' : 3}, g_attr={'round' : 7})
sage: fn(2, 3)
a23 + k323 + k723
```

Because all \( \text{Round_Component_Poly_Constr} \) objects are callable as \( \text{__call__}(\text{row}, \text{col}, \text{algorithm}) \), \( \text{__call__} \) will check the validity of these three arguments automatically. Any other
keywords, however, must be checked in polynomial_constr.

```python
sage: def my_poly_constr(row, col, algorithm='encrypt'):
    ....:     return x * rgf._F.one()  # example body with no checks
sage: rcpc = RijndaelGF.Round_Component_Poly_Constr(
    ....:     my_poly_constr, rgf, "My Poly Constr")
sage: rcpc(-1, 2)
Traceback (most recent call last):
  ... ValueError: keyword 'row' must be in range 0 - 3
sage: rcpc(1, 2, algorithm=5)
Traceback (most recent call last):
  ... ValueError: keyword 'algorithm' must be either 'encrypt' or 'decrypt'
```

**add_round_key** *(state, round_key)*

Return the round-key addition of matrices state and round_key.

**INPUT:**

- state – The state matrix to have round_key added to.
- round_key – The round key to add to state.

**OUTPUT:**

- A state matrix which is the round key addition of state and round_key. This transformation is simply the entrywise addition of these two matrices.

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 4)
sage: state = rgf._hex_to_GF('36339d50f9b539269f2c092dc4406d23')
sage: key = rgf._hex_to_GF('7CC78D0E22754E667E24573F454A6531')
sage: key_schedule = rgf.expand_key(key)
sage: result = rgf.add_round_key(state, key_schedule[0])
sage: rgf._GF_to_hex(result)
'4af4105edbc07740e1085e12810a0812'
```

**add_round_key_poly_constr**

Return the Round_Component_Poly_Constr object corresponding to AddRoundKey.

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 4)
sage: ark_pc = rgf.add_round_key_poly_constr()
sage: ark_pc
A polynomial constructor for the function 'Add Round Key' of Rijndael-GF block cipher with block length 4, key length 4, and 10 rounds.
sage: ark_pc(0, 1)
a01 + k001
```

When invoking the returned object’s __call__ method, changing the value of algorithm='encrypt' does nothing, since the AddRoundKey round component function is its own inverse.
sage: with_encrypt = ark_pc(1, 1, algorithm='encrypt')
sage: with_decrypt = ark_pc(1, 1, algorithm='decrypt')
sage: with_encrypt == with_decrypt
True

When invoking the returned object’s __call__ method, one can change the round subkey used in the returned polynomial by changing the round=0 keyword.

sage: ark_pc(2, 1, round=7)
a21 + k721

When passing the returned object to methods such as apply_poly and compose, we can make these methods use a non-default value for round=0 by passing in a dictionary mapping round to a different value.

sage: rgf.apply_poly(rgf.state_vrs, ark_pc,
.....: poly_constr_attr={'round' : 6})
[a00 + k600 a01 + k601 a02 + k602 a03 + k603]
[a10 + k610 a11 + k611 a12 + k612 a13 + k613]
[a20 + k620 a21 + k621 a22 + k622 a23 + k623]
[a30 + k630 a31 + k631 a32 + k632 a33 + k633]

sage: rcpc = rgf.compose(ark_pc, ark_pc,
.....: f_attr={'round' : 3}, g_attr={'round' : 5})
sage: rcpc(3, 1)
a31 + k331 + k531

apply_poly(state, poly_constr, algorithm='encrypt', keys=None, poly_constr_attr=None)

Return a state matrix where poly_method is applied to each entry.

INPUT:
- state – The state matrix over \( F_{2^8} \) to which poly_method is applied to.
- poly_constr – The Round_Component_Poly_Constr object to build polynomials during evaluation.
- algorithm – (default: “encrypt”) Passed directly to rcpc to select encryption or decryption. The encryption flag is “encrypt” and the decrypt flag is “decrypt”.
- keys – (default: None) An array of \( N_r \) subkey matrices to replace any key variables in any polynomials returned by poly_method. Must be identical to the format returned by expand_key. If any polynomials have key variables and keys is not supplied, the key variables will remain as-is.
- poly_constr_attr – (default:None) A dictionary of keyword attributes to pass to rcpc when it is called.

OUTPUT:
- A state matrix in \( F_{2^8} \) whose \( i, j \) th entry equals the polynomial \( \text{poly_constr}(i, j, \text{algorithm}, **\text{poly_constr_attr}) \) evaluated by setting its variables equal to the corresponding entries of state.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 4)
sage: state = rgf._hex_to_GF('3b59cb73fcd90ee05774222dc067fb68')
sage: result = rgf.apply_poly(state, rgf.shift_rows_poly_constr())
```
Calling apply_poly with the Round_Component_Poly_Constr object of a round component (e.g. sub_bytes_poly) is identical to calling that round component function itself.

```python
sage: state = rgf._hex_to_GF('4915598f55e5d7a0daca94fa1f0a63f7')
sage: apply_poly_result = rgf.apply_poly(state, ...
   ....: rgf.sub_bytes_poly_constr())
sage: direct_result = rgf.sub_bytes(state)
sage: direct_result == apply_poly_result
True
```

If the Round_Component_Poly_Constr object’s __call__ method returns a polynomial with state variables as well as key variables, we can supply a list of $N_r$ round keys keys whose elements are evaluated as the key variables. If this is not provided, the key variables will remain as is.:  

```python
sage: state = rgf._hex_to_GF('14f9701ae35fe28c440adf4d4ea9c026')
sage: key = rgf._hex_to_GF('54d990a16ba09ab596bbf40ea111702f')
sage: keys = rgf.expand_key(key)
sage: result = rgf.apply_poly(state, ...
   ....: rgf.add_round_key_poly_constr(), keys=keys)
sage: result == rgf.add_round_key(state, key)
True
```

We can change the value of the keywords of poly_constr’s__call__ method when apply_poly calls it by passing in a dictionary poly_constr_attr mapping keywords to their values.

```python
sage: rgf.apply_poly(rgf.state_vrs,
   ....: rgf.add_round_key_poly_constr(),
   ....: poly_constr_attr={'round': 5})
[a00 + k500 a01 + k501 a02 + k502 a03 + k503]
[a10 + k510 a11 + k511 a12 + k512 a13 + k513]
[a20 + k520 a21 + k521 a22 + k522 a23 + k523]
[a30 + k530 a31 + k531 a32 + k532 a33 + k533]
```

**block_length()**

Return the block length of this instantiation of Rijndael-GF.

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 6)
sage: rgf.block_length()
4
```

**compose**(f, g, algorithm='encrypt', f_attr=None, g_attr=None)

Return a Round_Component_Poly_Constr object corresponding to $g \circ f$ or the polynomial output of this object’s __call__ method.

**INPUT:**
• $f$ – A `Round_Component_Poly_Constr` object corresponding to a round component function $f$.

• $g$ – A `Round_Component_Poly_Constr` object corresponding to a round component function $g$ or a polynomial output of this object’s `__call__` method.

• `algorithm` – (default: “encrypt”) Whether $f$ and $g$ should use their encryption transformations or their decryption transformations. Does nothing if $g$ is a `Round_Component_Poly_Constr` object. The encryption flag is “encrypt” and the decryption flag is “decrypt”.

• `f_attr` – (default: None) A dictionary of keyword attributes to pass to $f$ when it is called.

• `g_attr` – (default: None) A dictionary of keyword attributes to pass to $g$ when it is called. Does nothing if $g$ is a polynomial.

**OUTPUT:**

• If $g$ is a `Round_Component_Poly_Constr` object corresponding to a round component function $g$, then `compose` returns a `Round_Component_Poly_Constr` corresponding to the round component function $g \circ f$, where $f$ is the round component function corresponding to the first argument $f$. On the other hand, if $g = g(A)_{i,j}$ for a round component function $g$, then `compose` returns $g(f(A))_{i,j}$, where $A$ is an arbitrary input state matrix.

**EXAMPLES:**

This function allows us to determine the polynomial representations of entries across multiple round functions. For example, if we wanted a polynomial representing the $1,3$ entry of a matrix after we first apply ShiftRows and then MixColumns to that matrix, we do:

```sage
define necessary imports
rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 4)
mcp = rgf.mix_columns_poly_constr()(1, 3); mcp
result = rgf.compose(rgf.shift_rows_poly_constr(), mcp)
```

We can test the correctness of this:

```sage
define necessary imports
result(state.list()) == new_state[1,3]
```

We can also use `compose` to build a new `Round_Component_Poly_Constr` object corresponding to the composition of multiple round functions as such:

```sage
compose(rgf.shift_rows_poly_constr(), ...
```

If we use `compose` to make a new `Round_Component_Poly_Constr` object, we can use that object as input to `apply_poly` and `compose`:

```sage
define necessary imports
result = rgf.apply_poly(state, fn)
```

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We can change the keyword attributes of the \_\_call\_\_ methods of \texttt{f} and \texttt{g} by passing dictionaries \texttt{f\_attr} and \texttt{g\_attr} to \texttt{compose}.

\begin{verbatim}
sage: fn = rgf.compose(rgf.add_round_key_poly_constr(),
......: rgf.add_round_key_poly_constr(),
......: f\_attr={\string\'round\string\': \string\'4\string\'},
......: g\_attr={\string\'round\string\': \string\'7\string\'})
sage: fn(1, 2)
a12 + k412 + k712
\end{verbatim}

\textbf{decrypt}(\texttt{ciphertext, key, format='hex'})

Return the ciphertext \texttt{ciphertext} decrypted with the key \texttt{key}.

INPUT:

\begin{itemize}
\item \texttt{ciphertext} – The ciphertext to be decrypted.
\item \texttt{key} – The key to decrypt \texttt{ciphertext} with.
\item \texttt{format} – (default: \texttt{hex}) The string format that both \texttt{ciphertext} and \texttt{key} must be in, either “hex” or “binary”.
\end{itemize}

OUTPUT:

\begin{itemize}
\item A string in the format \texttt{format} of \texttt{ciphertext} decrypted with key \texttt{key}.
\end{itemize}

EXAMPLES:

\begin{verbatim}
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 4)
sage: key = \textquoteleft2d6b02343f6d12dd09337ec75b36e3f0\textquoteright
sage: ciphertext = \textquoteleft54d990a16ba09ab596bbf40ea11702f\textquoteright
sage: expected_plaintext = \textquoteleft1e1d913b7274a9b5a4ab1a5f9133b93\textquoteright
sage: rgf.decrypt(ciphertext, key) == expected_plaintext
True
\end{verbatim}

We can also decrypt messages using binary strings.
**sage:** key = '00011010000011100011000000111101' * 4
**sage:** ciphertext = '0011000111110111011111011010100111' * 4
**sage:** expected_plaintext = ('1111010001011011000111110110100001' * 4
..... '01000011110011011000110110100001' * 4
sage: result = rgf.decrypt(ciphertext, key, format='binary')
sage: result == expected_plaintext
True

**encrypt**(plain, key, format='hex')

Return the plaintext plain encrypted with the key key.

INPUT:

• plain – The plaintext to be encrypted.
• key – The key to encrypt plain with.
• format – (default: hex) The string format of key and plain, either “hex” or “binary”.

OUTPUT:

• A string of the plaintext plain encrypted with the key key.

EXAMPLES:

```sage
from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 4)
key = 'c81677bc9b7ac93b25027992b0261996'
plain = 'fde3bad205e5d0d7354796def1fe37f1'
expected_ciphertext = 'e767290ddfc64143c50a444bec081f0'
rgf.encrypt(plain, key) == expected_ciphertext
True
```

We can encrypt binary strings as well.

```sage
key = '100101111000001111011010001' * 4
plain = '00000000101000000000000011110111' * 4
expected_ciphertext = ('11011111010001010001011110101111' * 4
..... '00100111101100011111111111111000' * 4
sage: result = rgf.encrypt(plain, key, format='binary')
sage: result == expected_ciphertext
True
```

**expand_key**(key)

Return the expanded key schedule from key.

INPUT:

• key – The key to build a key schedule from. Must be a matrix over \( \mathbb{F}_{2^8} \) of dimensions \( 4 \times N_k \).

OUTPUT:

• A length \( Nr \) list of \( 4 \times N_k \) matrices corresponding to the expanded key. The \( n \) th entry of the list corresponds to the matrix used in the add_round_key step of the \( n \) th round.

EXAMPLES:
```python
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 6)
sage: key = '331D0084B176C3FB59CAA0EDA271B565BB5D9A2D1E4B2892'
sage: key_state = rgf._hex_to_GF(key)
sage: key_schedule = rgf.expand_key(key_state)
sage: rgf._GF_to_hex(key_schedule[0])
'331d0084b176c3fb59caa0eda271b565'
sage: rgf._GF_to_hex(key_schedule[6])
'5c5d51c4121f018d0f4f3e408ae9f78c'
```

**expand_key_poly**(*row*, *col*, *round*)

Return a polynomial representing the *row*, *col* th entry of the *round* th round key.

**INPUT:**

- *row* – The row position of the element represented by this polynomial.
- *col* – The column position of the element represented by this polynomial.

**OUTPUT:**

- A polynomial representing the *row*, *col* th entry of the *round* th round key in terms of entries of the input key.

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 4)
sage: rgf.expand_key_poly(1, 2, 0)
k012
sage: rgf.expand_key_poly(1, 2, 1)
(x^2 + 1)*k023^254 + (x^3 + 1)*k023^253 + (x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + 1)*k023^251 + (x^5 + x^2 + 1)*k023^247 + (x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2)*k023^239 + k023^223 + (x^7 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + 1)*k023^191 + (x^7 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1)*k023^127 + k010 + k011 + k012 + (x^6 + x^5 + x)
```

It should be noted that **expand_key_poly** cannot be used with **apply_poly** or **compose**, since **expand_key_poly** is not a **Round_Component_Poly_Constr** object.

```python
sage: rgf.compose(rgf.sub_bytes_poly_constr(), rgf.expand_key_poly)
Traceback (most recent call last):
  ... TypeError: keyword 'g' must be a Round_Component_Poly_Constr or a polynomial over Finite Field in x of size 2^8
sage: state = rgf._hex_to_GF('00000000000000000000000000000000')
sage: rgf.apply_poly(state, rgf.expand_key_poly)
Traceback (most recent call last):
  ... TypeError: key must be a Round_Component_Poly_Constr or a polynomial over Finite Field in x of size 2^8
```

(continues on next page)
...  
TypeError: keyword 'poly_constr' must be a Round_Component_Poly_Constr

key_length()
Return the key length of this instantiation of Rijndael-GF.

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 8)
sage: rgf.key_length()
8

mix_columns(state, algorithm='encrypt')
Return the application of MixColumns to the state matrix state.

INPUT:
• state – The state matrix to apply MixColumns to.
• algorithm – (default: “encrypt”) Whether to perform the encryption version of MixColumns, or its decryption inverse. The encryption flag is “encrypt” and the decryption flag is “decrypt”.

OUTPUT:
• The state matrix over $F_{2^8}$ which is the result of applying MixColumns to state.

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 4)
sage: state = rgf._hex_to_GF('cd54c7283864c0c55d4c727e90c9a465')
sage: result = rgf.mix_columns(state)
sage: result
'
921f748fd96e937d622d7725ba8ba50c'
sage: decryption = rgf.mix_columns(result, algorithm='decrypt')
sage: decryption == state
True

mix_columns_poly_constr()
Return a Round_Component_Poly_Constr object corresponding to MixColumns.

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 4)
sage: mc_pc = rgf.mix_columns_poly_constr()
sage: mc_pc
A polynomial constructor for the function 'Mix Columns' of Rijndael-GF block cipher with block length 4, key length 4, and 10 rounds.
sage: mc_pc(1, 2)
a02 + x*a12 + (x + 1)*a22 + a32
sage: mc_pc(1, 0, algorithm='decrypt')
(x^3 + 1)*a00 + (x^3 + x^2 + x)*a10 + (x^3 + x + 1)*a20 + (x^3 + x^2 + 1)*a30

The returned object’s __call__ method has no additional keywords, unlike sub_bytes_poly_constr() and add_round_key_poly_constr().
number_rounds()

Return the number of rounds used in this instantiation of Rijndael-GF.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(5, 4)
sage: rgf.number_rounds()
11
```

shift_rows(state, algorithm='encrypt')

Return the application of ShiftRows to the state matrix state.

INPUT:

• state – A state matrix over \( \mathbb{F}_{2^8} \) to which ShiftRows is applied to.

• algorithm – (default: “encrypt”) Whether to perform the encryption version of ShiftRows or its decryption inverse. The encryption flag is “encrypt” and the decryption flag is “decrypt”.

OUTPUT:

• A state matrix over \( \mathbb{F}_{2^8} \) which is the application of ShiftRows to state.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 4)
sage: state = rgf._hex_to_GF('adcb0f257e9c63e0bc557e951c15ef01')
sage: result = rgf.shift_rows(state)
sage: rgf._GF_to_hex(result)
'ad9c7e017e55ef25bc150fe01ccb6395'
sage: decryption = rgf.shift_rows(result, algorithm='decrypt')
sage: decryption == state
True
```

shift_rows_poly_constr()

Return a Round_Component_Poly_Constr object corresponding to ShiftRows.

EXAMPLES:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 4)
sage: sr_pc = rgf.shift_rows_poly_constr()
sage: sr_pc(3, 0)
a33
sage: sr_pc(2, 1, algorithm='decrypt')
a23
```

The returned object’s __call__ method has no additional keywords, unlike sub_bytes_poly_constr() and add_round_key_poly_constr.

sub_bytes(state, algorithm='encrypt')

Return the application of SubBytes to the state matrix state.

INPUT:

• state – The state matrix to apply SubBytes to.
• **algorithm** – (default: “encrypt”) Whether to apply the encryption step of SubBytes or its decryption inverse. The encryption flag is “encrypt” and the decryption flag is “decrypt”.

**OUTPUT:**

• The state matrix over $\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$ where SubBytes has been applied to every entry of $\text{state}$.

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
sage: rgf = RijndaelGF(4, 4)
```

```python
code = RijndaelGF('c1d4941f7955f40f4b6f6c0a2d68730ad')
```

```python
result = rgf.sub_bytes(code)
```

```python
result = rgf._GF_to_hex(result)
```

```python
decryption = rgf.sub_bytes(result, algorithm='decrypt')
```

```python
decryption == state
```

```python
True
```

**sub_bytes_poly_constr()**

Return the `Round_Component_Poly_Constr` object corresponding to SubBytes.

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf import RijndaelGF
sage: sb_pc = RijndaelGF(4, 4).sub_bytes_poly_constr()
```

```python
sb_pc(2, 3)
```

```python
(x^2 + 1)*a23^254 +
(x^3 + 1)*a23^253 +
(x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + 1)*a23^251 +
(x^5 + x^2 + 1)*a23^247 +
(x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2)*a23^239 +
a23^223 +
(x^7 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + 1)*a23^191 +
(x^7 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1)*a23^127 +
(x^6 + x^5 + x + 1)
```

The returned object's `__call__` method has an additional keyword of `no_inversion=False`, which causes the returned polynomial to represent only the affine transformation step of SubBytes.

```python
sage: sb_pc(1, 0, no_inversion=True)
```

```python
(x^7 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1)*a10^128 +
(x^7 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + 1)*a10^64 +
a10^32 +
(x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2)*a10^16 +
(x^5 + x^2 + 1)*a10^8 +
(x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + 1)*a10^4 +
(x^3 + 1)*a10^2 +
(x^2 + 1)*a10 +
(x^6 + x^5 + x + 1)
```

We can build a polynomial representing the inverse transformation by setting the keyword
algorithm='decrypt'. However, the order of the affine transformation and the inversion step in Sub-
Bytes means that this polynomial has thousands of terms and is very slow to compute. Hence, if one wishes
to build the decryption polynomial with the intention of evaluating that polynomial for a particular input,
it is strongly recommended to first call sb_pc(i, j, algorithm='decrypt', no_inversion=True)
to build a polynomial representing only the inverse affine transformation, evaluate this polynomial for your
intended input, then finally calculate the inverse of the result.

```
sage: poly = sb_pc(1, 2, algorithm='decrypt', no_inversion=True)
sage: state = rgf._hex_to_GF('39daee38f4f1a82aaf432410c36d45b9')
sage: result = poly(state.list())
sage: rgf._GF_to_hex(result * -1)
'49'
```

When passing the returned object to apply_poly and compose, we can make those methods change the
keyword no_inversion of this object’s __call__ method by passing the dictionary {'no_inversion' : True} to them.

```
sage: result = rgf.apply_poly(state, sb_pc,
.....: poly_constr_attr={'no_inversion' : True})
sage: rgf._GF_to_hex(result)
'961c72894526f746aa85fc920adcc719'
sage: rcpc = rgf.compose(sb_pc, rgf.shift_rows_poly_constr(),
.....: f_attr={'no_inversion' : True})
```

Note that if we set algorithm='decrypt' for apply_poly, it will perform the necessary performance
enhancement described above automatically. The structure of compose, however, unfortunately does not allow this enhancement to be employed.
HARD LATTICE GENERATOR

This module contains lattice related functions relevant in cryptography. Feel free to add more functionality.

AUTHORS:
- Richard Lindner <rlindner@cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de>
- Michael Schneider <mischnei@cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de>

`sage.crypto.lattice.gen_lattice(type='modular', n=4, m=8, q=11, seed=None, quotient=None, dual=False, ntl=False, lattice=False)`

This function generates different types of integral lattice bases of row vectors relevant in cryptography. Randomness can be set either with `seed`, or by using `sage.misc.randstate.set_random_seed()`.

**INPUT:**
- **type** – one of the following strings
  - `'modular'` (default) – A class of lattices for which asymptotic worst-case to average-case connections hold. For more refer to [Aj1996].
  - `'random'` – Special case of modular (n=1). A dense class of lattice used for testing basis reduction algorithms proposed by Goldstein and Mayer [GM2002].
  - `'ideal'` – Special case of modular. Allows for a more compact representation proposed by [LM2006].
  - `'cyclotomic'` – Special case of ideal. Allows for efficient processing proposed by [LM2006].
- **n** – Determinant size, primal: $\det(L) = q^n$, dual: $\det(L) = q^{m-n}$. For ideal lattices this is also the degree of the quotient polynomial.
- **m** – Lattice dimension, $L \subseteq \mathbb{Z}^m$.
- **q** – Coefficient size, $q - \mathbb{Z}^m \subseteq L$.
- **seed** – Randomness seed.
- **quotient** – For the type ideal, this determines the quotient polynomial. Ignored for all other types.
- **dual** – Set this flag if you want a basis for $q - dual(L)$, for example for Regev’s LWE bases [Reg2005].
- **ntl** – Set this flag if you want the lattice basis in NTL readable format.
- **lattice** – Set this flag if you want a `FreeModule_submodule_with_basis_integer` object instead of an integer matrix representing the basis.
OUTPUT:

A unique size-reduced triangular (primal: lower_left, dual: lower_right) basis of row vectors for the lattice in question.

EXAMPLES:

Modular basis:

```python
sage: sage.crypto.gen_lattice(m=10, seed=42)
```

```
[11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
[ 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
[ 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
[ 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0]
[ 2 4 3 5 1 0 0 0 0 0]
[ 1 -5 -4 2 0 1 0 0 0 0]
[-4 3 -1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0]
[-2 -3 -4 -1 0 0 0 1 0 0]
[-5 -5 3 3 0 0 0 1 0 0]
[-4 -3 2 -5 0 0 0 0 1 0]
```

Random basis:

```python
sage: sage.crypto.gen_lattice(type='random', n=1, m=10, q=11^4, seed=42)
```

```
[14641 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
[ 431 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
[-4792 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
[ 1015 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0]
[-3086 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0]
[-5378 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0]
[ 4769 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0]
[-1159 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0]
[ 3082 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0]
[-4580 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1]
```

Ideal bases with quotient x^n-1, m=2*n are NTRU bases:

```python
sage: sage.crypto.gen_lattice(type='ideal', seed=42, quotient=x^4-1)
```

```
[11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
[ 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
[ 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
[ 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0]
[-2 -3 -3 4 1 0 0 0 0 0]
[ 4 -2 -3 -3 0 1 0 0 0 0]
[-3 4 -2 -3 0 0 1 0 0 0]
[-3 -3 4 -2 0 0 0 1 0 0]
```

Ideal bases also work with polynomials:

```python
sage: R.<t> = PolynomialRing(ZZ)
sage: sage.crypto.gen_lattice(type='ideal', seed=1234, quotient=t^4-1)
```

```
[11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
[ 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
[ 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
[ 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0]
```

(continues on next page)
Cyclotomic bases with $n=2^k$ are SWIFFT bases:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  1 & 4 & -3 & 3 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
  3 & 1 & 4 & -3 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
 -3 & 3 & 1 & 4 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
  4 & -3 & 3 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1
\end{bmatrix}
\]

Dual modular bases are related to Regev's famous public-key encryption [Reg2005]:

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
  0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 11 \\
  0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 11 & 0 & 0 \\
  0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 11 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
  0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 11 & 0 & 0 \\
  0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 11 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
  0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 11 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
  0 & 0 & 1 & -5 & -2 & -1 & 1 & -3 & 5 & 0 \\
  0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & -3 & 4 & 1 & 4 & -3 & -2 \\
  0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & -4 & 5 & -3 & 3 & 5 & 3 \\
  1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & -2 & -1 & 4 & 2 & 5 & 4
\end{bmatrix}
\]

Relation of primal and dual bases:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{sage: } & B\_primal = \text{sage.crypto.gen_lattice}(m=10, q=11, seed=42) \\
\text{sage: } & B\_dual = \text{sage.crypto.gen_lattice}(m=10, q=11, seed=42, dual=True) \\
\text{sage: } & B\_dual\_alt = \text{transpose(11*B\_primal.inverse()).change_ring(ZZ)} \\
\text{sage: } & B\_dual\_alt.\text{hermite_form()} == B\_dual.\text{hermite_form()} \\
\end{align*}
\]

True
(RING-)LWE ORACLE GENERATORS

The Learning with Errors problem (LWE) is solving linear systems of equations where the right hand side has been disturbed ‘slightly’ where ‘slightly’ is made precise by a noise distribution - typically a discrete Gaussian distribution. See [Reg09] for details.

The Ring Learning with Errors problem (LWE) is solving a set of univariate polynomial equations - typically in a cyclotomic field - where the right hand side was disturbed 'slightly'. See [LPR2010] for details.

This module implements generators of LWE samples where parameters are chosen following proposals in the cryptographic literature.

EXAMPLES:

We get 30 samples from an LWE oracle parameterised by security parameter $n=20$ and where the modulus and the standard deviation of the noise are chosen as in [Reg09]:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import samples
sage: S = samples(30, 20, 'Regev')
sage: len(S)
30
sage: S[0][0].parent(), S[0][1].parent()
(Vector space of dimension 20 over Ring of integers modulo 401, Ring of integers modulo 401)
```

We may also pass classes to the samples function, which is useful for users implementing their own oracles:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import samples, LindnerPeikert
sage: S = samples(30, 20, LindnerPeikert)
sage: len(S)
30
sage: S[0][0].parent(), S[0][1].parent()
(Vector space of dimension 20 over Ring of integers modulo 2053, Ring of integers modulo 2053)
```

Finally, `samples()` also accepts instances of classes:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import LindnerPeikert
sage: lwe = LindnerPeikert(20)
sage: S = samples(30, 20, lwe)
sage: len(S)
30
sage: S[0][0].parent(), S[0][1].parent()
(Vector space of dimension 20 over Ring of integers modulo 2053, Ring of integers modulo 2053)
```
Cryptography, Release 10.1

Note that Ring-LWE samples are returned as vectors:

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import RingLWE
sage: from sage.stats.distributions.discrete_gaussian_polynomial import DiscreteGaussianDistributionPolynomialSampler
sage: D = DiscreteGaussianDistributionPolynomialSampler(ZZ['x'], euler_phi(16), 5)
sage: ringlwe = RingLWE(16, 257, D, secret_dist='uniform')
sage: p = samples(30, euler_phi(16), ringlwe)[0][0].parent(); p
Vector space of dimension 8 over Ring of integers modulo 257
sage: assert all(c.parent() is p for b in samples(30, euler_phi(16), ringlwe) for c in b)
```

One technical issue when working with these generators is that by default they return vectors and scalars over/in rings modulo some $q$. These are represented as elements in $(0, q - 1)$ by Sage. However, it usually is more natural to think of these entries as integers in $(-q//2, q//2)$. To allow for this, this module provides the option to balance the representation. In this case vectors and scalars over/in the integers are returned:

```python
sage: for s in samples(30, 20, 'Regev', balanced=True):
....:     s1 = list(s[0]) + [s[1]]
....:     assert all(-401//2 <= b <= 401//2 for b in s1)
```

AUTHORS:
- Martin Albrecht
- Robert Fitzpatrick
- Daniel Cabracas
- Florian Göpfert
- Michael Schneider

REFERENCES:
- [Reg09]
- [LP2011]
- [LPR2010]
- [CGW2013]

```python
class sage.crypto.lwe.LWE(n, q, D, secret_dist='uniform', m=None):
    Bases: sageObject

    Learning with Errors (LWE) oracle.

    __init__(n, q, D, secret_dist='uniform', m=None)

    Construct an LWE oracle in dimension $n$ over a ring of order $q$ with noise distribution $D$.

    INPUT:
    - $n$ - dimension (integer $> 0$)
    - $q$ - modulus typically $> n$ (integer $> 0$)
    - $D$ - an error distribution such as an instance of DiscreteGaussianDistributionIntegerSampler or UniformSampler
    - $secret_dist$ - distribution of the secret (default: ‘uniform’); one of
      - “uniform” - secret follows the uniform distribution in $Z/qZ$
```
– “noise” - secret follows the noise distribution
– (lb, ub) - the secret is chosen uniformly from [lb, . . . , ub] including both endpoints

• m - number of allowed samples or None if no such limit exists (default: None)

EXAMPLES:

First, we construct a noise distribution with standard deviation 3.0:

```
sage: from sage.stats.distributions.discrete_gaussian_integer import DiscreteGaussianDistributionIntegerSampler
sage: D = DiscreteGaussianDistributionIntegerSampler(3.0)
```

Next, we construct our oracle:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import LWE
sage: lwe = LWE(n=20, q=next_prime(400), D=D); lwe
LWE(20, 401, Discrete Gaussian sampler over the Integers with sigma = 3.000000 and c = 0.000000, 'uniform', None)
```

and sample 1000 samples:

```
sage: L = []
sage: def add_samples():
....:     global L
....:     L += [lwe() for _ in range(100)]
sage: add_samples()
```

To test the oracle, we use the internal secret to evaluate the samples in the secret:

```
sage: S = lambda : [ZZ(a.dot_product(lwe._LWE__s) - c) for (a,c) in L]
```

However, while Sage represents finite field elements between 0 and q-1 we rely on a balanced representation of those elements here. Hence, we fix the representation and recover the correct standard deviation of the noise:

```
sage: from numpy import std
sage: while abs(std([e if e <= 200 else e-401 for e in S()]) - 3.0) > 0.01:
....:     L = [] # reset L to avoid quadratic behaviour
....:     add_samples()
```

If m is not None the number of available samples is restricted:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import LWE
sage: lwe = LWE(n=20, q=next_prime(400), D=D, m=30)
sage: _ = [lwe() for _ in range(30)]
sage: lwe()
# 31
Traceback (most recent call last):
...
IndexError: Number of available samples exhausted.
```

__call__ ()

EXAMPLES:
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import DiscreteGaussianDistributionIntegerSampler, ...
    ...LWE
sage: LWE(10, 401, DiscreteGaussianDistributionIntegerSampler(3))()[0].parent()
Vector space of dimension 10 over Ring of integers modulo 401
sage: LWE(10, 401, DiscreteGaussianDistributionIntegerSampler(3))()[1].parent()
Ring of integers modulo 401

class sage.crypto.lwe.LindnerPeikert(n, delta=0.01, m=None)
Bases: LWE

LWE oracle with parameters as in [LP2011].
__init__(n, delta=0.01, m=None)

Construct LWE instance parameterised by security parameter n where the modulus q and the stddev of
the noise is chosen as in [LP2011].
INPUT:
• n - security parameter (integer > 0)
• delta - error probability per symbol (default: 0.01)
• m - number of allowed samples or None in which case m=2*n + 128 as in [LP2011] (default: None)

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import LindnerPeikert
sage: LindnerPeikert(n=20)
LWE(20, 2053, Discrete Gaussian sampler over the Integers with sigma = 3.600954...
    and c = 0.000000, 'noise', 168)

class sage.crypto.lwe.Regev(n, secret_dist='uniform', m=None)
Bases: LWE

LWE oracle with parameters as in [Reg09].
__init__(n, secret_dist='uniform', m=None)

Construct LWE instance parameterised by security parameter n where the modulus q and the stddev of
the noise are chosen as in [Reg09].
INPUT:
• n - security parameter (integer > 0)
• secret_dist - distribution of the secret. See documentation of LWE for details (default='uniform')
• m - number of allowed samples or None if no such limit exists (default: None)

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import Regev
sage: Regev(n=20)
LWE(20, 401, Discrete Gaussian sampler over the Integers with sigma = 1.915069...
    and c = 401.000000, 'uniform', None)

class sage.crypto.lwe.RingLWE(N, q, D, poly=None, secret_dist='uniform', m=None)
Bases: SageObject

Ring Learning with Errors oracle.
Construct a Ring-LWE oracle in dimension $n=\phi(N)$ over a ring of order $q$ with noise distribution $D$.

**INPUT:**

- $N$ - index of cyclotomic polynomial (integer > 0, must be power of 2)
- $q$ - modulus typically > $N$ (integer > 0)
- $D$ - an error distribution such as an instance of `DiscreteGaussianDistributionPolynomialSampler` or `UniformSampler`
- poly - a polynomial of degree $\phi(N)$. If None the cyclotomic polynomial used (default: None).
- secret_dist - distribution of the secret. See documentation of `LWE` for details (default='uniform')
- $m$ - number of allowed samples or None if no such limit exists (default: None)

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import RingLWE
sage: from sage.stats.distributions.discrete_gaussian_polynomial import
    DiscreteGaussianDistributionPolynomialSampler
sage: D = DiscreteGaussianDistributionPolynomialSampler(ZZ['x'], n=euler_phi(20), sigma=3.0)
sage: RingLWE(N=20, q=next_prime(800), D=D)
RingLWE(20, 809, Discrete Gaussian sampler for polynomials of degree < 8 with $\sigma=3.000000$ in each component, $x^8 - x^6 + x^4 - x^2 + 1$, 'uniform', None)
```

**class** `sage.crypto.lwe.RingLWEConverter(ringlwe)`

**Bases:** SageObject

Wrapper callable to convert Ring-LWE oracles into LWE oracles by disregarding the additional structure.

**__init__**(ringlwe)

**INPUT:**

- ringlwe - an instance of a `RingLWE`

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import DiscreteGaussianDistributionPolynomialSampler,
    RingLWE, RingLWEConverter
sage: N = 16
sage: n = euler_phi(N)
sage: D = DiscreteGaussianDistributionPolynomialSampler(ZZ['x'], n, 5)
sage: ringlwe = RingLWE(N, 257, D, secret_dist='uniform')
sage: ringlwe[0].parent()
Vector space of dimension 8 over Ring of integers modulo 257
sage: ringlwe[1].parent()
Vector space of dimension 8 over Ring of integers modulo 257
```
sage: lwe = RingLWEConverter(RingLWE(16, 257, D, secret_dist='uniform'))
sage: set_random_seed(1337)
sage: lwe()
((32, 216, 3, 125, 58, 197, 171, 43), ...)

__call__()

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import DiscreteGaussianDistributionPolynomialSampler, RingLWE, RingLWEConverter
sage: D = DiscreteGaussianDistributionPolynomialSampler(ZZ['x'], euler_phi(16), 5)
sage: lwe = RingLWEConverter(RingLWE(16, 257, D, secret_dist='uniform'))
sage: set_random_seed(1337)
sage: lwe()
((32, 216, 3, 125, 58, 197, 171, 43), ...)

class sage.crypto.lwe.RingLindnerPeikert(N, delta=0.01, m=None)

Bases: RingLWE

Ring-LWE oracle with parameters as in [LP2011].

__init__ (N, delta=0.01, m=None)

Construct a Ring-LWE oracle in dimension \( n = \phi(N) \) where the modulus \( q \) and the stddev of the noise is chosen as in [LP2011].

INPUT:

- \( N \) - index of cyclotomic polynomial (integer > 0, must be power of 2)
- \( \delta \) - error probability per symbol (default: 0.01)
- \( m \) - number of allowed samples or \( \text{None} \) in which case \( 3*n \) is used (default: \( \text{None} \))

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import RingLindnerPeikert
sage: RingLindnerPeikert(N=16)
RingLWE(16, 1031, Discrete Gaussian sampler for polynomials of degree < 8 with \( \sigma = 2.803372 \) in each component, \( x^8 + 1 \), 'noise', 24)

class sage.crypto.lwe.UniformNoiseLWE(n, instance='key', m=None)

Bases: LWE

LWE oracle with uniform secret with parameters as in [CGW2013].

__init__ (n, instance='key', m=None)

Construct LWE instance parameterised by security parameter \( n \) where all other parameters are chosen as in [CGW2013].

INPUT:

- \( n \) - security parameter (integer >= 89)
- \( \text{instance} \) - one of
  - “key” - the LWE-instance that hides the secret key is generated
  - “encrypt” - the LWE-instance that hides the message is generated (default: key)
• \( m \) - number of allowed samples or \texttt{None} in which case \( m \) is chosen as in [CGW2013]. (default: \texttt{None})

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import UniformNoiseLWE
sage: UniformNoiseLWE(89)
LWE(89, 64311834871, UniformSampler(0, 6577), 'noise', 131)

sage: UniformNoiseLWE(89, instance='encrypt')
LWE(131, 64311834871, UniformSampler(0, 11109), 'noise', 181)
```

class \texttt{sage.crypto.lwe.UniformPolynomialSampler}(\( P, n, \text{lower\_bound}, \text{upper\_bound} \))

Bases: \texttt{SageObject}

Uniform sampler for polynomials.

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import UniformPolynomialSampler
sage: UniformPolynomialSampler(ZZ['x'], 8, -2, 2)().parent()
Univariate Polynomial Ring in x over Integer Ring
```

\texttt{__init__}(\( P, n, \text{lower\_bound}, \text{upper\_bound} \))

Construct a sampler for univariate polynomials of degree \( n-1 \) where coefficients are drawn uniformly at random between \texttt{lower\_bound} and \texttt{upper\_bound} (both endpoints inclusive).

**INPUT:**

- \( P \) - a univariate polynomial ring over the Integers
- \( n \) - number of coefficients to be sampled
- \texttt{lower\_bound} - integer
- \texttt{upper\_bound} - integer

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import UniformPolynomialSampler
sage: UniformPolynomialSampler(ZZ['x'], 10, -10, 10)
```

\texttt{__call__}()

Return a new sample.

**EXAMPLES:**

```python
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import UniformPolynomialSampler
sage: sampler = UniformPolynomialSampler(ZZ['x'], 8, -12, 12)
sage: sampler().parent()
Univariate Polynomial Ring in x over Integer Ring
```

class \texttt{sage.crypto.lwe.UniformSampler}(\texttt{lower\_bound}, \texttt{upper\_bound})

Bases: \texttt{SageObject}

Uniform sampling in a range of integers.

**EXAMPLES:**
Cryptography, Release 10.1

```
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import UniformSampler
sage: sampler = UniformSampler(-2, 2); sampler
UniformSampler(-2, 2)
sage: sampler() in range(-2, 3)
True
```

`__init__(lower_bound, upper_bound)`

Construct a uniform sampler with bounds lower_bound and upper_bound (both endpoints inclusive).

INPUT:

• lower_bound - integer
• upper_bound - integer

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import UniformSampler
sage: UniformSampler(-2, 2)
```

`__call__()`

Return a new sample.

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import UniformSampler
sage: sampler = UniformSampler(-12, 12)
sage: sampler() in range(-12, 13)
True
```

`sage.crypto.lwe.balance_sample(s, q=None)`

Given \((a,c) = s\) return a tuple \((a',c')\) where \(a'\) is an integer vector with entries between \(-q/2\) and \(q/2\) and 
\(c\) is also within these bounds.

If \(q\) is given \((a,c) = s\) may live in the integers. If \(q\) is not given, then \((a,c)\) are assumed to live in \(\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}\).

INPUT:

• s - sample of the form \((a,c)\) where \(a\) is a vector and \(c\) is a scalar
• q - modulus (default: None)

EXAMPLES:

```
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import balance_sample, samples, Regev
sage: for s in samples(10, 5, Regev):
    ....:     b = balance_sample(s)
    ....:     assert all(-29//2 <= c <= 29//2 for c in b[0])
    ....:     assert -29//2 <= b[1] <= 29//2
    ....:     assert all(s[0][j] == b[0][j] % 29 for j in range(5))
    ....:     assert s[1] == b[1] % 29
```

```
sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import balance_sample,
˓→DiscreteGaussianDistributionPolynomialSampler, RingLWE, samples
sage: D = DiscreteGaussianDistributionPolynomialSampler(ZZ['x'], 8, 5)
```

(continues on next page)
sage: rlwe = RingLWE(20, 257, D)
sage: for s in samples(10, 8, rlwe):
    ....:     b = balance_sample(s)
    ....:     assert all(-257//2 <= c <= 257//2 for bi in b for c in bi)
    ....:     assert all(s[i][j] == b[i][j] % 257 for i in range(2) for j in range(8))

Note: This function is useful to convert between Sage’s standard representation of elements in $\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$ as integers between 0 and q-1 and the usual representation of such elements in lattice cryptography as integers between $-q/2$ and $q/2$.

sage.crypto.lwe.samples(m, n, lwe, seed=None, balanced=False, **kwds)

Return m LWE samples.

INPUT:

- m - the number of samples (integer > 0)
- n - the security parameter (integer > 0)
- lwe - either
  - a subclass of LWE such as Regev or LindnerPeikert
  - an instance of LWE or any subclass
  - the name of any such class (e.g., “Regev”, “LindnerPeikert”)
- seed - seed to be used for generation or None if no specific seed shall be set (default: None)
- balanced - use function balance_sample() to return balanced representations of finite field elements (default: False)
- **kwds - passed through to LWE constructor

EXAMPLES:

sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import samples, Regev
sage: samples(2, 20, Regev, seed=1337)
[[(199, 388, 337, 53, 200, 284, 336, 215, 75, 14, 274, 234, 97, 255, 246, 153, 268,
  → 218, 396, 351), 15),
  ((365, 227, 333, 165, 76, 328, 288, 206, 286, 42, 175, 155, 190, 275, 114, 280, 45,
  → 218, 304, 386), 143)]

sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import samples, Regev
sage: samples(2, 20, Regev, balanced=True, seed=1337)
[[(199, -13, -64, 53, 200, -117, -65, -186, 75, 14, -127, -167, 97, -146, -155, 153,
  → -133, -183, -5, -50), 15),
  ((-36, -174, -68, 165, 76, -73, -113, -195, -115, 42, 175, 155, 190, -126, 114, -
  → 121, 45, -183, -97, -15), 143)]

sage: from sage.crypto.lwe import samples
sage: samples(2, 20, 'LindnerPeikert')
[[(506, 1205, 398, 0, 337, 106, 836, 75, 1242, 642, 840, 262, 1823, 1798, 1831,
  → 1658, 1084, 915, 1994, 163), 1447),
  ((463, 250, 1226, 1906, 330, 933, 1014, 1061, 1322, 2035, 1849, 285, 1993, 1975,
  → 864, 1341, 41, 1955, 1818, 1357), 312)]
• Index
• Module Index
• Search Page
PYTHON MODULE INDEX

C
sage.crypto.block_cipher.des, 75
sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes, 55
sage.crypto.block_cipher.present, 83
sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes, 45
sage.crypto.boolean_function, 119
sage.crypto.cipher, 5
sage.crypto.classical, 7
sage.crypto.classical_cipher, 43
sage.crypto.cryptosystem, 1
sage.crypto.lattice, 211
sage.crypto.lfsr, 109
sage.crypto.lwe, 215
sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator, 157
sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf, 191
sage.crypto.mq.sr, 161
sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser, 93
sage.crypto.sbox, 131
sage.crypto.sboxes, 149
sage.crypto.stream, 101
sage.crypto.stream_cipher, 105
sage.crypto.util, 113
## Symbols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>call</strong>() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.des.DES method)</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>call</strong>() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.des.DES_KS method)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>call</strong>() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.present.PRESENT method)</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>call</strong>() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.present.PRESENT_KS method)</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>call</strong>() (sage.crypto.lwe.LWE method)</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>call</strong>() (sage.crypto.lwe.RingLWE method)</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>call</strong>() (sage.crypto.lwe.RingLWEConverter method)</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>call</strong>() (sage.crypto.lwe.UniformPolynomialSampler method)</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>call</strong>() (sage.crypto.lwe.UniformSampler method)</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>init</strong>() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.des.DES method)</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>init</strong>() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.des.DES_KS method)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>init</strong>() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.present.PRESENT method)</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>init</strong>() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.present.PRESENT_KS method)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>init</strong>() (sage.crypto.lwe.LWE method)</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>init</strong>() (sage.crypto.lwe.LindnerPeikert method)</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>init</strong>() (sage.crypto.lwe.Regev method)</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>init</strong>() (sage.crypto.lwe.RingLWE method)</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>init</strong>() (sage.crypto.lwe.RingLWEConverter method)</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>init</strong>() (sage.crypto.lwe.RingLindnerPeikert method)</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>init</strong>() (sage.crypto.lwe.UniformNoiseLWE method)</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>init</strong>() (sage.crypto.lwe.UniformPolynomialSampler method)</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>init</strong>() (sage.crypto.lwe.UniformSampler method)</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>absolut_indicator() (sage.crypto.boolean_function.BooleanFunction method)</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absolute_autocorrelation() (sage.crypto.boolean_function.BooleanFunction method)</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>absolute_walsh_spectrum() (sage.crypto.boolean_function.BooleanFunction method)</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>add_key() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.minaes.MiniAES method)</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>add_key() (sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf.RijndaelGF method)</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>add_round_key() (sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf.RijndaelGF method)</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>add_round_key() (sage.crypto.mq.sr.SR_generic method)</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>add_round_key_poly_constr() (sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf.RijndaelGF method)</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AffineCipher (class in sage.crypto.classical_cipher)</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AffineCryptosystem (class in sage.crypto.classical)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>algebraic_degree() (sage.crypto.boolean_function.BooleanFunction method)</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>algebraic_immunity() (sage.crypto.boolean_function.BooleanFunction method)</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>algebraic_normal_form() (sage.crypto.boolean_function.BooleanFunction method)</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AllowZeroInversionsContext (class in sage.crypto.mq.sr)</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alphabet_size() (sage.crypto.cryptosystem.SymmetricKeyCryptosystem method)</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>annihilator() (sage.crypto.boolean_function.BooleanFunction method)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>antiphi() (sage.crypto.mq.sr.SR_gf2 method)</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>antiphi() (sage.crypto.mq.sr.SR_gf2n method)</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>apply_poly() (sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf.RijndaelGF method)</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cryptography, Release 10.1

[Page contents]

- ascii_integer() (in module sage.crypto.util), 113
- ascii_to_bin() (in module sage.crypto.util), 113
- autocorrelation() (sage.crypto.boolean_function.BooleanFunction method), 123
- autocorrelation_table() (sage.crypto.sbox.SBox method), 132

B
- balance_sample() (in module sage.crypto.lwe), 222
- base_ring() (sage.crypto.mq.SR_generic method), 168
- bin_to_ascii() (in module sage.crypto.util), 114
- binary_to_GF() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes.MiniAES method), 61
- binary_to_integer() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes.MiniAES method), 62
- block_length() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes.MinAES method), 46
- block_length() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes.SimplifiedDES method), 18
- block_length() (sage.crypto.classical.HillCryptosystem method), 2
- block_length() (sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf.RijndaelGF method), 202
- block_order() (sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator.MPolynomialSystemGenerator method), 157
- block_order() (sage.crypto.mq.SR_generic method), 168
- blum_blum_shub() (in module sage.crypto.stream), 101
- BlumGoldwasser (class in sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser), 93
- BooleanFunction (class in sage.crypto.boolean_function), 119
- BooleanFunctionIterator (class in sage.crypto.boolean_function), 128
- boomerang_connectivity_table() (sage.crypto.sbox.SBox method), 132
- boomerang_uniformity() (sage.crypto.sbox.SBox method), 133
- bracken_leander() (in module sage.crypto.sboxes), 153
- brute_force() (sage.crypto.classical.AffineCryptosystem method), 9
- brute_force() (sage.crypto.classical.ShiftCryptosystem method), 22

C
- carlet_tang_tang_liao() (in module sage.crypto.sboxes), 153
- Cipher (class in sage.crypto.cipher), 5
- cipher_codomain() (sage.crypto.cryptosystem.Cryptosystem method), 2
- cipher_domain() (sage.crypto.cryptosystem.Cryptosystem method), 2
- ciphertext_space() (sage.crypto.cryptosystem.Cryptosystem method), 3
- cnf() (sage.crypto.sbox.SBox method), 133
- component_function() (sage.crypto.cryptosystem.Cryptosystem method), 5
- compose() (sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf.RijndaelGF method), 202
- connection_polynomial() (sage.crypto.stream_cipher.LFSRCipher method), 105
- convert_to_vector() (in module sage.crypto.block_cipher.des), 81
- convert_to_vector() (in module sage.crypto.block_cipher.present), 91
- correlation_immunity() (sage.crypto.boolean_function.BooleanFunction method), 123
- Cryptosystem (class in sage.crypto.cryptosystem), 1

D
- decimating_cipher() (sage.crypto.stream_cipher.ShrinkingGeneratorCipher method), 202
- deciphering() (sage.crypto.classical.AffineCryptosystem method), 11
- deciphering() (sage.crypto.classical.HillCryptosystem method), 19
- deciphering() (sage.crypto.classical.ShiftCryptosystem method), 25
- deciphering() (sage.crypto.classical.SubstitutionCryptosystem method), 35
- deciphering() (sage.crypto.classical.TranspositionCryptosystem method), 37
- decrypt() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.des.DES method), 78
- decrypt() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes.MinAES method), 63
- decrypt() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.present.PRESENT method), 86
- decrypt() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes.SimplifiedDES method), 46
- decrypt() (sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf.RijndaelGF method), 204
- decrypt() (sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser.BlumGoldwasser method), 94
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function/Method</th>
<th>Class/Module</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>derivative()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.boolean_function.<strong>BooleanFunction</strong></td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>derivative()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.sbox.<strong>SBox</strong></td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES (class in sage.crypto.block_cipher.des)</td>
<td></td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES_KS (class in sage.crypto.block_cipher.des)</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>difference_distribution_table()</td>
<td>(sage.crypto.sbox.<strong>SBox</strong> method)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>differential_branch_number()</td>
<td>(sage.crypto.sbox.<strong>SBox</strong> method)</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>differential_uniformity()</td>
<td>(sage.crypto.sbox.<strong>SBox</strong> method)</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domain()</td>
<td>(sage.crypto.cipher.<strong>Cipher</strong> method)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enciphering()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.classical.<strong>AffineCryptosystem</strong> method</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enciphering()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.classical.<strong>HillCryptosystem</strong> method</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enciphering()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.classical.<strong>ShiftCryptosystem</strong> method</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enciphering()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.classical.<strong>SubstitutionCryptosystem</strong> method</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enciphering()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.classical.<strong>TranspositionCryptosystem</strong> method</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enciphering()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.classical.<strong>VigenereCryptosystem</strong> method</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encoding()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.classical.<strong>AffineCryptosystem</strong> method</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encoding()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.classical.<strong>HillCryptosystem</strong> method</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encoding()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.classical.<strong>ShiftCryptosystem</strong> method</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encoding()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.classical.<strong>SubstitutionCryptosystem</strong> method</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encoding()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.classical.<strong>TranspositionCryptosystem</strong> method</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encoding()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.classical.<strong>VigenereCryptosystem</strong> method</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encoding()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.stream.<strong>LFSRCryptosystem</strong> method</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encoding()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.stream.<strong>ShrinkingGeneratorCryptosystem</strong> method</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encrypt()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.block_cipher.des.<strong>DES</strong> method</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encrypt()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes.<strong>MiniAES</strong> method</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encrypt()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.block_cipher.present.<strong>PRESENT</strong> method</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encrypt()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes.<strong>SimplifiedDES</strong> method</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encrypt()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.mq.<strong>rijndael_gf</strong>.RijndaelGF method</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encrypt()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser.<strong>BlumGoldwasser</strong> method</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expand_key()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.mq.<strong>rijndael_gf</strong>.RijndaelGF method</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expand_key_poly()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.mq.<strong>rijndael_gf</strong>.RijndaelGF method</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>feistel_construction()</td>
<td>(in module sage.crypto.sbox)</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>field_polynomials()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.mq.<strong>SR</strong>.gf2</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>field_polynomials()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.mq.<strong>SR</strong>.gf2n</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fixed_points()</td>
<td>(sage.crypto.sbox.<strong>SBox</strong> method)</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from_bits()</td>
<td>(sage.crypto.sbox.<strong>SBox</strong> method)</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gen_lattice()</td>
<td>(in module sage.crypto.lattice)</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF_to_binary()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes.<strong>MiniAES</strong> method</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GF_to_integer()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes.<strong>MiniAES</strong> method</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gold()</td>
<td>(in module sage.crypto.sboxes)</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>has_blum_prime()</td>
<td>(in module sage.crypto.util)</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>has_linear_structure()</td>
<td>(sage.crypto.boolean_function.<strong>BooleanFunction</strong> method)</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>has_linear_structure()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.sbox.<strong>SBox</strong> method</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hex_str()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.mq.<strong>SR</strong>.generic method</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hex_str_matrix()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.mq.<strong>SR</strong>.generic method</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hex_str_vector()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.mq.<strong>SR</strong>.generic method</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HillCipher</td>
<td>(class in sage.crypto.classical_cipher)</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HillCryptosystem</td>
<td>(class in sage.crypto.classical)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>initial_permutation()</td>
<td>(sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes.<strong>SimplifiedDES</strong> method)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>initial_state()</td>
<td>sage.crypto.stream_cipher.<strong>LFSRCipher</strong> method</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>input_size()</td>
<td>(sage.crypto.sbox.<strong>SBox</strong> method)</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integer_to_binary()</td>
<td>(sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes.<strong>MiniAES</strong> method)</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integer_to_GF()</td>
<td>(sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes.<strong>MiniAES</strong> method)</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interpolation_polynomial()</td>
<td>(sage.crypto.sbox.<strong>SBox</strong> method)</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inverse()</td>
<td>(sage.crypto.classical_cipher.<strong>HillCipher</strong> method)</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
maximal_difference_probability_absolute()
(sage.crypto.sbox.SBox method), 144

maximal_linear_bias_absolute()
(sage.crypto.sbox.SBox method), 144

maximal_linear_bias_relative()
(sage.crypto.sbox.SBox method), 144

min_degree()
(sage.crypto.sbox.SBox method), 144

MiniAES
(class in sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes), 55

misty_construction()
(in module sage.crypto.sbox), 147

mix_column()
(sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes.MiniAES method), 68

mix_columns()
(sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf.RijndaelGF method), 207

mix_columns_matrix()
(sage.crypto.mq.sr.SR_generic method), 172

mix_columns_matrix()
(sage.crypto.mq.sr.SR_gf2 method), 184

mix_columns_matrix()
(sage.crypto.mq.sr.SR_gf2n method), 188

mix_columns_poly_constr()
(sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf.RijndaelGF method), 207

module
sage.crypto.block_cipher.des, 75
sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes, 55
sage.crypto.block_cipher.present, 83
sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes, 45
sage.crypto.boolean_function, 119
sage.crypto.cipher, 5
sage.crypto.classical, 7
sage.crypto.classical_cipher, 43
sage.crypto.cryptosystem, 1
sage.crypto.lattice, 211
sage.crypto.lfsr, 109
sage.crypto.lwe, 215
sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator, 157
sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf, 191
sage.crypto.mq.sh, 161
sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser, 93
sage.crypto.sbox, 131
sage.crypto.sbox, 131
sage.crypto.stream, 101
sage.crypto.stream_cipher, 105
sage.crypto.util, 113
monomial_function()
(in module sage.crypto.sbox), 154

MPolynomialSystemGenerator
(class in sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator), 157

N

new_generator()
(sage.crypto.mq.sr.SR_generic method), 172

nibble_sub()
(sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes.MiniAES method), 69

niho()
(in module sage.crypto.sbox), 154

nonlinearity()
(sage.crypto.boolean_function.BooleanFunction method), 126
	nonlinearity()
(sage.crypto.sbox.SBox method), 145

number_rounds()
(sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf.RijndaelGF method), 208

nvariables()
(sage.crypto.boolean_function.BooleanFunction method), 126

O

output_size()
(sage.crypto.sbox.SBox method), 145

P

period()
(sage.crypto.cryptosystem.Cryptosystem method), 3

permutation10()
(sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes.SimplifiedDES method), 49

permutation4()
(sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes.SimplifiedDES method), 50

permutation8()
(sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes.SimplifiedDES method), 50

permute_substitute()
(sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes.SimplifiedDES method), 51

phi()
(sage.crypto.mq.sh.SR_gf2 method), 184

phi()
(sage.crypto.mq.sh.SR_gf2n method), 188

plaintext_space()
(sage.crypto.cryptosystem.Cryptosystem method), 3

polynomial_system()
(sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator.MPolynomialSystemGenerator method), 157

polynomial_system()
(sage.crypto.mq.sh.SR_generic method), 172

polynomials()
(sage.crypto.sbox.SBox method), 145

PRESENT
(class in sage.crypto.block_cipher.present), 83

PRESENT_KS
(class in sage.crypto.block_cipher.present), 89

private_key()
(sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser.BlumGoldwasser method), 97

public_key()
(sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser.BlumGoldwasser method), 98

PublicKeyCipher
(class in sage.crypto.cipher), 5

PublicKeyCryptosystem
(class in sage.crypto.cryptosystem), 4

R

random_blum_prime()
(in module sage.crypto.util), 117
random_boolean_function() (in module sage.crypto.boolean_function), 128
random_element() (sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator.MPolynomialSystemGenerator method), 157
random_element() (sage.crypto.mq.sr.SR_generic method), 173
random_key() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes.MiniaES method), 71
random_key() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes.SimplifiedDES method), 52
random_key() (sage.crypto.classical.AffineCryptosystem method), 14
random_key() (sage.crypto.classical.HillCryptosystem method), 20
random_key() (sage.crypto.classical.ShiftCryptosystem method), 29
random_key() (sage.crypto.classical.SubstitutionCryptosystem method), 36
random_key() (sage.crypto.classical.TranspositionCryptosystem method), 38
random_key() (sage.crypto.classical.VigenereCryptosystem method), 41
random_key() (sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser.BlumGoldwasser method), 99
random_state_array() (sage.crypto.mq.sr.SR_generic method), 174
random_vector() (sage.crypto.mq.sr.SR_generic method), 174
rank_by_chi_square() (sage.crypto.classical.AffineCryptosystem method), 15
rank_by_chi_square() (sage.crypto.classical.ShiftCryptosystem method), 30
rank_by_squared_differences() (sage.crypto.classical.AffineCryptosystem method), 16
rank_by_squared_differences() (sage.crypto.classical.ShiftCryptosystem method), 32
Regev (class in sage.crypto.lwe), 218
resiliency_order() (sage.crypto.boolean_function.BooleanFunction method), 126
RijndaelGF (class in sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf), 197
RijndaelGF.Round_Component_Poly_Constr (class in sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf), 198
ring() (sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator.MPolynomialSystemGenerator method), 158
ring() (sage.crypto.mq.sr.SR_generic method), 174
ring() (sage.crypto.sbox.SBox method), 146
RingLindnerPeikert (class in sage.crypto.lwe), 220
RingLWE (class in sage.crypto.lwe), 128
RingLWEConverter (class in sage.crypto.lwe), 219
round() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.des.DES method), 79
round() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.present.PRESENT method), 88
round() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes.MiniaES method), 72
round_polynomials() (sage.crypto.mq.sr.SR_generic method), 175
samples() (in module sage.crypto.lwe), 223
SBox (class in sage.crypto.sbox), 131
sbox() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes.MiniaES method), 73
sage.crypto.block_cipher.des module, 75
sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes module, 55
sage.crypto.block_cipher.present module, 55
sage.crypto.block_cipher.sdes module, 45
sage.crypto.boolean_function module, 119
sage.crypto.cipher module, 5
sage.crypto.classical module, 7
sage.crypto.classical_cipher module, 43
sage.crypto.cryptosystem module, 43
sage.crypto.lattice module, 211
sage.crypto.lfsr module, 109
sage.crypto.lwe module, 215
sage.crypto.mq.mpolynomialsystemgenerator module, 157
sage.crypto.mq.rijndael_gf module, 191
sage.crypto.mq.sr module, 161
sage.crypto.public_key.blum_goldwasser module, 93
sage.crypto.sbox module, 131
sage.crypto.sboxes module, 149
sage.crypto.stream module, 101
sage.crypto.stream_cipher module, 105
sage.crypto.util module, 113
samples() (in module sage.crypto.lwe), 223
SBox (class in sage.crypto.sbox), 131
sbox() (sage.crypto.block_cipher.miniaes.MiniaES method), 73
Walsh–Hadamard transform

\texttt{walsh\_hadamard\_transform()}

\texttt{(sage.crypto.boolean\_function.BooleanFunction.method), 128}

\texttt{welch()} \textit{(in module sage.crypto.sboxes)}, 155